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Gettysburg Campaign and
Campaigns of 1864 and 1865
in Virginia

ROBERT M. STRIBLING

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and 1865 in Virginia



—BY—

Robert M. Stribling


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CONTENTS.

Gettysburg Campaign

CHAPTER	PAGE
I.—GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE AND HIS PLAN OF CAMPAIGN	11
II.—GENERAL LEE'S ARMY: ITS ORGANIZA- TION AND STRENGTH	17
III.—OPENING THE CAMPAIGN	22
IV.—INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA	27
STUART'S CAVALRY	29
V.—CHANGE OF PLANS	33
VI.—RECORDS BROUGHT TO BEAR	37
VII.—BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG	42
FIRST DAY	43
SECOND DAY	46
THIRD DAY	54
INFANTRY ASSAULT	64
CONCLUSION	67

Campaigns of 1864 and 1865 in Virginia

I.—STATEMENT OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS FROM THE CLOSE OF THE GETTYS- BURG CAMPAIGN TO MAY 4TH, 1864; ORGANIZATION, STRENGTH AND DIS- TRIBUTION OF ARMIES	70
GENERAL GRANT IN COMMAND.....	72
ORGANIZATION OF ARMIES	75
ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA	77
STRENGTH OF ARMIES—GRANT'S ARMY..	78
STRENGTH OF ARMIES—LEE'S ARMY....	80

then Cont. to 3 Mar 1942

II.—ARMIES PUT IN MOTION	83
GRANT'S ARMY PUT IN MOTION.....	84
LEE'S ARMY PUT IN MOTION	87
III.—BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS—5TH DAY OF MAY—EWELL ON THE OLD STONE PIKE	89
HILL ON THE PLANK ROAD	92
SIXTH DAY OF MAY	97
RETREAT CONTEMPLATED	107
GORDON'S FLANK ATTACK	109
IV.—BATTLE OF SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE—7TH AND 8TH DAYS OF MAY.	112
9TH DAY OF MAY	117
10TH DAY OF MAY	119
11TH DAY OF MAY	122
12TH DAY OF MAY	123
V.—FROM THE 13TH DAY OF MAY TO THE 21ST.—FROM MAY 21ST TO MAY 26TH.—BATTLE OF COLD HARBOR	131
MAY 21ST TO MAY 26TH.....	136
SECOND BATTLE OF COLD HARBOR.....	142
VI.—FROM BATTLE OF COLD HARBOR TO CROSSING THE JAMES RIVER.—GEN- ERAL REVIEW	144
GENERAL GRANT	148
GENERAL GRANT'S REPORT	152
BUTLER'S ARMY	156
VII.—THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN	162
BATTLE OF TREVILLIAN	163
EARLY MOVES AGAINST HUNTER.....	166
BATTLE OF MONOCACY	169
PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S DISPATCH.....	171
HALLECK'S DISPATCH	172
EARLY IN FRONT OF WASHINGTON.....	174
EARLY FALLS BACK TO VIRGINIA.....	176
BATTLE OF KERNSTOWN	181
BURNING OF CHAMBERSBURG	183

VIII.—SHERIDAN IN COMMAND	188
BATTLE OF WINCHESTER	192
BATTLE OF FISHER'S HILL	198
BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK	200
IX.—PERIOD OF ASSAULTS AT PETERSBURG—	
SMITH'S DAY	203
HANCOCK'S DAY	209
BURNSIDE'S DAY	210
MEADE'S DAY	211
X.—THE SIEGE	214
DISASTROUS ENDING OF WILSON'S RAID..	219
FRICTION AMONG COMMANDING OFFICERS	222
GRANT'S EMBARRASMENTS	228
XI.—SIEGE (CONTINUED)—JULY AGGRES-	
SIONS.—HANCOCK ON THE NORTH	
SIDE OF THE JAMES	233
BURNSIDE'S MINE	236
XII.—SIEGE (CONTINUED).—A CRISIS IM-	
PENDING.—AUGUST AGGRESSIONS.—	
HANCOCK'S SECOND ADVANCE	
NORTH OF THE JAMES.—WARREN	
ON THE WELDON RAILROAD.—HAN-	
COCK AT REAMS' STATION.—HAMP-	
TON'S BEEF RAID.	248
HALLECK'S DISPATCH	249
GENERAL GRANT'S REPLY	250
AUGUST AGGRESSIONS.—HANCOCK'S	
SECOND ADVANCE ON THE NORTH	
OF THE JAMES	251
WARREN ON THE WELDON RAILROAD....	253
HANCOCK AT REAMS' STATION.....	255
HAMPTON'S BEEF RAID	260

XIII.—SIEGE (CONTINUED).—GRANT'S SEPTEMBER AGGRESSIONS.—BUTLER ON THE NORTH SIDE OF THE JAMES.—WARREN AND PARKE ON THE SQUIRREL LEVEL ROAD.—ANDERSON ON THE WILLIAMSBURG ROAD	262
BUTLER ON NORTH SIDE OF THE JAMES	264
ANDERSON ON THE WILLIAMSBURG ROAD	273
GRANT RE-ENFORCED	274
XIV.—SIEGE (CONTINUED).—OCTOBER AGGRESSIONS.—BUTLER ON THE NORTH SIDE OF THE JAMES	277
HANCOCK ON THE BOYDTON PLANK ROAD	278
XV.—SIEGE (CONTINUED).—DECEMBER AGGRESSIONS	285
CONDITIONS AT THE CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1864	289
XVI.—CAMPAIGN OF 1865.—CONCLUSION.....	291
GRANT'S FEBRUARY AGGRESSIONS.....	293
CAPTURE OF FORT STEADMAN.....	297
SHERIDAN JOINS GRANT.—BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS	300
FIGHTING AROUND PETERSBURG	303
RETREAT—APPOMATTOX	305
CONCLUSION	307

PREFACE.

“WAR OF THE REBELLION.” “OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES” furnishes the material upon which *the history* of the campaigns of that war must be based.

Whilst in this compilation the official reports and correspondence of the Union armies are very full and complete, it is to be regretted that much of those of the Confederate armies were destroyed or lost. If, in the Records, the Confederate reports and correspondence were as complete as those of the Union army, the historian would find in that compilation the material for history complete, systematically arranged, and accessible to every one. As it is, enough of the records of the Confederate armies have been preserved in it, when carefully compared with the records of the Union armies, to preclude the possibility of going far astray.

In the Records, the campaigns are arranged in separate volumes, and each volume is divided into two parts. Part I contains the official reports, written after the close of the campaign, or of the engagement, and after careful comparisons and consideration of all the *res gestae* available at the time. When the name of the writer is known, a reference to the index of Part I of the volume is all that is necessary to find a copy of the original document. Part II contains the orders, reports, and other correspondence made in preparation for, and during the progress of, the action, and the reports of the commanding officers to their respective War Departments from the battlefield, under the headings, “CORRE-

SPONDENCE, ETC., UNION," and "CORRESPONDENCE, ETC., CONFEDERATE," and are arranged according to their dates. The date, therefore, makes references to *the correspondence* of either army easy to verify or refute. When so voluminous that the books would be inconveniently large, they are bound in three or more books, and the books designated "parts."

Volume 27 contains "THE RECORDS OF GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN.

Volume 36 contains "THE RECORDS OF THE CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA BY GRANT'S ARMY, from May 1st to June 12th.

Volume 37 contains "THE RECORDS OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN," from May 1st to August 12th, 1864.

Volume 43 contains "THE RECORDS OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN," from August 13th to December 31st, 1864.

Volume 40 contains "THE RECORDS OF THE OPERATIONS" in front of Richmond and Petersburg, from June 13th to July 31st, 1864.

Volume 42 contains "THE RECORDS OF THE OPERATIONS" in front of Richmond and Petersburg, from August 1st to December 31st, 1864.

Volume 46 contains "THE RECORDS OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1865 IN VIRGINIA."

On the last day in each month there is the "ABSTRACT OF THE RETURNS" of the armies for that month, in tabulated form, showing the strength of each for that month, and the casualties are generally found in the volume containing the official reports in connection with the report of the commanding officer.

In writing "THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN" and "THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1864 AND 1865 IN VIRGINIA," the narra-

tive is made to follow, in the main, the army that was the aggressor, as best exhibiting the strategy and tactics under which the campaign was conducted. General Lee initiated and was the aggressor in "THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN," and his army is followed in that campaign. Gen. Grant initiated and was the aggressor in the "CAMPAIGNS OF 1864 AND 1865 IN VIRGINIA," and the movements of his army are followed, except when General Lee took from him the initiative by sending General Early, with a part of his army, to the Valley of Virginia, the narrative follows Early's army, as it, at other times, as on the 6th day of May, and in minor affairs, when initiated by Lee, follows the part of the army employed in that affair.

I have attempted to write the history of these campaigns without following the outline of any previously written history, but by making a careful analysis of original documents, grouping the results together and building with them a connected narrative of events that will represent them in their true light, and, as far as possible, without too violently breaking the thread of the narrative, I have used the language of original documents.

I have confined the narrative to those events that have important bearings upon the progress of the campaigns, and have thus omitted mention of many minor affairs in which the quality of heroism was brilliantly displayed, and have carefully avoided notice of extensive writings that have appeared in print in exaltation of, or detracting from, the merits of prominent actors in the campaigns.

I am indebted to General L. L. Lomax, of War

Records Office, for "RECORD" information; to Colonel W. E. Cutshaw, Gray Carroll, and H. C. Stribling, for examination and criticism of my writings, and other assistance; to William L. Royal, for the use of his paper, published in the British Army and Navy Review, for the grouping of positions and movements of the Union corps in the morning of the 2d day at Gettysburg, and, also, for the use of the extract from speech of Edward Everett. R. M. STRIBLING.

Gettysburg Campaign.

CHAPTER I.

Gen'l Robert E. Lee and his Plan of Campaign

General Robert E. Lee was assigned to the command of "the Army of Northern Virginia" on the 1st day of June, 1862, General Joseph E. Johnston, the commander of that army, having received a disabling wound in the "BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES," on May 30th. At that time, General McClellan was steadily progressing in his operations for the investment of the city of Richmond with his army.

General Lee speedily concentrated all available forces, took the initiative, and, by skillful and heavy blows, hurled McClellan's army back to Harrison's Landing, on James River; then quickly assailed Pope's army on the Rapidan, defeated it at Manassas, drove it within the defenses of Washington, and entered Maryland; captured Harper's Ferry with its garrison of 12,000 and 76 pieces of artillery; fought the "Battle of Sharpsburg" against the combined armies of McClellan and Pope, and then retired into the Valley of Virginia to rest and recruit; thus completely changing the aspect of the war in Virginia and startling THE WORLD by the brilliancy of the summer's campaign.

When, on October 26th, the Union army again entered Virginia, he interposed his army between it and the interior of the State, and finally confronted it across the Rappahannock River at Fredericksburg. On December 13th, when a new commander, General Ambrose E.

Burnside, attempted to dislodge him from the strong position which he had taken, he fought the "BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG," and, with comparatively but little loss, drove Burnside's army back across the river, defeated and much demoralized; and recently (from the 2d to the 5th of May) had, at Chancellorsville, again defeated that army under still another commander, General Joseph Hooker, when only about two-thirds of his army was within reach, by the most daring and brilliant manœuvres known in the military art.

Now, June 1st, 1863, finding that General Hooker was not prepared to resume the aggressive since his signal defeat, he mapped out his campaign of aggression, which, if successful, in addition to what was accomplished directly, would act as a powerful diversion in favor of Pemberton's army, then in a most critical condition at Vicksburg.

General Lee at this time was not only the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, but was generally esteemed to be President Davis' military adviser, and, when he planned the Gettysburg campaign, must have considered the grand strategy that embraced all the armies of the Confederate States. The criticisms of General Lee's strategy in making this campaign, that appear to have the greatest force, are that he ignored Pemberton's critical condition at Vicksburg at a time when two-thirds of his army had just defeated Hooker's army, and, apparently, that part of his army that Longstreet had had at Suffolk could have been spared from the defense of Virginia and used in aid of Pemberton, which would have made Johnston's army, in conjunction with Pemberton's, stronger than Grant's army.

General Longstreet wrote in "FROM MANASSAS TO APOMATTOX" that, at this time, he suggested and urged upon General Lee a plan of campaign—i. e., that he, with his command, which had just arrived from before Suffolk, and General Joseph E. Johnston, with his army of about 20,000, at Jackson, Miss., should re-enforce Bragg in Tennessee, overwhelm Rosecrans, and press on into Ohio, and thus compel the abandonment of the siege of Vicksburg. This, he stated, could have been accomplished by utilizing the advantages of interior lines, but that General Lee rejected the plan. An obvious reason for its rejection is found in the fact that, whereas the distance, geographically, over which these columns would have to pass was much less than that of any available re-enforcements to Rosecrans, their water communications and greater railroad facilities, as well as their great superiority in numbers and abundant supplies of subsistence and quartermaster stores, would enable them to re-enforce Rosecrans more rapidly over their circuitous routes than these columns could be moved, on interior lines, over worn-out railroads, and with inadequate rolling stock; so that, in fact, they possessed all the advantages of interior lines. And, again, if the transference of these columns over such long distances could have been conducted with such secrecy that they arrived to Bragg before any re-enforcements to Rosecrans, the latter could have fallen back toward the Ohio River, without losing any position in itself valuable.

In view of these facts, General Lee's plan of campaign appears much more likely to have been efficient in relieving Pemberton than was Longstreet's.

Other writers have held that, at least, Longstreet's Corps should have been sent directly to the Western Department to Pemberton's relief, and then that General Lee, when Hooker advanced, if not strong enough to defeat him in a general engagement, should have adopted the so-called "Fabian Policy;" that is, avoided general engagements by holding his army always prepared to fall back from place to place, and thus to draw the enemy farther and farther from his base. If, in this case, General Lee had fallen back toward Richmond, Hooker, in pursuit, could have established a tidewater base, under cover of his army as it advanced, anywhere he might elect, and finally seated himself upon the same base on James River that Grant afterwards used. Had Lee, in the first place, fallen back toward the mountains and given up Richmond, it would have been impossible either to subsist a large army or furnish it with war "*materiel*," when the whole of tidewater, the chief cities and the principal railroads were under the control of the enemy. The war in Virginia would have, of necessity, degenerated into Guerrilla warfare, such as the Boers waged with such brilliant skill and heroic persistence, but with inevitable defeat.

A movement of his army to Manassas, following the route of the last year, when he marched around Pope's flank, naturally suggested itself, but such a movement would certainly be anticipated by Hooker, and he would have been confronted there by Hooker's army in battle array, and, at best, after a successful battle, no more important result could be expected than the driving back the Union army within the fortifications around Washington.

General Lee elected to keep his army together, and with it to move through the lower valley, cross from it the Potomac, and invade Pennsylvania; thus making a wide detour around, and out of sight of, Hooker's army. Should he succeed in reaching the line of the Susquehannah, with his army intact, he could, in addition to relieving the Confederate States of the subsistence of his army, then occupy it in breaking up the Northern and Western communications of Washington; in capturing, at least, some of the large cities in Pennsylvania and threatening others in New York and New Jersey, and in producing apprehension and dismay among the citizens, and thus cause the commander of the Union army either—(1) To divide his army with the view of protecting important points; or, in pressing for a general engagement, (2) to uncover Baltimore and Washington; or, failing in these, (3) to strike the divisions of the Union army in detail as they approached; or, else, finally, (4) receive its attack upon strong defensive ground.

General Longstreet has written that, as General Lee was entering upon the campaign, he asserted that he, after getting into Pennsylvania, would act purely upon the defensive. General Long has written that General Lee, whilst at Fredericksburg mapping out his campaign, placed his finger upon Gettysburg as the point at which the battle would be joined. In both the 2d and 3d contingencies, one or the other of which was most probable, but both dependent entirely upon the action of the Union forces, Gettysburg would probably be his objective point. In case he succeeded in establishing his army in such a position that the commander of the

Union army would be compelled to attack at all hazard or surrender some vital point, as the Capitol at Washington, then General Longstreet's view would probably have been acted upon.

CHAPTER II.

Lee's Army: Its Organization and Strength.

After the Battle of Chancellorsville, General Lee re-organized his army, dividing it into three, instead of two, corps, as it had been in the campaigns of the previous year. Each corps had assigned to it three divisions of infantry, thus distributing equally among them the nine divisions of infantry in the army; in all, 36 brigades. One battalion of artillery (from 16 to 18 guns) was assigned to each division, and one or more battalions of reserve artillery to each corps at large. There were 15 battalions of artillery and about 250 guns that operated with the infantry.

Lieutenant-General Thomas J. Jackson had died from wounds received in the "BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE." He had, as an independent commander, the year before, conducted the famous Valley campaign, by which he not only paralyzed the Union armies in the Valley, but prevented McDowell, at Fredericksburg, from re-enforcing McClellan before Richmond; and, upon its successful issue, had, with secrecy and dispatch, joined General Lee at Richmond, and was an important factor in the "SEVEN DAYS' BATTLE" that immediately ensued. His command was then absorbed into the "Army of Northern Virginia," of which he commanded one of its two corps, until he was mortally wounded at Chancellorsville. He was almost idolized by his soldiers, and had appeared to them to feed on the food of Gods, and to hurl his army upon the enemy like a thun-

der-bolt from heaven. General Lee had lost in him the leader of his vanguard, that struck such swift and unexpected blows—an irreparable loss—but his high resolve and indomitable courage had been so impressed upon his command that they, ever afterwards, characterized its "*esprit de corps*."

Major-General Richard S. Ewell, promoted to be a Lieutenant-General, was his successor. He had been with Jackson almost from the beginning of the war, and was next in command to him. General Fitz Lee, in his "GENERAL LEE," quoting from General Richard Taylor, wrote of him: "He succeeded to much of Jackson's spirit and the quickness and ardor of his strokes in battle. Virginia never had a truer gentleman, a braver soldier, nor an odder, more lovable fellow." Of nervous temperament and delicate physique, his system had been greatly shocked by the loss of his leg in the "SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS." The stump had been slow in healing and his strength wasted by the continued drain. Consequently, he had just rejoined his command, and had lost much of his pristine activity.

Major-General A. P. Hill was promoted to be a Lieutenant-General, and assigned to the command of the newly formed Third Corps. Of him General Lee, some short time before, had written to President Davis: "Next to Longstreet and Jackson, I consider A. P. Hill the best commander with me; he fights his troops well, and takes good care of them." He was, however, so daring and impetuous it was apprehended that, when in independent command, he might overstep the bounds of prudence.

Lieutenant-General James Longstreet—the Wheel-

horse—familiarily called by his soldiers “Old Pete,” was with him to continue in command of the “First Corps.” Always cool and deliberate, on the march he never obtruded himself upon his soldiers, but granted them the greatest liberty consistent with good order, and was careful that they should not be wearied and worn; and, in battle, marshaled them in accordance with the most advanced principles of the tactical art, and they had learned the value of thus husbanding and artistically applying their force.

The rank and file were seasoned troops; that is to say, they could live on a daily ration of a pound of corn meal and one-third of a pound of bacon; could prepare and cook the ration on a canteen split in half; could sleep without tents or shelter; could march without getting foot-sore; could wade rivers or be drenched in rain without being made sick or seriously disturbed; could drop out of or into ranks without straggling; and, in battle, could load and fire with aim and without agitation and flurry; could keep alignment over broken ground; had imbibed the *esprit de corps*; were resigned to whatever might happen, and ever ready to jump to gayety upon the slightest provocation; above all, had swelled the rebel yell of defiance and of victory, and had tasted the “*gaudia certaminis*.”

I quote from a letter of General Lee’s to General Hood, dated Camp Fredericksburg, May 21st, 1863: “I agree with you in believing that our army would be invincible if it could be properly officered and organized. There never were such men in an army before. They will go anywhere and do anything, if properly led. But there is the difficulty—proper commanders. Where can

they be obtained? But they are improving—constantly improving. Rome was not built in a day, nor can we expect miracles in our favour.”

General Longstreet has written: “I assured General Lee that the First Corps would receive and defend the battle, if he would guard the flanks, leaving his other corps to gather the fruits of success. The First Corps was as solid as a rock—a great rock. It was not to be broken of good position by direct assault, and was steady enough to work and wait for its chosen battle.”

It was estimated that the “army of invasion” would consist of about 65,000 infantry and artillery, and 10,000 cavalry. Besides which, Gen. Lee, at that time, hoped that an auxiliary force could be spared from the coast defenses, though necessarily small in numbers, made as imposing as possible by assigning General Beauregard to command it, and boldly pushing it forward to an attitude, threatening the defenses of Washington. Not only was that not done, but counter-demonstrations of the enemy up the Peninsula caused the authorities in Richmond to hold back around Richmond the brigades of Jenkins and Corse, of Pickett’s division; and the critical conditions at Vicksburg caused them to send to General Johnston, at Jackson, Mississippi, all the troops that could be drawn from the coast defenses, thus materially detracting from the 65,000 infantry and artillery.

The Union forces available to meet General Lee were Hooker’s army at Fredericksburg, about 110,000, 40,000 in and about Washington, and 12,000 in the lower Valley—total 162,000—besides troops that could be drawn from Norfolk and the coast further south.

In view of this great disparity of numbers and equally great disparity in all other military resources, a less bold and skillful commander would have hesitated to undertake so aggressive a campaign.

CHAPTER III.

Opening the Campaign.

General Lee opened the campaign by starting Ewell's Corps for Culpeper on the 2d day of June, 1863. By the 8th, Ewell's and Longstreet's Corps of infantry and artillery, and Stuart's Corps of five brigades of cavalry, and the battalion of horse artillery were assembled around the town of Culpeper, whilst Hill's Corps was left in front of Hooker's army at Fredericksburg to watch its movements and resist any advance by it; or, if it withdrew, to follow after the other corps.

On this day (the 8th), there was a grand review of the cavalry. Many ladies were present, some from as far as Richmond. General J. E. B. Stuart, the commander of the cavalry corps, mounted on a magnificent steed, splendidly caparisoned, and both he and it festooned with flowers—a contribution from the ladies—was in the seventh heaven of boyish delight. General Lee wrote to his wife a few days after: "Stuart was in all his glory." The day closed with a dance, which continued throughout the night, and Stuart, like Wellington on the night before Waterloo, was dancing at a ball, whilst Pleasonton, the commander of the Union cavalry, spent the night in crossing the Rappahannock river, and, at break of day, bore down upon him. A hard-fought cavalry battle ensued, which lasted throughout the day, characterized by but little order, but much close fighting and many acts of individual gallantry. Finally Southern valor prevailed, and Pleasonton was driven

back across the river without having uncovered the infantry.

General Lee at once perceived that Hooker would not assail A. P. Hill, but purposed to make a defensive disposition of his army, and the next day (June 10th) Ewell was started to the Valley. Upon entering the Valley Ewell was met by Jenkins' brigade of cavalry that had been operating in the mountain section of the State. At Cedarville, Warren county, he divided his force. Rodes' division, with the larger part of Jenkins' cavalry, moved upon Berryville, where there was a small Union force, and the other two divisions, (Early's and Johnson's), upon Milroy's main force at Winchester. General Imboden, with a small brigade of mounted men, had been ordered to move from Staunton through the mountains to Hancock, and there to break up the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, damage as much as possible the canal, and to be prepared to co-operate with the army in its advance into Pennsylvania, protecting its left flank and gathering forage.

On the 14th Early's division, after an effective bombardment of their lines to the northwest of the town by Jones' artillery, carried the outer defenses of Winchester in that direction by storm, and Ewell enveloped Milroy's command in it. At the same time, Rodes, with his division, having previously driven into Winchester the brigade of the enemy on outpost duty at Berryville, had moved on and invested Martinsburg. During the night, Milroy abandoned his artillery and stores, and attempted to escape with the troops, mounted on the horses of the Transportation Department, but encountered Johnson's division. Four thousand were captured

and the remainder dispersed; some of the fugitives flying east to Harper's Ferry, and some west toward Cumberland. Colonel B. F. Smith, with a detachment of 1,200 infantry and a six gun battery at Martinsburg, met a like fate, though he was somewhat more successful in evading the guard, and lost, proportionally, fewer men, but five of his six guns.

The 12,000 troops composing "the army of occupation of the Valley" were thus summarily disposed of for the remainder of the campaign. Twenty-eight pieces of artillery, with their equipments, and large amounts of commissary and quartermaster stores, in addition to the prisoners, were the fruits reaped by Ewell, while his losses were only 269 killed and wounded—an excellent beginning, and well worthy of his predecessor, Jackson.

On the morning of the 15th, Jenkins' cavalry was on the Potomac at Williamsport, and A. P. Hill in front of Fredericksburg, on the Rappahannock; Longstreet at Culpeper, with Stuart's cavalry between him and Manassas, in close observation of Hooker's movements; Ewell, with two divisions, at Winchester, and his other (Rodes) at Martinsburg. Lee's army was thus stretched out from Fredericksburg to Williamsport, on the Potomac. President Lincoln wrote to General Hooker on the 14th: "If the head of Lee's army is at Martinsburg and the tail of it on the plank road between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, the animal must be very slim somewhere. Can't you break him somewhere?"

That day A. P. Hill started for Culpeper, Longstreet to skirt the eastern base of the Blue Ridge Mountains to Snicker's and Ashby's Gaps, on the line dividing Fauquier and Loudoun from the Valley; the cavalry,

through Fauquier to Loudoun, on a more eastern line, to keep Hooker's army in observation, hold back his cavalry, and screen from their observation the movements of the infantry, artillery, and army trains. On the 16th, Rodes' division, preceded by Jenkins' cavalry, crossed the Potomac at Williamsport into Maryland, and on the 19th moved to Hagerstown. On this day (19th) Johnson crossed the Potomac to Sharpsburg, and Early moved in the direction of Harper's Ferry by Shepherdstown, on the Virginia side of the river.

General Hooker, having, as soon as it commenced, ascertained that a movement was on foot in the direction of Culpeper, proposed to attack the rear guard of Lee's army (A. P. Hill's corps) and crush it, and, with that in view, laid a bridge across the Rappahannock and sent over Sedgwick's command, but General Halleck, commander-in-chief, supported by President Lincoln, thought it too hazardous, and ordered him to move his army, so as to keep it interposed between Lee and Washington. Following his directions from Washington, he became embarrassed and bewildered. His first point of concentration was Manassas, thinking that it was Lee's objective, but, finding he had marched around it and was concentrating his army in the Valley—Ewell threatening Harper's Ferry, and Longstreet a direct advance through Loudoun upon Washington, or to interpose his corps between Harper's Ferry and Washington—he moved into Loudoun, and disposed his army to meet an attack from either quarter. Now, ignorant of Lee's exact position and purposes, he again attempted to break through the cavalry screen and uncover the infantry, and, on the 21st, the cavalry skirmishing culmi-

nated in a sharp fight at Upperville, on the line between the counties of Fauquier and Loudoun, with a result similar to that of the engagement in Culpeper. By this time all the artillery and army trains and Hill's corps had arrived without having been molested, and the whole army was concentrated upon the Potomac.

CHAPTER IV.

Invasion of Pennsylvania.

General Lee quickly made disposition of his troops for the invasion of Pennsylvania. On the 22d day of June, he ordered General Ewell to move his Corps to the line of the Susquehannah—one of its divisions to cross over the South Mountain and pass through Gettysburg to York, Pa., with the view of indicating a movement upon Baltimore, as he wrote in his first report (p. 307): “In order to retain it (the Union army) on the east side of the mountain, after it should enter Maryland, and thus leave open our communications with the Potomac through Hagerstown and Williamsport, General Ewell had been instructed to send a division eastward from Chambersburg to cross the South Mountain. Early’s division was detached for this service, and proceeded as far east as York.” Ewell, with the other two divisions, was directed to proceed north, up the Valley, toward Harrisburg, which place in the order (p. 914) he was directed to capture, “if within his means,” and Ewell, in his report, wrote: “I was ordered to capture.”

Longstreet and Hill crossed the Potomac on the 24th and 25th, and reached Chambersburg during the afternoon of the 27th. The same day Ewell, with his two divisions, reached Carlisle, and Early, with the other, the neighborhood of York. The infantry was now admirably disposed for an advance upon Harrisburg, and from there upon Philadelphia and New York, with nothing in that direction to oppose it but militia, hastily and

reluctantly gathered. A disposition of troops that was masterful, not only when looking north, but was equally well disposed for prompt concentration, either to the east or west of the South Mountains, to meet an advance of the army of the Potomac, should it press for an engagement from the direction of Frederick, Md. The army had found in the country occupied abundant supplies of subsistence and forage, as well as of horses and other quartermaster stores. Thus General Lee had succeeded in transferring the seat of warfare from Fredericksburg to the heart of Pennsylvania without a single misadventure, and in placing the body of his army in a commanding position, with no army of the enemy in sight. By this move he had marched his army past the Union army, and left the line of his communications with Virginia exposed in such a way as apparently to invite General Hooker to take possession of it.

General Hooker, upon finding on the 25th that General Lee was transferring his whole army across the Potomac, did the same with the Union army, and, after crossing on the 25th and 26th and establishing his headquarters at Frederick City, pressed forward the leading corps into the Catoclin Valley, with the view of resisting an advance eastward by Lee through the mountain passes in Maryland. Finding, on the 27th, that Lee had marched past them in the direction of Chambersburg, he proposed to throw three or more corps through the mountain passes, and seize upon Lee's line of communications.

In an article in *The North American Review* for March, 1891, by General Butterfield, Chief of Staff (p. 280), it is stated: "Hooker, at this time, applied for

15,000 troops from Heintzelman's and Schenck's commands about Baltimore and in Maryland, which request was refused, and the use of French's 10,000 troops at Harper's Ferry to strike the line of Lee's communications with Virginia being likewise refused, Hooker tendered his resignation."

The administration at Washington, already dissatisfied with his conduct of the campaign up to this point, and disapproving his proposed move, made that the occasion of a change of commanders, accepted General Hooker's resignation, and transferred the command of the army to Major-General George G. Meade. On the 28th, the new commander, General Meade, called in, from Knoxville and the Catoctin Valley, Hooker's leading Corps, and concentrated the whole army around Frederick City, with the view of its prompt concentrated advance east of the mountains to find Lee's army and force it to battle.

STUART'S CAVALRY.

Before leaving Virginia with his infantry, artillery, and trains, General Lee, at 5 P. M., June 23d, issued to Stuart his final order (p. 923), directing him to cross the Potomac with three of his brigades and "move on and feel the right of Ewell's troops." If Hooker's army appears to be moving north, to cross the Potomac at Shepherdstown (as General Lee states in his report, though the order as printed in the records may bear a different construction); otherwise, if he thinks he can do it "without hinderance," to pass through, or around, the army and cross the river between it and Washington, and to instruct the officer in command of the two bri-

gades left in Virginia "to watch the flank and rear of the army, and, in the event of the enemy leaving his front, to close upon the rear of the army." June 24th (p. 927) Stuart issued his order to General Robertson, commanding the two brigades left in Virginia, as follows: "Your object will be to watch the enemy; deceive him as to our designs, and harrass his rear if you find him retiring. Be always on the alert; let nothing escape your observation, and miss no opportunity to damage the enemy. After the enemy has moved beyond your reach, leave pickets in the mountain gaps, withdraw to the west side of the Shenandoah, cross the Potomac and follow the army, keeping on its right and rear."

On the night of the 24th, the brigades, commanded by Hampton, Fitz Lee, and W. H. F. Lee, rendezvoused secretly at Salem, now Marshall, and with them Stuart, "in the exercise of the discretion given him," at 1 A. M. of the 25th, commenced his march around Hooker's army. He had expected when he assembled the brigades that he would be able to ride directly from Bull Run Mountain to the Potomac, passing to the west of Centreville and between the corps of the army of the Potomac (his scouts having informed him that it was practicable to do so), and cross the Potomac river during the night of the 25th in advance of any part of Hooker's army. Unfortunately for his plans, when he arrived at Bull Run Mountain, he found all the Union corps in motion in the direction of the river, and he made a wide detour eastward through Prince William and Fairfax counties to avoid collision with them. The Union army, moving north, was thus interposed between

him and General Lee, and he rode as far north as York before he could pass around it and communicate with General Lee. Had he been able to accomplish his purpose as designed, he could have crossed the river and placed his cavalry in front of Hooker as he advanced and kept General Lee informed of his every step. This marks the first misadventure of the campaign, unless it be said that the inaction of Robertson's command was contemporaneous with it. From the 24th, nothing was heard from Stuart by General Lee until during the afternoon of July 1st, when it was ascertained that Stuart had arrived at Carlisle. He was at once ordered to rejoin the army, and did so during the afternoon of the 2d.

General Stuart, in his report, describes the march around the Union army, the capture near Washington of a wagon train, and of several hundred prisoners on the march, several skirmishes, and quite a severe engagement at Hanover; his arrival at York after Early had left, and his then pressing on to Carlisle in search of the army.

Reports from Robertson's two brigades are very meagre. With regard to them, from the 24th to the 29th, the critical period, in which conditions determined that the two armies would come into collision at Gettysburg, is a perfect blank in the records, and we learn from General Lee's report that he heard nothing from them during that time, and that as soon as heard from a scout that the enemy had crossed the Potomac, he sent back "an order for it to rejoin the army without delay." There is, in the Records, no report from Robertson, or from the regimental commanders of his brigade.

General Jones, commanding the other brigade, and his regimental commanders commenced their reports on the 29th, at which time he, with three of his regiments, was at Snickersville, Loudoun county. From his report and those of his officers, we find that the three regiments marched that day to Berryville, Clarke county, and there joined Robertson's brigade; June 30th, both marched to Martinsburg; July 1st, crossed the Potomac at Williamsport, and encamped that night near Greencastle, Pa.; July 2, marched to Chambersburg, and encamped about a mile beyond it; July 3d, marched to Fairfield, and there encountered a regiment of Union cavalry in pursuit of some wagons.

I am thus minute in following the itinerary of these brigades, because, whether due to conditions that could not be foreseen, to misdirected aggressive energy on the part of one column, or apathy on the part of the other, or a combination of them all, the order of the campaign was interrupted, as will appear as we proceed.

CHAPTER V.

Change of Plans.

On the 28th General Lee thought, from not hearing from the cavalry, that General Hooker had not left Virginia, and wrote in his report (p. 307): "Preparations were now made to advance upon Harrisonburg; but, on the night of the 28th, information was received from a scout that the Federal army, having crossed the Potomac, was advancing northward, and that the head of the column had reached the South Mountain. As our communications with the Potomac were menaced, it was resolved to prevent his further progress in that direction by concentrating our army on the east side of the mountain. Accordingly, Longstreet and Hill were directed to proceed from Chambersburg to Gettysburg, to which point General Ewell was also instructed to march from Carlisle."

Again, in his later, and more carefully considered report, after the reports from all the different parts of the army had been received by him, he wrote (p. 316): "The advance upon Harrisburg was arrested by intelligence received on the night of the 28th to the effect that the army of General Hooker had crossed the Potomac and was approaching the South Mountain. In the absence of the cavalry, it was impossible to ascertain his intentions, but to deter him from advancing further west and intercepting our communications with Virginia, it was determined to concentrate the army east of the mountains."

Acting under the impression produced by the scout's

information, that the Union army was moving westward to Hagerstown, on the line of his communications with Virginia, it must have been a great surprise to him, when his leading divisions approached Gettysburg, to find Meade's vanguard there ahead of him. General Lee wrote (p. 317) after the close of the battle of the first day: "It was ascertained from the prisoners that we had been engaged with two corps of the army formerly commanded by General Hooker, and that the remainder of the army, under General Meade, was approaching Gettysburg."

Apparently, it had been General Lee's plan to operate west of the South Mountain, and to keep General Meade east of it, as the sending of Early east of it to threaten Baltimore clearly indicates. In case the Union army crossed over in spite of his manœuvres to distract it, he appears to have relied upon the fact that the concentration of his army at Gettysburg would place it nearer to Baltimore than the Union army, and, unless the move was quickly responded to by it, he could interpose his army between Baltimore and Washington, on the one side, and the Union army on the other; capture Baltimore and invest Washington; open his communications with Virginia east of the mountains, and thus compel the commander of the Union army to make the attack upon him in his selected position at all hazards, or else surrender the Capitol, by which his gains would more than counterbalance his losses in abandoning Harrisburg that was within his grasp. Such a contingency had evidently been contemplated by him as probable or in accordance with his desire, or he would not have adopted and acted upon the information of the scout

without investigation. He was in error in supposing that contingency had arisen—an error fraught with such grave consequences as to call for the most minute investigation. Was it due to the absence of Stuart whilst he was riding around the Union army? to the inefficiency of Robertson's command? or to the sudden change of the commanders of the Union army, and the consequent changes in the plans of operations of that army?

It appears from the fact that, on the morning of the 28th, three of the seven corps of the Union army were in the Catoctin Valley, near Middletown, and one other at Knoxville, with the passes in the mountain well guarded, and the other three corps about Frederick City, arranged either to follow after them, or to cover Washington, taken in connection with Hooker's correspondence with Washington, that it was the purpose of that commander to cross over the mountain, as General Lee supposed he was doing. But, on the 28th, General Hooker was displaced, and General Meade placed in command of the army. The latter immediately drew back the corps from Middletown and Knoxville to Frederick, so that they might be prepared to join in with the general advance of the whole army east of the mountains, which advance was to be put in motion early in the morning of the 29th. The order for this change was dated 11 A. M., June 28th. Of this change of plans General Lee had no intimation from any quarter until the two armies came into collision at Gettysburg.

Had General Lee known that the corps had been withdrawn from Middletown on the 28th, as he should

have known, if his cavalry had had in close observation the changes of position of those corps, and that the army of the Potomac was advancing east of the mountains as rapidly as it was possible for the divisions to move, it is almost certain he would not have ordered the concentration of his army east of the mountains, for he so distinctly stated: "To deter him from advancing further west and intercepting our communications with Virginia, it was determined to concentrate the army east of the mountains."

If the Army of the Potomac had crossed over the mountain at the passes in Maryland, as General Lee supposed it was doing, and approached him from that direction, taking possession of his line of communication and occupying the passes in the mountain as it advanced, a prompt concentration of his whole army east of the mountains, alone, could prevent Meade from soon occupying the mountain passes between him and Gettysburg, and then he would be forced to turn back and make the attack with the strong strategical and tactical positions in the hands of his adversary. Thus, it was not what Meade did, but what General Lee supposed he was doing, that caused him to fall back from before Harrisburg. Just enough information to mislead brought on the battle at Gettysburg. General Lee wrote that when the army crossed the Potomac "it was expected of the cavalry to furnish reliable information of the enemy." The gravamen of that misconception he distinctly lays at the door of the cavalry.

CHAPTER VI.

The Records Brought to Bear.

What General Lee would have done had he known the facts fully, instead of being compelled to act upon the imperfect information of the scout, is a question open to speculation, for General Lee never disclosed what were his plans in contingencies that never arose. But, had he known that Meade's army was advancing—the left wing composed of three corps (First, Eleventh, and Third) through Emmetsburg to Gettysburg, and the other four on lines east of that route, and kept within easy supporting distance; the Twelfth and Second directed upon Gettysburg, the Fifth upon Hanover and the Sixth upon Manchester, to be a general reserve for the whole—it is almost positively certain that he would not have crossed his army over the mountain.

The Union correspondence may throw some light to guide the speculations of those inclined to construct a theory based upon probabilities.

General Couch, commanding the Department of the Susquehannah, with headquarters at Harrisburg, wrote to the Secretary of War, June 29th (p. 407): "I hold from Altoona, along the Juniata and Susquehannah, to Conowingo bridge, above Havre de Grace (a distance of more than 200 miles). My whole force organized is, perhaps, 16,000 men; 5,000 regulars can whip them all to pieces in an open field. I am afraid they will ford the river in its present state." Again, on the same day, to General Meade: "I have only 15,000 men, such as they are, on my whole line, say 9,000 here."

Lorenza Thomas, Adjutant-General, wrote to Secretary E. M. Stanton from Harrisburg, July 1st (p. 478): "This is a difficult place to defend, as the river is fordable both above and below," and proceeds to comment upon the want of artillery, and especially of practiced artillerists, and concludes: "The excitement here is not so great as I found it in Philadelphia, and the people begin to understand that the fate of this city depends entirely upon the results of the operations of the Army of the Potomac."

Simon Cameron, to President Lincoln, from Harrisburg, June 29th (p. 409): "Let me impress upon you the absolute necessity of action by Meade to-morrow, even if attended with great risk, because if Lee gets his army across the Susquehannah, and puts our army on the defensive on that line, you will readily comprehend the disastrous results that must follow to the country."

Secretary E. M. Stanton, to General Dana, in command at Philadelphia, dated War Department, June 29th (p. 408): "It is very important that machinery for manufacturing arms should not fall into the hands of the enemy, and that it should be preserved for the use of the government. In case of imminent danger to the works of Alfred Jenks & Son, of Philadelphia, who are manufacturing arms for the government, you are authorized and directed to impress steam tugs, barges or any description of vessels to remove the gun-manufacturing machines beyond the reach of the enemy."

These extracts indicate what the highest officials of the U. S. Government thought were some of the possibilities before General Lee, and also that Harrisburg was not

prepared to resist an attack by Ewell. Governor Curtin wrote letter after letter to President Lincoln. In some suggesting changes in the terms of enlistment of the militia; in others, the appointment of certain officers to command the active militia, in order to popularize the draft that was odious to the people. General Wool, commanding in the city of New York, wrote (p. 392): "I again repeat that this great emporium, from which both army and navy receive their supplies, as well as pay, ought not to be left without means of defense."

In Pennsylvania, New York City, and New Jersey there was a condition of public sentiment that verged upon revolt. As was further evidenced by the resistance to the draft in the city of New York, a few months later, in spite of Lee's failure in Pennsylvania and the fall of Vicksburg, to suppress which and overawe the malcontents the government deemed it necessary to send there a large army, consisting of about 42 regiments.

It is to be presumed that General Lee knew something of these conditions, for he had always heretofore kept himself well informed in regard to the conditions he had to encounter. He must have known something of the quality of the militia, for Early's cavalry, on its way to York, had come upon a full regiment of this militia at Gettysburg, which had dispersed so quickly that Jenkins could not get in sight of it. York had been abandoned by the military, and the municipal officers met Early several miles from the city to treat for its surrender. Again, at Wrightsville, 1,200 militia had retreated across the Columbia bridge, and set fire to it before Gordon could get his brigade in order to attack. General Early wrote (p. 467): "I regretted very much

the failure to secure the bridge, as, finding the defenseless condition of the country generally and the little obstacle likely to be afforded by the militia to our progress, I had determined, if I could get possession of the Columbia bridge, to cross my division over the Susquehannah."

General Ewell reached Carlisle on the 27th, and wrote (p. 443): "From Carlisle I sent forward my engineer. Captain H. B. Richardson, with Jenkins' cavalry, to reconnoiter the defenses of Harrisburg, and was starting on the 29th for that place, when ordered by the general commanding to join the main body of the army at Cashtown, near Gettysburg." General Rodes wrote (p. 552): "On the arrival at Carlisle, Jenkins' cavalry advanced towards Harrisburg, and had, on the 29th, made a thorough reconnoissance of the place, with the view of our advance upon it, a step which every man in the division contemplated with eagerness, and which was to have been executed on the 30th." Ewell, therefore, must have known that the river was fordable above and below the city, and something of the numbers and quality of the troops defending it.

A. P. Hill, in his report, wrote (p. 606): "On the morning of June 29th, the Third Corps, composed of the divisions of Major-Generals Anderson, Heth, Pender, and five battalions of artillery, under the command of Colonel R. L. Walker, was encamped upon the road from Chambersburg to Gettysburg, near the village of Fayetteville. I was directed to move on this road in the direction of York, and to cross the Susquehannah, menacing the communications of Harrisburg with Philadelphia, and to co-operate with General Ewell,

acting as circumstances might require." When writing this, General Hill evidently had in mind the first order he received—that for the capture of Harrisburg.

With these lights to guide us, it is almost assured that General Lee, with his communications safe, would not have called off Ewell from before Harrisburg, but rather would have pressed him on to its capture, and, after its capture, would probably have crossed the river and occupied the line of the Susquehannah with Washington's northern and western connections, and the cities of Lancaster, Philadelphia, Trenton, and New York lying defenseless in his rear—a condition that appeared so alarming to Senator Cameron.

After having on the 28th ordered a general advance upon Harrisburg and the line of the Susquehannah, that night, General Lee received the information from the scout that led him to suppose that the army of the Potomac was crossing over the mountain to the line of his communications. He hastily changed all his plans, and ordered the concentration of his army at Gettysburg. Such bold strategy as herein above outlined must be based upon the confident belief on the part of General Lee that the fighting strength of his army was decidedly greater than that of General Meade.

CHAPTER VII.

Battle of Gettysburg.

A. P. Hill, who, with his corps, was at Fayetteville on the morning of the 29th, moved Heth's division to Cashtown, eight miles from Gettysburg, on that day, and ordered Pender, with his division, to follow on the 30th. Pettigrew, commanding one of Heth's brigades, obtained permission from Heth to take his brigade to Gettysburg to procure some shoes that he hoped to find there. The permission was granted, probably, because Hill, in the absence of all the cavalry, desired to be assured that the Union troops were not assembling in close proximity to him. Pettigrew found the town was occupied by Buford's cavalry, returned without engaging it, and reported the fact. General Hill promptly notified General Lee and Ewell, who had arrived at Heidlersburg, about nine miles distant; hastened Pender's march, and prepared to move with two divisions upon Gettysburg early the next morning, whilst Anderson was directed to conduct the trains to Cashtown as rapidly as possible.

Upon receiving the notification from Hill, General Ewell changed the direction of Rodes' march from toward Cashtown to Gettysburg by the Middletown road, and directed Early to do the same, marching on the Heidlersburg road; so that, on the morning of July 1st, four divisions, with their battalions of artillery, were concentrating upon Gettysburg.

A promptness of action upon Hill's part, followed by similar promptness by Ewell, highly commendable in

those officers, if it was desired to surprise and crush that advanced detachment when beyond the support of the other columns.

THE FIRST DAYS' BATTLE.

About 10 A. M., Heth, who was in advance, encountered Buford's cavalry about three miles from Gettysburg, deployed Archer's and Davis' brigades in line across the road on which he was moving, and advanced them, accompanied by a battery. After driving back the cavalry "to the wooded hill to the west of the town," these brigades encountered there Wadsworth's division of the First Corps, charged it gallantly, and, meeting with some success, continued to advance, especially Davis' brigade, much beyond the support of the remainder of the division. All of Meredith's brigade of Wadsworth's division was not confronted, and it swept down upon the right flank of Archer's brigade and threw it into disorder. The other divisions of the First Corps, arriving on the field at this time, each of these brigades (the two having become separated in the advance) had its flanks enveloped, lost heavily in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and were driven back. Among the prisoners lost was General Archer himself.

General Hill next deployed the whole of Heth's division in the front line, and Pender's in a second, and after some delay, probably to allow Ewell's divisions to come up in supporting distance, about 1:30 P. M. made a second advance. The whole of the First (Reynolds') Corps was now up. Heth engaged it in gallant style, and was making progress in a closely contested battle when, at 2:30 P. M., Rodes' division arrived on his left

flank, and, about an hour later, Early came up still further to the left. As Rodes was deploying in line at a right angle to Hill's line, with the view of enveloping the First Corps, the Eleventh (Howard's) Corps began to arrive, and deployed in his front. Colonel Carter, having selected for his battalion of artillery a commanding position on an elevated ridge, known as "Oak Hill," that was on Rodes' line, from which his guns were directed upon the right flank of Reynolds' corps, quickly opened a fire that enfiladed the right of the line and threw it into disorder. Rodes then advanced to engage it with his infantry. One of his brigades (O'Neal's), on the left of his line, blundered in the first advance, mistook its direction and, obliquing to the left, isolated itself from the line, and, encountering a part of Howard's corps, was driven back, and uncovered the flank of Iverson's, the next brigade. These two brigades met with heavy losses.

As soon as Early had gotten two of his brigades in line, and Jones' battalion of artillery at effective work, there was a general advance along the whole line, Pender having moved forward to the front line with Heth, and the two Union corps were then routed and driven, pell mell, through the town to the heights beyond.

General Hancock, sent forward by General Meade to represent him on the field, arrived there between 3 and 3:20 P. M., and has written: "There had been an attempt to reform the Eleventh Corps as they passed Cemetery Hill, but it had not been very successful. I presume there may have been 1,000 or 1,200 organized troops of that corps in position on the hill."

General Doubleday wrote, in his report (p. 257):

"The First Corps was reduced to 2,400." General Howard wrote to General Meade (p. 696): "I believe I have handled these two corps to-day, from a little past 11 A. M. until 4 P. M., when General Hancock assisted me in carrying out orders I had issued, as well as any of your corps commanders would have done. The above has mortified me and will disgrace me. Please inform me frankly if you disapprove of my conduct that I may know what to do."

Hill and Ewell took more than 5,000 prisoners, among them two general officers, besides the wounded, and General Reynolds, the commander on the field, had been killed; but, owing to bad management, four of their fine brigades—two of Heth's and two of Rodes'—had suffered, unnecessarily, heavy losses that reflected upon the tactical skill of their commanding officers.

Gen. Lee, who arrived upon the field in time to witness the closing scenes of the battle, appears not to have realized at once the extent of victory, probably due to his concern on account of the losses in the four brigades, but, knowing, as we now do, its extent and the position at that time of the other Union corps, he should have pressed the four divisions upon Cemetery Hill, and dislodged the disorganized troops that were there before any fresh troops arrived. In his report he wrote: "It was ascertained from the prisoners captured in the battle that we had engaged two corps of Meade's army, and that the remainder were rapidly approaching, but how near they were could not be ascertained." So his order to Ewell was: To press the enemy actively, but that he did not wish him to bring on a general engagement before he could get Longstreet up. Unfortunately, Early

had sent one of his brigades (Smith's), that had not been engaged, out on the extreme left and rear to meet a reported advance of the enemy on the York road, and, becoming uneasy about it, had sent another (Gordon's), to its support—thus half of his division was rendered unavailable at a critical time—Rodes' division, that had borne the brunt of the battle with the Eleventh Corps was more or less disorganized, and Ewell concluded to await the arrival of Johnson's fresh division, that was hourly expected, and the opportunity, in consequence, was lost.

The troops engaged in this battle were, on the Union side, the First Corps, 10,089 strong; the Eleventh Corps, 9,893; and Buford's Cavalry, 3,000. Total, 22,982. On the Confederate side, two of Hill's and two of Ewell's divisions—four divisions, variously estimated at from 20,000 to 26,000; by Colonel Walter Taylor, who was in the best position to know, at from 22,000 to 24,000.

That afternoon, about 6 P. M., the Twelfth Corps arrived, and, about sunset, two-thirds of the Third Union Corps commenced to arrive near to the ground occupied by the remnants of the First and Eleventh corps. During the night of July 1st, all of Lee's infantry and artillery moved up into close proximity to the field, except Pickett's division that had been left behind at Chambersburg as a rear guard, and Law's Brigade of Hood's division left on picket at New Guilford.

SECOND DAY'S BATTLE.

On the morning of the second day of July, the following were the positions of the different corps of the Union Army: the remnants of the First and Eleventh corps

strengthened since the afternoon of the day before by the gathering in of the stragglers, were in line upon Cemetery and Culp's hills. The Twelfth Corps, 8,600 strong, had reached the field during the afternoon of the first, one division of it (Williams', about 4,000 strong), was formed in line on the right of the First and Eleventh corps, and two brigades of the other division (Geary's), about 3,000 strong, in line to the left of the First Corps. The Third (Sickles') Corps, 12,600 strong, less two brigades, one from each division, that had been left behind near Emmetsburg as a cover to that flank, reached the neighborhood of the battlefield, also, during the afternoon of the first. The two brigades of Birney's, the leading division, upon arriving, went into camp, and the two brigades of Humphrey's, the other division, halted about a mile distant and also went into camp. These two incomplete divisions had in them two-thirds of the brigades of the corps, or about 8,000 men. The two brigades, that had been left behind, did not arrive upon the field until 9 A. M. The Second (Hancock's) Corps arrived during the early part of the night within four miles of the field, and went into camp on the Baltimore road. It reached the field about 7 A. M. The Fifth (Sykes') Corps encamped during the night on the Hanover road, nine miles off, and began to arrive on the field about 8 A. M.; Crawford's division of this corps did not arrive until noon. All these troops were much worn by their hastened marches. The Sixth (Sedgwick's) Corps did not arrive until 2 P. M., after a march, it was claimed, unexampled for rapidity. The reserve artillery and the large army ammunition trains did not arrive until 10:30 A. M. General Hunt wrote:

“The heat was oppressive, the long marches, especially the night marches, were trying and had caused much straggling.”

We now know that an attack by Lee's army early in the morning of the second, the earlier the better, would have resulted in dislodging Meade's army from its position. At sunrise there would have been on the field to encounter it only 15,000 troops added to the remnants of the First and Eleventh corps. At 8 A. M. Hancock's Corps had joined the 15,000, soon after Sykes' Corps was available. At 10:30 A. M. the reserve artillery became available, and not until 3 P. M. was the Sixth Corps available. It was 10 A. M. before General Meade, with his engineer officer and his chief of artillery, had viewed the ground and commenced disposing the troops and artillery upon it. It was 1 P. M. when Sickles deployed his corps in line upon the Emmetsburg road, and between 3 and 4 P. M., when the Fifth Corps was relieved from its position in rear of the right of the line, as the army reserve, by the arrival of the Sixth Corps. The attack was not commenced until 4 P. M., when Hood opened with his artillery.

By this time, it was made clear by their observations, that General Lee intended to attack the left wing of the army, and the Fifth Corps was massed in Sickles' rear. When Longstreet opened the battle, Meade knew where the force of it would strike, and had massed there all available strength.

Why was it that almost all of a long July day was granted Meade to observe the disposing of Lee's troops, to gather his strength and dispose it where it would be most effective? As was so eloquently said, soon after

the battle was fought, upon the occasion of the dedication of the Soldiers' Cemetery, at Gettysburg, at which there was a large concourse of people, among them President Lincoln, some of his cabinet, many members of Congress, and officers of the army, by the Hon. Edward Everett, of Boston, in his address: "And here I cannot but remark upon the Providential inaction of the Rebel army. Had the conflict been renewed by it at daylight on the second of July, with the First and Eleventh Corps exhausted by battle, the Third and Twelfth wearied by their forced march, and the Second, Fifth and Sixth not yet arrived, nothing but a miracle could have saved the army from a great disaster. Instead of this, the day dawned, the sun rose, the cool hours of the morning passed, and a considerable part of the afternoon wore away without the slightest aggressive movement upon the part of the enemy. Thus time was given for one-half of our forces to arrive and take their places in the lines, while the rest of the army enjoyed a much needed rest."

The explanation of this delay or inaction has called forth much crimination and recrimination on the Confederate side, and all, who were in position to know, have committed to writing their recollections in regard to it. General Lee's staff, without a single exception, concur in this: General Lee was anxious to make the attack as soon as possible, but that, through them, no official order was issued directing it. Hill, Early, and others wrote, in their official reports, that it was their understanding that the attack was to have been made early in the morning. General Pendleton, General Lee's chief of artillery, fixed the time arranged for the attack

at sunrise. Beyond a doubt an attack early in the morning was expected by the army. But General Longstreet has asserted positively that he received no order to attack before 11 A. M. As the order given by General Lee did not go through the official channels, but was verbal and, probably, in this instance, while in closed conference with Longstreet, General Longstreet's assertion must be accepted, and should be without cavil or reflections upon the candor of that distinguished officer. In the main, the assertions and opinions of those who hold that General Longstreet did not measure up to the requirements of the occasion, do not directly conflict with his statement. It is probable, that General Lee was burning with an eager desire that the attack should be made, though, finding his right hand executive officer was full of delays, he withheld a positive direction until 11 A. M., when General Longstreet said he received it.

General Hood, who commanded the flanking division of Longstreet's Corps, in a letter in reply to one written by Longstreet to him, asking him for his recollections, wrote of the occurrences in the morning of the second of July: "I arrived, with my staff, in front of the heights of Gettysburg shortly after day-break on the morning of the 2nd of July. My division soon commenced filing into an open field near me, where the troops were allowed to stack arms and rest until further orders. A short distance in advance of this point and during the early part of the morning, we were both engaged, in company with General Lee and A. P. Hill, in observing the position of the Federals. General Lee—with coat buttoned

to the throat, sabre-belt buckled around the waist, and field-glasses pending at his side—walked up and down in the shade of the trees near us, halting now and then to observe the enemy. He seemed full of hope, yet, at times, buried in deep thought. He was, seemingly, anxious you should attack that morning. He remarked to me: ‘The enemy is here, and if we do not whip him, he will whip us.’ You thought it better to await the arrival of Pickett’s division—at that time still in the rear—in order to make the attack; and you said to me subsequently, while we were seated near the trunk of a tree: ‘The General is a little nervous this morning, he wishes me to attack, I do not wish to do so without Pickett. I never like to go into battle with one boot off.’ Thus passed the forenoon of that eventful day; when in the afternoon—about 3 P. M.—it was decided to no longer await Pickett’s division, but to proceed to our extreme right and attack up the Emmetsburg road.”

About this time, Pickett arrived in rear of the line. and his troops had eaten their mid-day meal before Hood’s guns opened fire. They were not, however, called into action.

About 4 P. M., Longstreet attacked the extreme left of Meade’s army with three divisions—Hood’s on the right, McLaw’s in the centre and Anderson’s, of Hill’s Corps, on the left, assisted, by Alexander, with as much of the artillery of the First Corps as the positions and the nature of the attack would admit of. They made a magnificent attack. Sickles’ Corps, that was in line upon the Emmetsburg road, was promptly reinforced by the Fifth Corps, a part of the Second, two regiments of the Twelfth, and a brigade of the First Corps. His

line was broken and driven back, and left on the field many guns; the Fifth Corps and other reinforcements were closely and destructively engaged; one of Anderson's brigades reached the crest upon which the troops were reformed after Sickles had been driven from his advanced position, and for a time held it, but as night approached, these divisions, exhausted by continuous and close fighting with troops, numerically so superior, were forced to fall back and leave behind them the guns they had overrun. In this battle, Longstreet's troops were well disposed for the attack, and fought with such courage, skill, and persistence that they placed *hors-de-combat* more of the enemy than there were men in their ranks; and, in spite of all their prearrangements, almost accomplished the defeat of that wing of their army; indeed, the bold pushing to the front of their reserve artillery and its skillful handling, alone, held the assault in check at a time when the infantry had been hopelessly broken.

Early in the engagement, after the left wing of the enemy had been broken and driven back, and the troops were being reformed to press the advantage, that splendid division commander, General Hood, received a disabling wound, and, though his place in command of the division was ably filled by Brigadier General Law, still the disabling of Hood occurred at so critical a time that no one could, at once, grasp his purposes and handle the brigades as he would have done, especially as they encountered conditions, from the character of the ground over which they were to move, that were unknown when the attack was commenced.

On the left of Lee's line, Ewell's whole corps should

have made an assault while Longstreet was holding Meade's left in so strong grasp that troops were being drawn from his front; but no advance was made until after it was known that Longstreet's hold had been lost. Then, Johnson assaulted the intrenchments in his front on Culp's Hill, that was the extreme right of Meade's infantry, whilst Stuart, who had arrived on the field during the course of the afternoon, and had pressed back their cavalry on that flank to the line of the infantry, assailed it.

Between the opposing cavalry there were gallant charges attended with heavy losses on both sides, and the day closed with honors easy. Johnson met with some success; a brigade of Meade's troops having been withdrawn from that line to assist in holding back Longstreet, he drove the enemy from a part of the line; his success was not, however, very material and was accomplished with considerable loss. General Early attacked still later, but with only two brigades; they reached and entered the Union works on their right-centre and captured two batteries, but Rodes did not support him, and he was forced back and compelled to leave the captured guns behind him.

This hesitancy and ineffective expenditure of force appear to reflect upon the tactical skill of the army commander; but when, as we have seen and as his writings since clearly show, Longstreet assumed to thwart General Lee's purposes in order to force him to await Pickett's arrival, as Hood wrote, or, as accords with his writings, to adopt a plan of manœuvring suggested by himself, there can be no doubt as to the responsibility for the delays in the attack and the loss of the opportunities of

the morning; and there is equally as little doubt that Longstreet, by his refractoriness, embarrassed the arrangements on the other parts of the field, so that Ewell, laboring under his great physical disabilities, was not able to act with the promptness and co-ordination that the occasion called for.

THIRD DAY'S BATTLE.

General Meade, during the night of the second, reinforced his right, and these troops, reoccupying a part of the intrenched line from which they had been driven the evening before, which Johnson, through oversight, had failed to hold, early in the morning assailed Johnson and, being repulsed, were, in turn, assailed by Johnson. The engagement was well sustained by both sides. Whilst the enemy failed to drive Johnson, he, too, in turn, failed to drive them, and all fighting on that part of the line had ceased some time before the preparations against the centre had been completed.

At the close of the second day, General Lee's confidence in the ability of his army to master that of General Meade's was unshaken. He viewed the ground carefully. The position of Meade's army, with both flanks drawn or driven in, "hammered in," as General Newton expressed it at the time, rendered it impossible to turn either with any hope of disorganizing it by striking it in reverse. He saw that the wings were almost impregnable, but that, Longstreet having gained possession of the crest skirted by the Emmetsburg road, the centre was projected so far forward, he could envelope it in artillery fire and thus render it untenable. Accordingly, he arranged for the battle of the next day to

begin by crushing the centre. To make this clear, it is necessary to go into details. On p. 308, Part 2d of the War Records, General Lee wrote of the second day: "In front of General Longstreet the enemy held a position from which, if he could be driven, it was thought our artillery could be used to advantage in assaulting the more elevated ground beyond and thus enable us to reach the crest of the ridge. * * * After a severe struggle, Longstreet succeeded in getting possession of the desired ground." (p. 320.) "A careful examination was made of the ground secured by Longstreet, and his batteries were placed in positions, which, it was thought, would enable them to silence those of the enemy. Hill's artillery and part of Ewell's were ordered to open simultaneously and the assaulting column to advance under cover of the combined fire of the three. The batteries were directed to be pushed forward as the infantry progressed, protect their flanks and support their attacks closely." Now, as to the fulfillment (p. 321) "His (enemy's) batteries reopened as soon as they (his infantry) appeared. Our own, having nearly exhausted their ammunition in the protracted cannonade that preceded the advance of the infantry, were unable to reply or render the necessary support to the attacking party. Owing to this fact, which was unknown to me when the assault took place, the enemy was enabled to throw a strong force of infantry against our left, already wavering under the concentrated fire of artillery from the ridge in front and from Cemetery Hill on the left."

Were General Lee's expectation reasonable? Was it sound judgment to expect his guns to silence those of the enemy, and for the assaulting columns to succeed in its

advance under cover of the combined artillery fire of the three corps? If so, and the reasonable expectations had been fulfilled, the crest would have been carried almost beyond a doubt, and General Lee, having attained his first objective point, would have been prepared to use his whole army in accordance with his prearranged plans, not disclosed, because the failure to carry the crest prevented their attempted execution.

The assaulting column was directed upon the crest that extends to the southwest, the face of Cemetery Hill. This crest formed a projection about the centre of Meade's line of battle, which fell back thence to the right and left. His line has been compared to a fish hook; the hill, on its curve, to the left of it the shank, and to the right, the hook. General Lee had 150 guns bearing upon it. (*General Pendleton*): "They could use only 80 guns in reply." (*General Hunt*): "Their fire was more or less divergent, whilst ours was convergent. His troops massed, and ours diffused." (*General Pendleton*): "The available infantry on the crest at the time of the cannonade were two small and incomplete divisions (Gibbon's and Hays') of the Second (Hancock's) Corps, and Doubleday's division, composed of two of his brigades that had been in the rout of the first day, and Stannard's brigade, that marched with the Third Corps (Doubleday). The strength of Meade's whole army (infantry and artillery) on that day was 58,000." (Council of War, p. 74.)

Now let us examine into the effects of Lee's initiative of the battle as deduced from the official reports of the Union officers who commanded upon that part of the line.

General Hancock, who commanded the whole line that was assaulted, wrote (p. 372): "About 1 o'clock the enemy opened upon our front with the heaviest artillery fire I have ever known. Their guns were in position at an average distance of about 1,400 yards from my line, and ran in a semi-circle from the town of Gettysburg to a point opposite Roundtop Mountain. The air was filled with their projectiles, there being scarcely an instant but that several of their projectiles were not bursting at once. No irregularity of ground afforded much protection, and the plain in the rear of the line of battle was soon swept of everything movable. The infantry troops maintained their position with great steadiness, covering themselves as best they might by the temporary, but trifling, defenses they had erected and by the accidents of the ground. Scarcely a straggler was seen. The artillery of the corps, imperfectly supplied with ammunition, replied to the enemy most gallantly, maintaining the unequal contest in a manner that reflected the highest honor upon that branch of the service."

General Doubleday wrote (p. 258): "About 2 P. M. a terrific artillery fire opened upon us from more than 100 guns. The firing was accurate and incessant, and lasted for several hours, blowing up caissons from time to time, and sweeping away artillery and staff horses as well as men in every direction. Towards 5 P. M. I received notice from General Hancock and others that the final charge had commenced. Shortly afterward several batteries and divisions from other corps reported to me re-enforcements. I posted them along the crest at the points most threatened by the enemy's advance."

Captain Hazard, commanding the artillery brigade of the Second Corps, and holding the line upon which the attack was made with 28 guns, wrote (p. 480): "Battery 'B,' First New York Artillery, was entirely exhausted; its horses and men killed and disabled. The commanding officer, Captain J. M. Rorty, killed, and First Lieutenant A. S. Sheldon severely wounded. The other batteries were in similar condition. Still they bided the attack."

Major Osborn, commanding the artillery of the First Corps (32 guns), just to the right of the crest that was assaulted, wrote, that the guns of his command, with the exception of two batteries, were enfiladed, and continues, (P. 750), "The artillery of the reserve proved all that could be expected, or even asked, of it. Without their assistance I do not conceive how we could have maintained the position we held."

General Hunt, chief of artillery of the Army of the Potomac, wrote (p. 239): "As soon as the nature of the enemy's attack was made clear, I went to the park of the reserve artillery, and ordered all the batteries to be ready to move at a moment's notice. As 2:30 P. M., finding our ammunition was running low and that it was very unsafe to bring up loads of it, a number of caissons and limbers having been exploded, I directed that the fire should be gradually stopped, which was done, and the enemy soon slackened his also. I then sent orders to such batteries as were necessary to replace the exhausted ones, and all that were disposable were sent to me. About 3 P. M. Fitzhugh's, Parson's, Weirs', and Cowan's batteries (24 guns) reached this point, and were put in position in front of the advancing enemy."

In a summary, he adds: "The destruction of *materiel* was large. The enemy's cannonade, in which he must have exhausted his ammunition, was well sustained, and cost us a great many horses, and the explosion of an unusually large number of caissons and limbers. The whole slope behind the crest, although concealed from the enemy, was swept by his shot, and afforded no protection to carriages and horses." Further, the Union reports show that the line in front of Ewell was taken in reverse by the fire from the right of Longstreet's line; that the front of A. P. Hill was enfiladed, and *vice versa* in regard to Ewell's fire; Meade's headquarters was so riddled with shot that it had to be hastily abandoned. The park of the reserve artillery had to be moved to the rear, out of the range of fire; "several officers and men were wounded and animals killed, both in the batteries and ammunition trains" (*Brig.-Gen. R. O. Tyler*); and it is, further, shown that General Hunt's order to cease firing had been anticipated by most of the batteries. It appears still further, from the reports of General Newton and others, that re-enforcements were hurried to that part of the line, and that sufficient time was granted, after the artillery fire ceased, to place them to meet the infantry assault.

I would comment upon the fact noted by Hancock and others: "Scarcely a straggler was seen;" that the reply made by a man to the compliments of his captain, for staying with his battery under a heavy shelling, "My God! Captain, how can I get away?" might be applicable. Nobody ever moves about at such a time from choice. A common expression was: "Lay low and grab a root."

A careful examination of the Confederate reports discloses the fact that, on their side, only one limber was exploded, and not a single caisson, and that the casualties in killed and wounded were unusually small, when the number of projectiles directed upon them is considered.

After the artillery had exhausted its ammunition, and firing along the line had virtually ended, it is somewhat difficult to ascertain exactly the length of time that elapsed before the infantry lines were put in motion, as reports, not having in view that especial fact, differ. The most conservative approximation is about an hour, during which time of lull of fire there was much riding forth and back of officers between the infantry and artillery lines.

All reports, except Doubleday's, in which all the operations were timed one hour later, concur in fixing the time at which the cannonade commenced at 1 P. M., and the advance of the infantry three hours later. A close, well-sustained fire cannot be kept up for a much longer time than one and a half hours with the twelve-pounder ammunition carried in the chests of a gun, and none of the batteries were replenished from the ordnance trains after the action commenced until after its close.

It will be seen by reference to the extract quoted before from Hunt's report, that it was 2:30 P. M. when he ordered: "That the fire should be gradually stopped, and the enemy gradually slackened his also." It was 3 P. M., when four batteries reported and were put in position, which, in the report he states, it would have been unsafe to attempt during the continuance of the

shelling. It was 4 P. M. when the infantry advanced. Besides this, and a proper inference from other reports, I have talked with many of the artillerists of the corps, and all with whom I have talked had been impressed with the long time that elapsed after the artillery fire virtually ceased, before the infantry advanced.

Does it not appear from the foregoing that General Lee's expectations that his guns would silence those of the enemy were not unreasonable? that, during the continuance of the fire, it was impossible to bring up fresh guns and fresh infantry? that none were brought up until the fire ceased? and that a sufficient time elapsed after the cessation of the artillery fire to bring up fresh guns from the artillery reserve and to mass fresh divisions of infantry in rear of the front line? If this be true, the protracted cannonade to the exhaustion of ammunition, and the long interval of time (so precious to the enemy and so well utilized by him) before the assaulting column was put in motion were an all-sufficient cause for the failure of General Lee's expectations.

If, when his artillery fire was at its most effective and their fire was slowing and wild, the assaulting column had advanced and some guns had joined in with it, as was ordered, the remainder behind it, as it advanced, could have continued their fire when the infantry commenced the descent of the hill, during its passage across the valley, and until the ascent of the crest was commenced, while the guns to the right and left could have kept up uninterrupted fire upon Hancock's line and in rear of it; so that any re-enforcements sent to it would have had to face an artillery fire as destructive as the

fire Pickett and Pettigrew passed through in reaching the hill, and the assaulting column would, doubtless, have been enabled to fulfil General Lee's expectations.

Why this long-protracted cannonade and after-delay? I have quoted from General Lee's report, in which he characterized the duration of the cannonade as "*protracted*." General Pendleton, his chief of artillery, wrote in his report (p. 352): "Proceeding, again, to the right to see about the anticipated advance of artillery, delayed beyond expectation, I found, among other difficulties, many batteries getting out of or low in ammunition, and the all-important question of supply secured my earnest attention. Frequent shells endangering the First Corps' ordnance train in the convenient locality I had assigned it, it had been removed further back. This necessitated longer time for filling the caissons. What was worse, the train itself was limited, rendering requisite demand upon the reserve train further off. With our means, to keep up supply at the rate required for such a conflict, proved practically impossible. There had to be, therefore, some relaxation of the *protracted* fire, and some lack of support of the attempted and defeated advance."

General Pendleton re-enforces General Lee's word, "*protracted*," and justifies the astute General Hunt in his comment: "He must have exhausted his ammunition."

General Longstreet wrote in his report (p. 360): "The guns on the hill at the enemy's left were soon silenced. Those at the Cemetery Hill combatted us, however, very obstinately, many of them were driven off, but fresh ones were brought up to replace them

Colonel Alexander was ordered to a point where he could best observe the effects of the fire, and to give notice of the most opportune moment for our attack. Some time after our batteries opened fire I rode to Major Dearing's batteries. It appeared that the enemy put in fresh batteries about as rapidly as others were driven off. [That must have been after Hunt had ordered the firing to cease, as is apparent from the extracts from his report that have been given.] I concluded, therefore, that we must attack very soon if we hoped to accomplish anything before night. I gave orders for the batteries to refill their ammunition chests and to be prepared to follow the advance of the infantry. Upon riding over to Colonel Alexander's position, I found that he had advised General Pickett that the time had arrived for the attack, and I gave to General Pickett the order to advance to the assault. I found then that our supply of ammunition was so short that the batteries could not reopen. The order for this attack, which I could not favor under better auspices, would have been revoked, had I felt that I had that privilege."

Colonel Alexander, in his report, does not allude to this important duty assigned to him. So much for the Confederate reports bearing upon this subject.

General Longstreet wrote in his book, "FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX": "After having notified Colonel Walton to open with the batteries, and Alexander directed that Pickett should not be called until the artillery practice showed fair opportunity, I rode to a woodland hard by to lie down and study for some new thought that might aid the assaulting column." After describing the cannonade, he wrote: "General Pickett rode to

confer with Alexander, then to the ground upon which I was resting, when he was soon handed a slip of paper. After reading it, he handed it to me. It read: "If you are coming at all, come at once, or I cannot give you proper support, but the enemy's fire has not slackened at all. At least eighteen guns are still firing from the Cemetery itself. (Signed) Alexander." [That must have been penned before Hunt gave his order to cease firing.] Pickett said: "General, shall I advance?" The effort to speak failed me, and I could only indicate by a nod. I mounted and spurred to Alexander's post. He was ordered to stop the march at once and fill up his ammunition chests. But, alas! There was no more ammunition to be had."

That evening the chests of all the batteries were filled from the ordnance train.

I think enough has been written to make it clear that, in the conduct of certain details of the battle essential to success, there were delays, hesitancy, misapprehensions, and mismanagement on the part of General Lee's officers having them in charge, in striking contrast to the promptness and admirable order of the Union commanders.

INFANTRY ASSAULT.

The infantry had been, during the early morning hours, brought up in rear of the artillery line and disposed in the most sheltered positions available for the advance—Pickett's division on the right in two lines, Kemper's and Garnet's brigades in the front, to be followed, at an interval of 200 yards, by Armistead's. Heth's division (under the command of Brigadier-

General Pettigrew, Heth having been wounded the day before), composed of four brigades—Pettigrew's, commanded by Colonel J. K. Marshall; Davis', Brockenbrough's, and Archer's—extended Pickett's front line to the left, and was followed on the line with Admisteard by two brigades—Lane's and Scales', of Pender's division, commanded by General Trimble. Wilcox's brigade of Anderson's division was to march, some little time after, on the extreme right to protect that flank.

The assaulting column numbered about 14,000. As has been written before, after the artillery ammunition had been exhausted and its guns, consequently, powerless, a sufficient time elapsed before the column was put in motion for the Union commanders to bring up fresh guns and fresh divisions of infantry to make, as strong as their capabilities admitted of, the line that had been swept by the artillery fire.

As soon as the order was given, this eager, expectant infantry, that had been chafing under the delays, advanced as if upon parade—the field officers carefully watching that the direction should be maintained and the line kept dressed; and the rank and file responding as promptly as if assured that their destination was to be the triumphant entrance into the lines of the enemy. When they had nearly crossed the open space between the artillery lines of the two armies, under a terrific fire of shells, canister, and musketry from the line in front and to their right and left, and Stannard's brigade, emerging from the wooded environments of the stream that skirted the base of Cemetery Hill, bore down upon its right flank, the right regiments changed front as if upon parade and confronted it whilst the line kept

its direction unbroken. A similar advance, in larger force and much more formidable, was made upon the left flank of Pettigrew's line, necessitating a similar change of front of a much larger part of the troops on that flank. The step of the second line had been quickened so that, when the ascent of the crest commenced, the two lines had become blended into one, and they entered together the first line of the enemy's works. The Rebel yell of victory went up and was echoed back from the artillery line, but it was short-lived. Enveloped, overwhelmed, shot down, and crushed out of existence, nothing was left but the barest skeletons of those proud organizations.

To add to the disaster, after it was known that Pickett's and Pettigrew's command had been destroyed, Wilcox's small brigade was dashed to the front to be riddled by their artillery, and, without the opportunity of firing a gun, was broken and dispersed.

Of Pickett's three brigade commanders, Garnet and Armistead were killed, and Kemper, the other, dangerously wounded. Of the regimental commanders, only two returned, unwounded, to the lines of the army, and so few of the rank and file that the skeletons of the organizations could scarcely be preserved. Of Pettigrew's and Trimble's, the reports are so meagre, because so few were left to write them, that it is impossible to ascertain with accuracy their losses. In the Records, the losses of the whole campaign are aggregated, and these troops had fought on the first day and some of them on the second. Pickett's losses are clearly defined as of that day, because that was the only engagement in which they participated, and his losses are a good index

to the losses of the others, for they moved together and shared the same fate.

CONCLUSION.

Some writers have insisted that more of Lee's infantry should have been sent forward to the support of the assaulting column. There was not infantry enough in Lee's army, unassisted by artillery, if every man in it had been sent, to crush Meade's centre, prepared as it was, at the time of the assault, by positive knowledge of the point of attack and with abundance of time after the artillery had been exhausted to concentrate their forces.

A great blunder had been made. Instead of close co-operation between the two arms of the service, as was ordered, the battle was divided into two separate and distinct parts—the first fought by artillery without any infantry, and the second, by infantry alone, without any artillery.

Such a disastrous failure, it seems, would surely demoralize any army. To this army, it was but a ripple on the stream of its destiny; for, during that evening and night, it was disposed on a defensive line and awaited, during the fourth, an assault. Then, again, from the 6th to the 13th, we see it arrayed in battle order on the Maryland side of the Potomac, that had jumped its bounds and made an impassable barrier, prepared to engage its adversary, and the crippled Union army approaching with cautious steps, too weak to strike at the caged lion, strong in his invincible fortitude. When the waters subsided, it took up its old line on the Rapidan, and was the first to strike an aggressive blow.

It is difficult to ascertain, with accuracy, what was the numerical strength of either army on that battlefield, because, on each side, it must be based upon estimates on account of changes that took place at the initiation of the campaign, and during its progress. General Meade estimated the strength of the army he took into the battle at about 100,000. General Lee did not have with him two brigades (Jenkins' and Corse's, of Pickett's Division) that, in the estimate of his strength given in the beginning of this article, were counted upon, so that he fell short of the estimate of 65,000 infantry and artillery by the several thousands embraced in those brigades.

The losses sustained in this campaign—on the Union side, exclusive of the destruction of Milroy's army at its initiation, and, on the Confederate side, inclusive of the losses incident to the retreat were officially reported at:

Meade's: killed, 3,072; wounded, 14,477; missing, 5,434. Total, 23,003.

Lee's: killed, 2,592; wounded, 12,709; missing, 5,150. Total, 20,451.

This account of the "BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG" ends with the concise and lucid statement of the causes of its loss, that was made by Genl. R. E. Lee, in a letter, written in 1868, to Major William M. McDonald:

"As to the Battle of Gettysburg, I must again refer you to the official accounts. Its loss was occasioned by a combination of circumstances. It was commenced in the absence of correct intelligence. It was continued in the effort to overcome the difficulties by which we were surrounded, and it would have been gained could one

determined and united blow have been delivered by our whole line. As it was, victory trembled in the balance for three days, and the battle resulted in the infliction of as great an amount of injury as was received, and in frustrating the Federal Campaign for the season."

Campaigns of 1864 and 1865 in Virginia.

CHAPTER I.

Statement of Principal Events from the Close of the Gettysburg Campaign to May 4th 1864, Organization, Strength, and Distribution of Armies.

After the close of the Gettysburg campaign, General Lee resumed his old position on the line behind the Rapidan river, and General Meade soon confronted him on that line.

Both armies required time for rest, reorganization and recruiting, but conditions in Tennessee soon brought the rest to an end: A battle impending at Chickamauga caused Longstreet's Corps to be detached from the Army of Northern Virginia, and two divisions of it (Hood's and McLaws') to be sent by rail to reinforce Bragg. They started on the 9th day of September, and arrived at Chickamauga just in time to contribute largely to the success of that battle. After the battle and after Bragg had confronted the Union army in Chattanooga, he sent Longstreet east to capture Knoxville and destroy or drive away the Union forces in East Tennessee. Longstreet failed to accomplish the object, and, as winter approached, moved his troops to the dividing line between Virginia and Tennessee, and wintered there. Pickett's, the other division of the corps, that had suffered so severely at Gettysburg, was

quartered about Petersburg, Va., and General Pickett was placed in command of the Department of Southern Virginia and North Carolina.

About the same time, heavy detachments were made from the Army of the Potomac to quell the draft riots in the City of New York, and, afterwards, the Eleventh and Twelfth corps were consolidated and sent to Rosecrans at Chattanooga. After the consolidation, the new corps was designated as the Twentieth Corps.

General Lee, knowing that Meade's army was weakened by these detachments, put his army in motion, on the 9th day of October, around Meade's right flank with the view of interposing it between Meade and Washington. He was not successful in accomplishing that object, but succeeded in forcing Meade to the line of Bull Run, near Manassas, and then in thoroughly destroying the railroad bridges and track, so that it was late in the season before Meade could resume his old position on the Rapidan. General Lee, soon after his return, dispersed his cavalry with the view of foraging their animals and collecting supplies for the army.

General Meade, having established his army on the line of the Rapidan, and it having become known that General Lee had weakened his army, and that a part of the infantry with him had been drawn back toward the Central Railroad, drew back his army from Lee's front, and crossed the Rapidan beyond the extreme right of Lee's line with the view of turning it and engaging Lee outside of his intrenchments. General Lee met this aggression by extending his line to the south behind Mine Run, a confluent of the Rapidan from the south, and intrenching it, so that when Meade arrived in front of

it, this extension of his line appeared as formidable as the line behind the Rapidan. After some days spent in manœuvring and skirmishing, Meade retired his army during the night, recrossed the river, and his army resumed its old position, without bringing on a general engagement. These two movements have been denominated "campaigns of strategy," and did not result in marked encounters.

Both armies now went into winter quarters, and extensive systems of furloughs for officers and men were adopted by each. General Lee having sent off his cavalry and cantoned all his artillery, not in position on the line, at Fredericks Hall, in Louisa county, and along the line of the Central Railroad, in Albemarle county, for convenience of forage, weakened the two corps of infantry with him by sending Hoke's Brigade and two regiments to North Carolina and, later, by sending Early, with two brigades of his division, to the Shenandoah Valley; and still the Commissary Department of the army left with him was so scantily supplied, that, from day to day, the question arose whether he could maintain his position on that line.

GENERAL GRANT IN COMMAND.

Major General U. S. Grant was promoted to be lieutenant-general on the 9th day of March, 1864, and placed in command of all the armies of the United States. The Administration of the government determined that armies unprecedented in numbers and equipments should be placed in the field, and that General Grant's directions for their organization and distribution should be complied with in the most minute par-

ticulars. General Grant arranged that the best veteran troops should be distributed in the two armies—one in Virginia, over which he, in person, would take command, and the other in Tennessee, over which, by his desire, General Sherman was placed in command; and he arranged, also, that all the armies and detachments of troops in the East were to be used in subordination to the Army of the Potomac, commanded directly by himself, and all the armies and detachments of troops in the West were to be used in subordination to that commanded by General Sherman, in person, and be under his orders. He arranged that the campaign should be opened simultaneously by all the armies—Sherman's objective point to be Atlanta—his, to be Richmond.

In Virginia there were to be two armies auxiliary to his army: one of them, under the command of General B. F. Butler, was to be transported up James river from Fortress Monroe, under the escort of a fleet of gunboats, and landed, with expedition, on the peninsula between the James and Appomattox rivers, and it was to attempt to capture the City of Richmond by surprise; if failing in that, was to break up all its southern communications and closely invest it from James River below, to James River above, the city. The other, composed of three detachments, was to sweep the country west of the Blue Ridge mountains. The detachment under the command of General George Crook, to move from westward on the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad to Lynchburg, destroying that railroad as it progressed, and thence to Staunton; another, under the command of General William W. Averell, composed of mounted men, was to dash through the mountains of West Virginia

to the same point, whilst the third, under the command of General Franz Sigel, was to march up the Valley from Winchester. When all were united at Staunton, the united army was to march in a body down the Central Railroad, making a wreck of it, and close in upon the right flank of Grant's army. When the time came to move, some modifications were made in the plans first arranged for this army.

The Army of the Potomac, re-enforced by Burnside's army and both under the personal command of General Grant, starting from the Rapidan, was to hold Lee's army in view, force it to battle as soon as possible, and "*hammer away*" upon it to its destruction at any cost of men and "*materiel*," under the assurance from the Administration that all requirements would be promptly met.

General Lee, comprehending Grant's plan of campaign, and, with the view of disconcerting it, as well as for the purpose of procuring supplies, directed that a series of movements should be made by the troops in North Carolina and Southern Virginia during the latter part of the winter and early spring for the capture of the coast towns—Newbern, Plymouth, and Washington, in North Carolina. General Grant, in order to give to Butler's army strength sufficient to insure its success, ordered the withdrawal from North Carolina and the coast further south of a force of 10,000 men, that, under the command of General Quincy A. Gillmore and denominated "Tenth Corps," reported to General Butler at Fort Monroe during the month of April. The opportunity was seized upon, and General Hoke, assisted by the new Confederate ram, Albemarle, that moved down

the Roanoke river and drove away the gunboats, destroying one of them, captured Plymouth on April 20th, with its garrison of 2,834 men, all the war material and many valuable stores; and, in consequence, Washington, but feebly garrisoned, was evacuated after it had been pillaged and the greater part of it burned by the garrison. Grant, though seriously disturbed, would not permit his plans for concentration to be frustrated by this blow as they would have been, had he attempted the recapture of the towns. Hoke remained in Plymouth, with his forces, only long enough to remove the prisoners and stores. These, and the encouragement given to the Confederates by having scored the first victory of the campaign, were the only fruits.

Grant's plans were now fully disclosed, and General G. T. Beauregard was ordered to the command of the Department of Southern Virginia and North Carolina, with headquarters at Weldon, N. C., and directed to assemble there all detachments of troops that could be drawn from the coast defenses, with the view of meeting Butler's army.

The 4th day of May was fixed upon by Grant as the day upon which all the armies were to be put in motion.

ORGANIZATION OF ARMIES.

After General Grant took command, "The Army of the Potomac," commanded by Major-General George G. Meade, was reorganized and its infantry consolidated into three corps, corresponding with the number of corps in the Army of Northern Virginia. The Second Corps, commanded by Major-General W. S. Hancock, composed of four divisions: First, Barlow's; Second, Gib-

bon's; Third, Birney's, and Fourth, Mott's; and, with it, Tidball's artillery brigade of ten batteries.

The Fifth Corps, commanded by Maj.-Gen. G. K. Warren, composed of four divisions: First, Griffin's; Second, Robinson's; Third, Crawford's; Fourth, Wadsworth's; and, with it, Wainwright's artillery brigade of nine batteries.

The Sixth Corps, commanded by Maj.-Gen. John Sedgwick, composed of three divisions: First, Wright's; Second, Getty's; Third, Rickett's; and, with it, Tompkins' artillery brigade of nine batteries

The cavalry, to the command of which Major-General Philip H. Sheridan was assigned, was organized into three divisions: First, Torbert's; Second, Gregg's, and Third, Wilson's.

The Reserve Artillery, commanded by Brigadier-General Henry J. Hunt, was composed of fourteen batteries. There were also twelve batteries of horse artillery.

In addition to these, there was organized an engineer brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General H. W. Benham.

General Grant arranged that "The Army of the Potomac" should be accompanied by another army to act in conjunction with it, that would not be under General Meade's command, but would receive its instructions directly from himself. This army was commanded by Major-General Ambrose E. Burnside, and was composed of four divisions of infantry: First, Stevenson's; Second, Potter's; Third, Willcox's, and Fourth, Ferrero's, and, with each of them, two batteries; the reserve artillery, Captain John Edwards commanding, and the provisional brigade of three regiments, Colo-

nel Marshall commanding. In the latter part of May, and just before the Battle of Cold Harbor, this army was transferred to General Meade's command by General Grant's order, and was thereafter known as the "Ninth Corps." During the latter part of April this army was drawn by General Grant from Annapolis, Md., where it had been assembled, and distributed along the railroad from Manassas to the Rappahannock river, and when the 4th day of May was fixed upon as the day upon which all the armies were to be put in motion, its detachments were drawn in close to the Rappahannock River, prepared to march at a moment's notice.

ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA.

The organization of the infantry remained unchanged from what it was in the Gettysburg campaign, divided into three corps. *First, Longstreet's*, composed of only two divisions until May 22d, when the army reached Hanover Junction, and was joined by Pickett's division: First Division, Kershaw's; Second, Fields', and, with it, was Alexander's artillery, composed of fourteen batteries—fifty-four guns, divided into three battalions.

Second Corps, Ewell's, composed of three divisions: First, Early's; Second, Johnson's, and Third, Rodes', and, with it, was Long's artillery, composed of eighteen batteries—seventy-three guns, divided into five battalions.

Third Corps, A. P. Hill's, composed of three divisions: First, Anderson's; Second, Heth's; Third, Wilcox's, and, with it, was Walker's artillery, composed of twenty batteries—sixty guns, divided into five battalions.

The Cavalry Corps, commanded by Major-General J. E. B. Stuart, was reorganized into three divisions: First, Hampton's; Second, Fitz. Lee's; Third, W. H. F. Lee's, and, with it, was one battalion of horse artillery—twenty guns.

STRENGTH OF ARMIES.

GRANT'S ARMY.

Abstract from trimonthly return of the Army of the Potomac, Maj.-Gen. George G. Meade, U. S. Army, commanding, April 30, 1864.

Command	Present for duty		Aggregate present	Pieces of field artillery
	Officers	Men		
Commanding general and staff.....	43	43
Provost guard (Patrick).....	69	1,057	1,513
Engineer Brigade (Benham).....	45	1,917	2,413
Engineer Battalion (Mendell).....	5	309	354
Guards and orderlies (Ingalls).....	2	59	91
Artillery (Hunt).....	141	4,446	5,722	92
Signal Corps (Fisher).....	14	207	233
Second Army Corps (Hancock).....	1,345	27,330	35,474	54
Fifth Army Corps (Warren).....	1,257	24,740	32,341	48
Sixth Army Corps (Sedgwick).....	1,062	22,986	28,449	48
Cavalry Corps* (Sheridan).....	616	15,209	20,838	32
Total	4,609	98,260	127,471	274

Command	Present for duty equipped							
	Infantry		Cavalry		Artillery		Total	
	Officers	Men	Officers	Men	Officers	Men	Officers	Men
Provost guard (Patrick)...	52	737	18	311	70	1,048
Guards and orderlies (Ingalls)	2	59	2	59
Artillery (Hunt).....	59	2,391	64	2,052	123	4,443
Second Army Corps (Hancock).....	1,276	25,405	50	1,602	1,326	27,007
Fifth Army Corps (Warren).....	1,227	22,898	45	1,525	1,272	24,423
Sixth Army Corps (Sedgwick).....	1,003	21,581	2	48	43	1,536	1,048	23,165
Cavalry Corps* (Sheridan).....	585	11,839	24	839	609	12,678
Total.....	3,617	73,012	607	12,257	226	7,554	4,450	92,823

*Serviceable horses, 15,036.

†The monthly return of the army for April, 1864, reports a grand total of 4,737 officers and 99,048 men "present for duty." This difference between the two returns is not explainable. There are no tri-monthly returns on file for the month of May. In transmitting the return for June 30, 1864, General Meade says: "The last tri-monthly report previously rendered was for April 30. * * * In consequence of the movements of the troops between the dates mentioned and the absence of all facilities for the preparation of the stated tri-monthly reports, it was found altogether impracticable to render such reports when due."

Abstract from return of the Ninth Army Corps, commanded by Maj.-Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside, U. S. Army, for April 30, 1864.

Command	Present for duty		Aggregate present	Pieces of field artillery
	Officers	Men		
Commanding general and staff.....	14	14
First Division (Stevenson).....	111	2,559	3,066	12
Second Division (Griffin).....	242	5,508	6,346	12
Third Division (Willcox).....	262	6,110	7,009	12
Fourth Division (Ferro).....	142	2,953	3,423	6
Cavalry.....	69	1,199	1,418
Reserve Artillery (Edwards).....	2	79	87
Total.....	842	18,408	21,363	42

Present for duty. Grand total, 122,119.

Aggregate. Grand total, 148,834.

LEE'S ARMY.

Abstract from field return of the Army of Northern Virginia, Gen. Robert E. Lee, C. S. Army, commanding, April 20, 1864; headquarters, Orange Court House, Va.

Command	Present for duty		Aggregate present
	Officers	Men	
Second Army Corps, Lt. Gen. R. S. Ewell:			
Staff.....	16	16
Early's division a.....	393	4,182	5,578
Johnson's division.....	556	4,894	6,383
Rodes' division b.....	559	6,629	8,733
Total.....	1,524	15,705	20,710
Third Army Corps, Lt. Gen. A. P. Hill:			
Staff.....	16	16
Anderson's division.....	553	6,439	7,910
Heth's division.....	558	6,948	8,502
Wilcox's division.....	569	7,261	8,963
Total.....	1,696	20,648	25,391

a Hoke's brigade detached ; not reported.

b Two regiments detached ; not reported.

These are the last returns before the armies were put in motion. There are no returns from Longstreet's Corps. Longstreet and others, after careful investigation, have fixed upon 10,000 as the extreme limit of the strength of that part of the Corps with him. Adding that number to strength of the Second and Third Corps makes the total infantry of the ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA 49,573 present for duty. Stuart's Cavalry reported at 8,557 for duty, and Artillery as it appears in the Records, makes the the full strength of Lee's army to be 64,344 for duty, 72,913 aggregate.

Strength of the "Army of the James" that advanced upon Richmond by abstract from returns of Maj.-Gen. B. F. Butler's army, April 30

	Effectives	Aggregate
Eighteenth Army Corps (Major General Wm. F. Smith).....	18,151	20,918
Tenth Army Corps (Major-General Gillmore).....	16,305	18,801
Kautz's Cavalry Division.....	3,000	3,000
Cavalry from about Ft. Monroe.....	1,800	1,800
Total.....	39,256	44,519

Beauregard's army that confronted it (when assembled) approximately..... 25,000

Such statements as I can find in regard to the strength of this army are given in the body of the narrative.

Strength of the army that operated in the Valley of Virginia, from Grant's report.

Siegel's, that moved up the Valley.....	7,000
Under Crook and Averell.....	10,000
Total effectives.....	17,000

"By Returns," Breckenridge, commanding the Valley Department, had in the army that encountered it,

	Effectives	Aggregate
Infantry and its Artillery.....	3,824	4,446
Cavalry and its Artillery.....	2,219	2,669
Total.....	6,043	7,115

In addition to the two armies that were to move together, under the personal command of General Grant, it was arranged that there should be assembled in Washington a force that, by May 21st, proved to be 40,000 available, and that it should be held there to re-enforce Grant's army in the field, when called for by him. It was also arranged that five (5) days' rations for 150,000 men, and a corresponding amount of forage for animals should be held aboard of transports ready to move at a moment's notice to any point on the navigable waters Grant might direct.

An army of 150,000 men, with its war "*materiel*" and necessary transportation, was decided to be as large an army as could be moved in sufficient compactness on the roads in that section of Virginia over which it was proposed to manœuvre, and, hence, all in excess of that number were to be held in reserve to supply losses as they occurred.

It might be supposed that the display of such overwhelming forces in his front, and the projected attacks upon his flanks and rear would cause General Lee to seek the protection of some natural barrier or strong fortifications, as it appears from his first dispatch to Washington, General Grant thought he would do. The dispatch was as follows:

"GERMANA FORD, May 4th, 1864.

"The crossing of Rapidan effected. Forty-eight hours now will demonstrate whether the enemy intends giving battle this side of Richmond.

U. S. GRANT, *Lt. General*.

H. W. Halleck, Major-General, Chief of Staff."

CHAPTER II.

Armies Out in Motion.

All the Union armies moved from their respective stations on the 4th day of May. On that day Sigel, with his 7,000 troops, commenced his march up the Valley towards Staunton, where he expected to unite with the force of 10,000 from the direction of Lewisburg, under the command of Generals Crook and Averell, but Breckenridge met him before he reached that point with his division of infantry, the Lexington Cadets and about 800 militia, and, on the 15th, defeated him at New Market and drove him back, in confusion, to Cedar Creek. Crook and Averell, on their way to join him, met with such resistance that they were compelled to retrace their steps. Breckenridge was thus, temporarily, relieved from pressure in the Valley, and his infantry was moved by rail to Hanover Junction to co-operate with Lee's army, and became available when General Lee reached that place.

May 4th, General Butler ascended James River with his army of about 37,000 effectives, and, protected by gunboats, effected landings at City Point and Bermuda Hundreds, and on the 6th, commenced his attempt to gain permanent possession of the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad. A division of cavalry under the command of Brigadier-General August V. Kautz, at the same time, started from Suffolk, Va., to break up the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad, and then to join Butler at Bermuda. Beauregard succeeded in getting together forces sufficient to defeat Butler, in front of

Drewry's Bluff, on May 16th, and drove him away from the railroad and back to his entrenchments at Bermuda. He then intrenched a line extending across the peninsula from the James to the Appomattox, so as to cover the railroad, and, as Grant expressed it, "bottled him up securely." But Butler's holding the lower end of the peninsula required that Beauregard should remain in full force in front of Richmond and Petersburg, for, protected by gunboats, Butler could cross either river with his full force in a night, and attack one or the other of those cities, so that his position, secure from attack, was masterful, and, when General Grant approached, afforded him a "*point d'appui*," without which the condition of his army would have been critical.

The two auxiliary armies met with defeat very nearly at the same time, May 15th and 16th—the one at New Market, in the Valley, and the other in front of Drewry's Bluff; and any anxiety in regard to them, that General Lee might have felt, was thus early relieved, and any hopeful expectations that General Grant had, were, for the time, destroyed.

GRANT'S ARMY PUT IN MOTION.

General Grant put the Army of the Potomac in motion during the afternoon of the 3rd of May. The Fifth Corps, followed by the Sixth and preceded by Wilson's division of cavalry, was directed to Germana Ford. The Second Corps, followed by the Reserve Artillery and preceded by Gregg's division of cavalry, was directed to Ely's Ford, lower down the river. The park of the supply trains, guarded by the remaining division of

cavalry, Torbert's, followed Hancock's line of march to Chancellorsville. All these movements were executed without any of the columns having been molested. The Fifth Corps, after crossing the Rapidan river, bivouacked for the night of the 4th on the Germana and Fredericksburg plank road near the old Wilderness Tavern, where the Brock Road to Spottsylvania Courthouse crossed it, and the Sixth Corps, between that place and the river and about the crossing. Hancock's Corps bivouacked at Chancellorsville, and the Reserve Artillery near the same place. The cavalry was thrown well out to the front—a brigade of Wilson's division resting for the night at Parker's Store on the plank road from Orange Courthouse, which was on the line of march for the Fifth Corps the next day, and afterwards became one of the most prominent points in the Battle of the Wilderness.

General Meade stated in his report: "It was directed by the Lieutenant-General commanding that, in turning the right flank of Lee's army, I should swing my army at sufficient distance to avoid coming in contact with the intrenchments on Mine Run."

General Grant announced his purpose to force Lee to a general engagement as soon as it was possible to do so outside of his intrenchments, and directed that every part of the army should move with the greatest promptness, in strict accordance with the plan mapped out by him, to accomplish that purpose.

It must be borne in mind that, during the movements of the armies and the engagements that ensued, Grant's instructions to Meade and Burnside were very minute, and that neither of those so-called army com-

manders were permitted to exercise discretionary powers greater than those which legitimately belong to corps commanders, and not as great as those General Lee expected his corps commanders to exercise.

When the army was established on the south side of the Rapidan and in command of all the road to an extent sufficient to deploy it, and with room behind it to move and park all of his extensive trains, General Grant expressed his satisfaction at having accomplished what he had feared would be one of his most difficult tasks. He promptly ordered Burnside to join him with his army, and issued directions to Meade for the march of his army the next day (May 5th). Hancock's corps, starting as early as possible, to move to Shady Grove Church by the road from Chancellorsville to Todd's Tavern, and Warren to move in the same direction by the Parker's Store road, to be followed on that road by Sedgwick's corps, and, when the corps halted for the night, it was directed that a line of battle should be taken and strongly intrenched without delay. Had Grant succeeded in getting his army to Shady Grove Church it would have been on a line almost directly between Lee's line on the Rapidan and Richmond. Evidently it was Grant's expectation that Lee would move his army behind Mine Run, on the line of intrenchments he had made there the fall before, when the Army of the Potomac advanced upon that flank, and would expect to receive the attack there, if he did not fall back entirely from his line on the Rapidan. At Shady Grove Church, Grant's army would be entirely beyond those lines, and between them and Richmond.

The troops were accordingly put in motion, as di-

rected, at 6 A. M., May 5th, but Warren had not proceeded as far as Parker's Store before the head of Ewell's column made its appearance on the Stone Pike, on which, as he passed it, he had left Griffin's division. Warren then halted his command, and, in accordance with orders received from Meade, who joined him there, with Grant in his company, to use the full strength of his corps in an advance upon the enemy on the Stone Pike, countermarched the divisions that had passed beyond, and concentrated the corps upon it and to the left of it. Sedgwick was ordered to come up on the right of Griffin, and extend the line in that direction as far as occasion called for. A compact front was made by Warren, from right to left, in the order of Griffin, Robinson, Wadsworth, and Crawford, who commanded the four divisions of the corps, and an advance made.

It appears from the Union correspondence of the day that General Grant thought the force of the enemy a small one, sent out by Lee to delay his march while he fell back towards Richmond, and very reluctantly consented to the delay of his march.

LEE'S ARMY PUT IN MOTION.

General Lee, having ascertained through his scouts that Grant's army was in motion towards Germana Ford, at mid-day on the 4th, put his army in motion to meet it, and force it to battle before it could be disentangled from the crossing of the river in that densely wooded country; so that, whilst Grant was making haste to force Lee to battle before he could escape, Lee, instead of contemplating a retreat, was equally

anxious to take the initiative and strike Grant's army before he could deploy it. Ewell was directed to proceed with his corps down the Old Stone Pike, and A. P. Hill, with his corps down the Plank Road (two roads that run from Orange C. H. to Fredericksburg, nearly parallel with each other, and varying in distance apart from one to three miles, at the point where the two armies came in contact, from two and a quarter (2 1-4) to two and a half (2 1-2) miles apart, the Stone Pike nearest the Rapidan). Longstreet was ordered to the front with his two divisions, that were encamped near Gordonsville, and directed upon the Plank Road, or roads to the South of it, as conditions at that time might call for.

Ewell, in his report of the battle that ensued, wrote that he had in his corps at that time about 13,500 effective infantry and 2,000 artillery. Ramseur, with his brigade and three regiments from each of the other two divisions, was left on the line of the Rapidan as a rear guard, so that, when Ewell engaged Warren on the 5th, his infantry could not have been in excess of 10,000 men.

A. P. Hill left Anderson with his division in the intrenchments on the Rapidan, and, consequently, had only two of his divisions—Wilcox's and Heth's—available on the 5th, not more than 12,000 effective infantry.

CHAPTER III.

Battle of the Wilderness

FIFTH DAY OF MAY.

EWELL ON THE OLD STONE PIKE.

Edward Johnson's, the leading division of Ewell's corps, bivouacked two miles South of Locust Grove, on the night of the 4th, in about three miles of the bivouac of Warren's corps. Early on the 5th, General Ewell received instruction from General Lee, who accompanied Hill's march, to regulate his march by Hill's, whose progress down the Plank Road he could tell by the firing at the head of the column, and, at the same time, informed him that he preferred not to bring on a general engagement before Longstreet came up. Ewell, in consequence, advanced slowly with John M. Jones' brigade of Johnson's division in advance, prepared for action. At 11 A. M. Jones' brigade came in sight of a part of Warren's corps crossing the Pike from the direction of Germana Ford, and moving towards Parker's Store, on the Plank Road, and halted. The Stonewall brigade of Johnson's division was sent out immediately on a road that diverged from the Pike to the Germana Ford road, and from it was promptly thrown out a skirmish line that drove the pickets of the enemy back to within one and a half miles of the Ford, and thus delayed Sedgwick by threatening the trains that were accumulated on the Germana Road. The other two brigades of Johnson's division were thrown out to the left in the same direction. After some delay, there

was a demonstration against Jones' brigade, and General Ewell ordered Battle's brigade of Rodes' division to support it, and Doles' brigade in line on the right of Battle's, with instructions "not to allow themselves to become involved, but to fall back slowly if pressed."

Before these arrangements were completed, Griffin and Wadsworth made an unexpected attack upon Jones' brigade, and drove it back upon Battle's, which was also seriously disordered. Daniel's and Gordon's brigades were then ordered up, and brilliantly regained the lost ground, capturing several hundred prisoners, and relieving Doles, who, though hard pressed, had held his ground. The other brigades of the corps were then moved up to the firing line, Early's bearing to the left of the Pike and making connection with Johnson. Sedgwick was delayed in taking position on the right of Warren by the thick woods and the threatening of the Stonewall brigade, and, consequently, by Ewell's first deployment, with the exception of Jones' brigade, Johnson's division was not confronted, and, in the advance soon after, struck Warren's right flank unprotected.

Ewell advancing from the whole of his front, Warren was pressed back in confusion for some distance and lost a section of artillery that was covered with so heavy a fire that it could not be withdrawn. Ewell, in pressing Warren back, reached ground slightly elevated that commanded a clearing in the woods in front, and afforded some protection in rear, and, mindful of General Lee's instructions not to precipitate a general engagement before Longstreet could be brought up, he halted there and took up a line of battle crossing the Pike

at a right angle, Rodes' left resting on the Pike, and Johnson's and Early's divisions extending the line to the left of the Pike. The line was intrenched as speedily as possible, so that, when an advance was made against it soon after, it afforded excellent protection. Warren wrote in his report: "My divisions lost heavily in this attack, and the thick woods caused much confusion in the lines."

General Meade wrote in his report: "When Wadsworth was compelled to retire, Crawford was for a time isolated, but was drawn in, not, however, without the loss of many prisoners." Wright's division of Sedgwick's corps was brought up to the right of Griffin, and repeated assaults were made upon Ewell's line during the afternoon, attended with heavy losses, but little or no success. Sedgwick could use only one of his divisions against Ewell in the afternoon in conjunction with Warren, because early in the day one of his divisions (Getty's) had been sent in haste to the Plank Road to assist the cavalry in holding back from the Brock Road Hill's column until troops could be concentrated in front of it, and his third division (Rickett's) was required to protect the trains on the Germana road from the threatened attack near the Ford. But little artillery on either side could be brought up through the dense woods to the firing line. Ewell was, however, more successful than Warren, and got several batteries on his line that were very effective.

On the Confederate side, Brigadier-General Jones was killed whilst rallying his command, and his brigade was temporarily disorganized. Brigadier-General Stafford was mortally wounded, and Brigadier-General

Pegram severely wounded. Colonel J. Thompson Brown, commanding that part of Ewell's artillery on the line of battle, was killed; otherwise Ewell's casualties were remarkably few, and the men were greatly emboldened by their success.

During the afternoon Warren, finding that Ewell was too strong to be broken by Sedgwick's and his commands, and that, after Hancock's arrival on the Plank Road, the force there still was not strong enough to make any progress, sent Wadsworth with his division and Baxter's brigade to add strength to it by attacking Hill's left flank while he was engaging Hancock. This force did not reach position in time to be used before nightfall. Thus ended the first day on the Stone Pike, and by the next morning both armies on that part of the field were strongly intrenched upon parallel lines all the way through dense woods, with only one small clearing between them near the Pike, which was covered so closely by the lines on either side of it that neither could use it for artillery positions. Ewell took during the day more than a thousand prisoners.

HILL ON THE PLANK ROAD.

Two divisions of Hill's Corps, Heth's in advance, moving down the Plank Road, about 11 A. M., encountered cavalry at Parker's Store, and steadily drove it back to the Brock Road, about four miles from the store. The command of this road was essentially necessary for the movements of Grant's army then in progress, and Getty's division of the Sixth Corps was hastened to the crossing from Wilderness Tavern, and reached there in time to deploy in the Brock Road as the cavalry

was falling back beyond it, and Hancock, the head of whose column was passing Todd's Tavern, was ordered to arrest his march, which was taking him away from the battle, and to hasten back with his corps to the same point. The head of Hancock's column arrived to Getty's assistance at 2:30 P. M., and the corps was deployed as fast as it came up in front of Hill's divisions that had, when Getty was encountered, deployed in line a division on either side of the road, but had not as yet completed their formation to press upon Getty.

Hancock was ordered to attack with the whole force and drive Hill back beyond Parker's Store, where it was expected a junction with Warren would be made. After having hastily intrenched double lines at the crossing of the road, and having massed a number of guns to the left of his line, on a hill near the Brock Road, that was free of wood, and, placing them in charge of General Barlow, who was to use his division in their support, and was to intrench the whole position as strongly as possible as a cover to his left flank, at 4:15 P. M. he made the attempt, and "the battle raged with great severity until 8 P. M. without decided advantage to either side," as Hancock wrote in his report, during which time the whole of Hancock's corps, with the exception of two or three brigades and Getty's division, were closely engaged. Hancock wrote in his report that there were in his corps about 27,000 officers and men, and Getty's division had in it about 8,000.

Hill's successful resistance to so formidable a battle array, persistently hurled against him, reflects great credit on the two divisions engaged. There were not in them both together more than 12,000 men. Hill, dur-

ing the engagement, did not stand on the defensive, but made repeated dashes upon the lines of the enemy, in one of which he overran a section of artillery that had been pressed to the front on the Plank Road, but did not have time to carry it back from the field before he was compelled to draw back to the line upon which his troops had been formed before the engagement commenced. He conducted the engagement with great spirit and aggressiveness, repeatedly broke Hancock's line of battle, and compelled him to use his reserves in propping it up.

In Hancock's command Brigadier-General Hays was killed, and Generals Getty and Bartlett wounded. Almost the whole of the infantry of the Army of the Potomac had been engaged this day and repulsed at every point by Ewell's Corps, less Ramseur's command, and Johnston's brigade not arrived, and by two divisions of Hill's Corps; not more than one-half of Lee's infantry—not much, if at all, in excess of 20,000 men.

The 5th of May closed with General Lee having accomplished the arrest of Grant's flanking movement, and forcing him to confront his army in the Wilderness, where there were few roads, and the country was densely wooded, so that but little of Grant's immense artillery force could be brought into action. Thus Lee selected the battle ground most favorable to his army, centering upon two wide, firm roads, from 6 to 8 miles in front of Mine Run, upon which he could fall back in case of a repulse, and upon which to move his troops and trains to the front or rear. The collision of the two armies had taken General Grant so completely by surprise, when his army was strung out in columns of march,

and had resulted in such marked success to Lee that General Lee proposed to take the initiative the next morning, and, with that in view, his directions to Ewell for the next day (May 6th) were, in addition to holding his part of the line, to watch closely for a favorable opportunity to strike the right wing of Grant's army, and, if he found the opportunity, to strike with all his force and drive it from the river and dis sever Grant's connection with his base on the Orange Railroad.

Ewell brought up during the afternoon of the 5th Ramseur's command, that had been left in the intrenchments on the Rapidan, and Johnston's brigade arrived from Hanover Junction early in the morning of the 6th. Then Ewell's Corps was in full strength and fine condition.

General Lee directed that the march of Longstreet and Anderson should be hastened that they might be prepared for action at light. Longstreet was directed to come on the right flank of Hill's Corps, prepared to break through the left of Grant's army, and destroy his aggression in that direction. Delays, however, occurred and neither had reported when Hancock opened the battle, at 5 A. M., against Heth and Wilcox, unassisted and with no supports in sight. Hill expecting them to be relieved by fresh troops, had not taken the precaution of entrenching during the night, but allowed his men to rest after the arduous duties of the day, neither had the ammunition trains brought up ammunition, nor the supply trains, rations. Such was the condition on the Plank Road at 5 A. M. on the 6th.

During the night of the 5th, a connection was made

through the woods between the Second and Third corps of Lee's army, sufficient only to designate the direction of the intermediate line, and was held by a thin line of skirmishers from Ewell's Corps. Ramseur reported early in the morning that there was an interval in the line, unoccupied, of about a mile, into which Burnside advanced his two divisions later in the day. The line of this connection between the Stone Pike and the Plank Road was between two and a half and three miles in length.

Of Sheridan's Cavalry Corps, Torbert's division, guarding the army trains, did not arrive at Chancellorsville until after midday of the 5th. During the 5th, Wilson, who was covering the front of the march to Shady Grove Church with his division of cavalry, was attacked by a part of Stuart's Cavalry at Craig's Church, and driven back in confusion to Todd's Tavern. Wilson was reinforced there by Gregg, and Stuart was held in check. The fighting between the cavalry of the two armies was quite severe, and attended with considerable losses. Sheridan reported that he "was compelled to act on the defensive on account of the immense amount of material and trains at Chancellorsville, and on the road to Ely Ford."

Burnside having come up, during the afternoon of the 5th, with his three white divisions, General Grant ordered an attack to be made along the whole line at 4:30 A. M., of the 6th, in which all of the infantry was to participate, including Burnside's army. Upon representation by Meade that it would be difficult to make an orderly attack at so early an hour, and suggesting 6 A. M. as more suitable, General Grant replied: "The hour

may be changed to 5 A. M., as I am afraid, if delayed until 6 A.M., the enemy will take the initiative, which I desire especially to avoid." The hour for the simultaneous attacks along the whole line was, consequently, fixed at 5 A. M.

SIXTH DAY OF MAY.

By the morning of the 6th, General Long had quite a number of guns in position on Ewell's line of battle, roads upon which to move them having been cut through the woods, and their shrapnel and canister proved very destructive to the assaulting columns. Warren and Sedgwick, though they made repeated assaults with massive lines, met with no success at all, and, at 9 A. M., General Meade ordered the attack on the right to be suspended, that defensive works must be thrown up which could be held by the fewest possible number of men, and as large a number of men as possible be held prepared for an attack to Hancock's right. From that time until late in the afternoon, the fighting on Warren's and Sedgwick's lines was conducted by firing from the intrenchments, and all aggressive fighting drifted towards the Plank Road with Parker's Store as the immediate objective point.

At 5 A. M., Hill, with Heth's and Wilcox's divisions not as yet reinforced, was attacked by Hancock, with Birney's, Mott's and Getty's divisions in line, supported by Carroll's and Owens' brigades of Gibbons' division. At the same time that Hancock attacked in front, Wadsworth, with his division and Baxter's Brigade, of the Fifth Corps, advanced and engaged the left flank of Hill's line, in accordance with the following order:

May 6th, 12:15 A. M., "We are ordered to make another advance to-morrow (to-day) at 4:30 A. M., everywhere on the line. Set your line of battle on a line northeast and southwest and march directly southeast upon the flank of the enemy in front of General Hancock. G. K. WARREN, Major-General."

It would seem from this order, issued at midnight, that, when General Grant entered the Wilderness, his commanding officers were provided with compasses. The advance of lines of battle by the points of the compass is frequently alluded to in reports. Swinton, in his history, wrote that the Wilderness was, to Grant's army, a "*Terra Incognita*," and it appears that the approved instrument used in efforts to find the North Pole was used by Grant's army in its attacks upon Lee's army.

General Hancock wrote in his report: "After a desperate contest, in which our troops conducted themselves in the most intrepid manner, the enemy's line was broken at all points, and he was driven, in confusion, through the forest for about a mile and a half. Our line, which had become somewhat disordered, was now halted to adjust its formation before advancing farther. General Birney directed General Webb to relieve the troops of General Getty's Division with his brigade. These troops, having lost heavily during the fight earlier in the morning, were withdrawn, and formed on the original line of battle along the Brock Road."

In the Union correspondence of the day, at 5:40 A. M., Hancock reported: "We have driven the enemy from their position and are keeping up the Plank Road, connected with Wadsworth, taking quite a number of pris-

oners. My attack is being made with three divisions on both sides of the Plank Road." At 6 A. M., he reported: "The left of our assault has struck Longstreet." At 6:30 A. M., he requested that: "Burnside may go in as soon as possible. We about hold our own against Longstreet, and many regiments are tired and shattered." At 8 A. M., Meade to Hancock: "General Wadsworth, with 5,000 on Birney's right, is directed to take your orders. Two of Burnside's divisions have advanced nearly to Parker's Store, and are ordered to attack to their left which will be your front." At this hour (8 A. M.) Stevenson's Division of Burnside's Corps, that had been detached from Burnside before he moved and ordered to Hancock, reported to Hancock as a reinforcement. Hancock reported: "At 8:50 A. M., Birney's, Stevenson's, Mott's and Wadsworth's divisions, and Webb's, Carroll's and Owens' brigades of Gibbons' division advanced along the Plank Road, and became furiously engaged with the enemy." General Warren wrote in his report, that he reinforced Wadsworth with Colonel Kitching's Brigade (2,400 strong), and that later, finding that Ewell was intrenched on the right and but little impression could be made, he sent another brigade to sustain Hancock, who had now two of his divisions and one of the Sixth Corps.

At the time it was the impression in Lee's army that Hill's two divisions did not hold as firmly as they should have done, and it was passed around among the soldiery that General Lee rebuked the commanding officers with great severity, and that his rebuke was the cause of Hill's sickness that made him, for a short time, relinquish the command of his corps; but, knowing as

we now do, how formidable the attack was, and how broken Hancock's battle was by the contest, it appears they were entitled to commendation for holding as long as they did, rather than censure for giving way when they did; and also, in addition, commendation for the smallness of the number of prisoners they lost in falling back before the front and flank attacks.

When Hill took position on the Brock Road in front of Getty, General Pendleton placed Poague's Battalion of twelve guns on an elevation to the left of the Plank Road, about a mile in rear of Hill's line of battle, which overlooked a clearing in front and was the only position near the front where artillery could be used. When Hill's line was driven back, these guns were used very effectively, and stayed the right of Hancock's advanced whilst Longstreet was coming up, and, after his arrival, gave support and strength to his attack. Longstreet, who was moving on the right of the Plank Road to strike Hancock's left flank on the Brock Road, was notified that Hill had been forced back, and was urged to hasten to his relief. He changed his direction to the Plank Road, and, when he reached it, doubled the columns of divisions, and, with the two divisions abreast, came down the Plank Road at a double-quick, promptly formed across it, and received Hancock's onset as Hill's men were passing to the rear. Hancock's advance was immediately checked by Longstreet's arrival. At 8 A. M. Anderson, of Hill's Corps, arrived with his division, and the tide of battle began to change, and then the strain upon Hancock to withstand it became intense. At 8:40 A. M., it was reported: "General Wadsworth has only about 2,000 for duty." At 9:30,

Bartlett's Brigade, of the Fifth Corps, reported, and was put in on the right.

General Longstreet has written that after deploying three brigades of Kershaw's on the right of the road and three of Fields' on the left: "I ordered the advance of the six brigades by heavy skirmish lines to be followed by stronger supporting lines. Hancock's lines were checked by my first steady, rolling fire, and after a brisk fusilade were pushed back to their intrenched line, (one of the temporary lines that the enemy threw up when the advance was checked), when the fight became steady and very firm, occasionally swinging parts of my line back, and compelling the reserves to move forward and recover it. Two divisions of the Ninth Corps, at the same time, marching for Parker's Store, were encountered between the Plank and Turnpike Roads by our Second (Ewell's) Corps. Under this combination, the forces struggled an hour at the extreme tension of skill and valor. General M. L. Smith, of the engineers, being sent by General Lee, was ordered on the right to the unfinished railroad, to find a way around the left of the enemy's line, while we engaged his front. At 10 A. M. General Smith returned and reported favorably of his reconnoissance: that the heavy woodland concealed the route of the proposed flank march, and that there was no force of the enemy in observation. Hancock's left on the Brock Road (Barlow with his division and artillery in mass) was in strong, well-guarded position, but there was room along its front for our troops to march near the unfinished railroad beyond view of that left on the Brock Road. Colonel Sorrel, chief of staff, was ordered to conduct three brigades, G. T. An-

derson's, of Fields'; Mahone's, of R. H. Anderson's; and Wofford's, of Kershaw's division, have them faced to the left and marched down against Hancock's left. Davis' Brigade, of Heth's division, also got into this command.

As soon as the troops struck Hancock, his line began to break, at first slowly, then rapidly. Somehow, as they retreated, a fire accidentally started in the leaves and began to spread as the Confederates advanced. All the enemy's battle on the right of the Plank Road was broken up, and General Field was fighting severely with his three brigades on the left against Wadsworth and Stevenson, pushing them a little.

The Twelfth Virginia Regiment, of Mahone's Brigade, got to the Plank Road some little time before the other regiments of the brigade, and, viewing the contention on the other side between Field's and Wadsworth's divisions, dashed across and struck the left of Wadsworth's line. This relieved Field a little and, under this concentrated push and fire, Wadsworth fell mortally wounded. In a little while, followed the general break of the Union battle. The break to the left had relieved Kershaw's troops, and he was waiting for the time to advance, and Jenkins' Brigade that had been held in reserve, and that part of R. H. Anderson's division not in use, were ready and anxious for opportunity to engage.

General Smith then reported to me a way across the Brock Road that would turn Hancock's extreme left. He was asked to conduct the flanking brigades and handle them as the ranking officer. As Wofford's left stepped out, the other troops moved down to the Plank Road; Jenkins' Brigade in the road and Kershaw's di-

vision along the side. I rode at the head of the column, Jenkins, Kershaw, and the staff with me. After discussing the dispositions of their troops for re-opening battle, Jenkins rode closer to offer congratulations, saying: "I am happy; I have felt despair of the Cause for some months, but I am relieved, and I feel assured that we will put the enemy back across the Rapidan before night." Little did he or I think these sanguine words were the last he would utter.

When Wadsworth fell, the Union battle broke up in hasty retreat. Field's brigades closed to fresh ranks, the flanking brigades drew into line near the Plank Road, and with them the other regiments of Mahone's Brigade; as the Twelfth Virginia Regiment marched back to find its place on the other side of the Plank Road, it was mistaken, in the woods, for an advance of the enemy, and fire was opened upon it from the other regiments of the brigade. The men threw themselves to the ground to let the fire pass. General Jenkins had not finished the expressions of joyful congratulations, which I have quoted, when he fell mortally wounded. Captain Doby and Orderly Bowen, of Kershaw's staff, were killed. At the moment that Jenkins fell, I received a severe shock from a minie ball passing through my throat and right shoulder. The blow lifted me from the saddle, and my right arm dropped to my side, but I settled back in my seat and started to ride on, when in a minute the flow of blood admonished me that my work for the day was done. As I turned to ride back, members of my staff, seeing me about to fall, dismounted and lifted me to the ground."

In consequence of this unparalleled disaster, the fur-

ther advance of the Confederate troops was arrested for for several hours. General Lee was sent for, and, being at some distance from that point, did not arrive there for some time. He, upon his arrival, at once decided that the troops should be formed in parallel lines, or lines that were connected, (a fearful danger from broken formations in the intricate woods, being presented, as an object lesson, by the catastrophe that had just occurred). Much time was consumed in making the new formation, during which Burnside's two divisions came up in supporting distance, and a brigade of heavy artillery (2,400 strong) reinforced Hancock, and time was granted to him to mass all the available forces of the whole army in double lines to meet an assault.

In the Union correspondence, Lyman wrote at 2 P. M.: "Burnside is making a heavy attack, facing the Orange Plank Road. General Hancock has a continuous line, but not organized enough to advance. Robinson's Brigade is nearly up. Hancock has troops enough to hold, if he can hold at all."

General Grant, emboldened by the arrest of Longstreet's assault, ordered Hancock to attack at 6 P. M. To which order Hancock replied: "The disorganized condition of my command rendered it extremely difficult to obtain a sufficiently reliable body to make a really powerful attack." At 5:25 P. M. he wrote: "At 4:15 P. M., the enemy made a very determined assault upon my lines * * *. The attack of the enemy was continuous and exceedingly vigorous. * * * The attack and repulse were of the handsomest kind."

In view of the number of Lee's troops engaged and their casualties, as well as of the tenor of the few Con-

federate reports that have been preserved, this attack was more in the nature of a strong demonstration than of a determined assault.

General Burnside wrote in his report: "On the morning of the 6th, the first, second, and third divisions got under way. The first division (Stevenson's) was directed to report to General Hancock. The provisional brigade and the cavalry were so disposed as to relieve these divisions. The Fourth (Ferrero's) division was directed to report to Sedgwick. With the remaining two divisions, the second (Potter's) and the Third (Willcox's), I moved out on the Parker's Store Road between the positions then held by Warren and Hancock, and, after crossing the Wilderness Run about daylight, General Potter was directed to make his dispositions with a view to pressing his force forward so as to seize, if possible, the point known as Parker's Store. General Willcox's division was so disposed to the right and left of the road as to support the movement of General Potter. Just as preparations were made to charge the enemy, an order was received from the commanding general to move all the available forces to the left, with the view of attacking the enemy on the right of Hancock. Potter was moved by the left flank, and Willcox was left to cover the Parker's Store road. Potter soon came in contact with the enemy, intrenched on the opposite side of a swampy ravine, and made three charges, but the enemy's line was not carried. At 2 P. M., the last of Willcox's division was withdrawn from the Parker's Store Road to support Potter in his attack. Later, General Willcox, supported by Potter, at 5:30 P. M., and after Hancock had been attacked, com-

menced the assault; and, forcing the enemy back to his intrenchments, held a line in front of them. At about dusk, General Willcox opened communication with the right of the Second Corps."

He reported his casualties in the two divisions were 985. "Among them some of our most valuable officers and men."

General Hancock, in his explanation of his repulse and disorganization, as the result of Longstreet's flank attack, wrote: "At about 10 A. M., I was directed to take immediate measures to check an advance of the enemy that had driven back Cutler's Brigade on the extreme left of Warren's line with heavy losses and were within half a mile of Warren's headquarters. Two brigades from Birney were sent to effect that object."

Cutler, after Wadsworth was killed, commanded his division, and after his brigade had been driven back, wrote: "I have 1,269 men of the three brigades of my division; 740 of my own and the balance of Rice's and Stone's." Ramseur's Brigade, of Ewell's Corps, had been sent in the morning to extend Ewell's right so as to make connection with Hill's left, and Ramseur wrote in his report; that "moving at a double-quick, I turned the enemy's left, and, with the skirmish line, composed of the Fourth North Carolina Regiment, under the gallant Major Osborne, drove back his line of battle half a mile, capturing some prisoners and the knapsacks and shelter tents of an entire regiment." This must have been the attack referred to by Hancock.

General Hancock wrote further in this connection: "After my left had been broken through, I endeavored to hold my advanced position to my right of the Plank

Road by throwing back my left, but was unable to effect this because of the heavy and murderous fire." Still further in this connection: "I do not know why my order to attack with Barlow's division was not more fully carried out; but it was probably owing to the apprehended approach of Longstreet's Corps on my left about this time. But had my left advanced, as directed by me in several orders, I believe the overthrow of the enemy would have been assured. At all events, an attack on the enemy's right by troops of Barlow's division would have prevented the turning of the left of Mott's division, which occurred later in the day." To continue from Hancock's report: "General Birney thought it advisable to withdraw the troops from the wood where it was impossible to adjust our lines, and to reform them in the breastworks along the Brock Road, on the original line of battle. The troops were reformed in two lines of battle on the same ground from which they had advanced in the morning. The enemy pushed forward until he was within a few hundred paces of our breastworks, but did not attempt to assault them at that time."

RETREAT CONTEMPLATED.

At 1 P. M., after Hancock's left had been turned, and his line of battle broken up, the Union correspondence of the day shows that retreat was in the air: That the woods were full of disorganized troops making to the rear: Sheridan was ordered to draw in the cavalry "so as to secure the protection of the trains." He reported at 2:35 P. M.: "The trains are now moving to Ely's Ford. The trains of the Second Corps would not move

without an escort, so I have sent 1,300 dismounted men to Ely's Ford with it. I have sent a regiment to scour the country to United States Ford and to watch the roads. United States Ford is not in a passable condition for cavalry or infantry without much labor; it is also quite deep." Again: "Unless the trains are ordered to cross the river at Ely's Ford, and directed to pack on the north bank, the road will be blocked up, and it will be impossible to get to the Ford." Again, Sheridan to Gregg: "Fall back from your present position at Todd's Tavern, and relieve General Wilson's division now occupying Piney Grove Church and Alrichs." Butler dispatched from Bermuda at 1 P. M., 7th.: "We are intrenching for fear of an accident to the Army of the Potomac." Again the same day: "If the Army of the Potomac is unsuccessful, we want the 10,000 reserves here for the safety of the country." On the 8th day of June, the correspondent of a Cincinnati newspaper was, by special order, drummed out of camp with a big placard on his back and breast, inscribed "Libeller of the Press," because he had written for his paper, that Meade wished to retreat at this time, and was prevented from doing so by General Grant.

There were no reserves, and Hancock's line had to be propped up by robbing other portions of the line. But the unexampled catastrophe that had occurred on the Plank Road delayed the advance until 4:15 P. M. The intervening hours were well utilized by the officers of the Army of the Potomac, and Grant's army was relieved by the delay from the impending disaster.

GORDON'S FLANK ATTACK.

In accordance with General Lee's direction to Ewell, General John B. Gordon had, early in the morning, found the right flank of Sedgwick's line, and a way of getting around it without exposing the troops to view. Ewell referred the matter to General Early, commanding that part of the line. Early did not approve. As the day advanced, Gordon still urging, Ewell, in person, examined into its practicability, and ordered him, through General Early, to make the attack with his and Johnston's brigades, and, as they swept up the line, that the troops, as they were uncovered, should join in. So much time had been lost, that it was late in the afternoon when the order was given. Gordon promptly formed the two brigades in line, in an open field about 400 yards from the right flank of Sedgwick's command, that rested upon a dense thicket, upon which Rickett's division was in position. Gordon formed his brigade on the right of the line and Johnston's on the left, and placed eight guns in position in the field, to be used if occasion was presented. Gordon's Brigade swept up the line of breastworks, and, Johnston's to the left of them until darkness arrested the attack. Johnston's Brigade, in the advance through the dense woods, obliqued to the left and lost connection with Gordon's. His officers reported that they came in sight of the trains that were moving towards the river, apparently, without any guard, and would have charged upon them, had they not been recalled at this time, which was as darkness was setting in.

The attack was a complete surprise to Sedgwick's

command, and but slight resistance was made; the men leaving their guns, knapsacks, and haversacks behind the breastworks and taking to flight. 400 dead were left on the field and 600 prisoners were taken, and two general officers, Seymour and Shaler, and, besides them, many prisoners were lost in the thick woods. Almost the whole line to the north of the Stone Pike was swept with little loss on Gordon's part (only fifty casualties); and no effort was made afterwards to recover it. Had the attack been made some hours earlier, Ewell could have pressed Sedgwick and Warren with their forces diminished by the heavy detachments to Hancock's relief out of the way, and gone in between Hancock and Ely's Ford where the army trains were being pushed, and the condition of Grant's army would have been rendered helpless. The disaster on the Plank Road and the delay in Gordon's attack saved Grant's army.

The casualties in Grant's army from the beginning of the 5th to the close of the 6th of May, "The Battle of the Wilderness," were reported to amount to 17,666. The Confederate officer directed to collect the arms from the Wilderness battlefield, after the armies moved, reported that he found left there by Grant's army almost as many muskets as were in Lee's army.

Except in Jones' brigade, of Ewell's Corps, and Heth's and Willcox's divisions, of Hill's, the casualties in Lee's army were remarkably few. Ewell wrote, in his report, that his total losses in the Wilderness were 1,250 killed and wounded. In the Records, there are no reports of this engagement from Hill's Corps; but, though two of the divisions had been broken, their casualties had not been great.

We see thus early in the campaign, that the Army of the Potomac, under the new organization and with General Grant in command, did not fight with the spirit and effectiveness that it had fought with, during its career from "The Seven Days' Battle," until the time of those changes.

CHAPTER IV.

Battle of Spottsylvania Court House.

SEVENTH AND EIGHTH DAYS OF MAY.

The 7th was spent by Grant in drawing in and organizing his forces, and in sending to the Orange Railroad his wounded that could be moved, and in preparing field hospitals for those that he was forced to leave behind in the hands of the enemy, and, also, in arranging for a change of base from the Orange Railroad to Tidewater, the nearest points on which were Fredericksburg and Aquia Creek or Belle Plain behind it on the Potomac River. In order to effect this and carry out his other designs, he proposed to make the change during the night of that day, when the movement would be concealed by darkness, by a flank march to seize Spottsylvania Courthouse, so as to cover Fredericksburg with his army and make that base secure. And, expecting that the change of base would be a surprise to Lee, he proposed to press on at once towards Richmond, and interpose his army between Lee and Richmond before Lee could get his army in hand to resist.

If Lee was preparing for aggression by interposing his army between Grant and the Orange Railroad, it would be far removed from the line of the proposed march, and Grant would have accomplished a feat in strategy that would go sounding down the ages. Apparently, with this expectation, Grant dispatched to Washington, May 8th, 11:30 A. M.: "The army commenced moving at 9 P. M. yesterday, and when closed

up to the position assigned for the first day's march will stand thus: General Warren's Corps at Spottsylvania Courthouse; Hancock's, at Todd's Tavern; Sedgwick's, on the road from Piney Branch Church to the Courthouse, and General Burnside, at Alrich's. It is not yet demonstrated what the enemy will do. My effort will be to form a junction with Butler as early as possible, and be prepared to meet any enemy interposing. My exact route to James River I have not definitely marked out."

In his programme of the campaign, Grant wrote that his immediate objective was to be Lee's army, and that he would pursue it wherever it went. From this dispatch it appears that, instead of pursuing that course, he planned to dodge Lee's army and make haste to join Butler on James River. The nearness of the navigable waters of the Rappahannock, York, and James Rivers to the left flank of the line of the proposed march secured to him a convenient and safe base of supplies at any point on it, where his army might be halted, and, consequently, the move could be made without endangering his communications. Provisions had been made, as we have seen, before the campaign opened, for the prompt establishment, by a fleet of transports, of a base at any point on the navigable waters Grant might direct.

General Lee, perceiving that Grant had given up the fight on that field, early in the day, made a reconnoissance in force, General Long, with several batteries composing the principal part of it, to Grant's right, and found he had given up the Germana road and that there were but few troops in that direction. Later, his cavalry reported a movement in force towards Fredericks-

burg. Grant's change of base was then apparent to him, and Anderson, now in command of Longstreet's Corps, was ordered to Spottsylvania Courthouse, and Ewell to follow directly after him, whilst A. P. Hill guarded the rear. Anderson reached the Courthouse early in the morning of the 8th ahead of any of Grant's infantry, drove away some cavalry that had entered the place from the direction of Fredericksburg, and marched out on the road leading to Todd's Tavern, to relieve Stuart's cavalry that was being pressed back by Warren, who was advancing on that road.

The morning of the 7th was spent by Warren and Hancock in trying to ascertain what were Lee's intentions, and they reported that he had fallen back some distance on the Plank Road to his intrenched line, near Parker's Store. By midday, Grant, having ascertained the conditions as well as he could, ordered Sheridan, with the cavalry, to drive Stuart's cavalry from Todd's Tavern and open the road from there to the Courthouse. A severe cavalry fight ensued there, and Stuart fell back slowly towards the Courthouse, contesting every step of the way, and obstructing the road as he passed along it. At 8 P. M., Sheridan reported that he had driven Stuart, on the Courthouse road, about three miles from Todd's Tavern.

By General Grant's direction, Sheridan was to drive Stuart entirely away from the line of march of the infantry, and Warren was to take the lead of the infantry, starting out with his corps as soon as darkness covered the withdrawal, and march by the Brock Road to Todd's Tavern, and thence to the Courthouse; Sedgwick, withdrawing at the same time with Warren, was to use a road

east of the Brock, and come in behind Warren at Todd's Tavern; whilst Hancock was to follow Warren on the Brock Road to Todd's Tavern, halt there, and dispose his command as a rear guard for the army. Burnside was to move back to Chancellorsville, and approach the Courthouse from the direction of Fredericksburg.

It was expected that Sheridan would have no serious difficulty in driving Stuart from Todd's Tavern and the road to the Courthouse, and, as Grant would then hold the direct roads from the Wilderness, from Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg to the Courthouse, and was taking the initiative and making the movement under cover of night, it seems, he had no doubt that he would be able to take possession of it, and command all the roads leading to it, before any part of Lee's infantry could possibly get there.

Warren, in his report, wrote: "At 9 P. M., we began to move toward Spottsylvania Courthouse, the corps having the lead on the Brock Road. We were delayed about one and a half hours by the cavalry of General Meade's escort, and, on reaching a point two miles beyond Todd's Tavern, were delayed about three hours by Torbert's cavalry endeavoring to clear the way for us. They gave it up about 6 A. M., on the 8th, and got out of our way. General Robinson's division immediately went forward, led by himself. He at once cleared out the enemy's cavalry, and the wood with which they had obstructed the road, and, advancing rapidly, struck the advance of Longstreet's Corps near the Block House."

In the Union correspondence of the day, he dispatched at 8 A. M.: "General Robinson has gone ahead with

a brigade, mostly in line. I follow close after with columns filling the road and artillery. * * * Our troops are exceedingly hesitating, I think." At 10:15 A. M.: "I attacked with what was in hand of Robinson's division, led by himself, in person, and General Griffin's division, by himself. Robinson's troops fought with reluctance and fell back; himself severely wounded in the knee. This exposed Griffin's left and a part of his command fell back also. All in much confusion, refusing much of our attempts to stop them till they got out of fire. I have sent Crawford and Cutler to his support." At the time of this report (10:15 A. M.) Meade wrote: "Sedgwick's best division joined Warren." At 12:30 P. M., Warren dispatched: "General Wright has brought up his division to support me. I have again suffered heavily especially in stragglers. I have done my best, but with the force I now have, I cannot attack again. I cannot gain the Courthouse with what force I have. While I am writing, the reports of my officers come in such that I need reinforcements. I dare not fall back, for then I shall disclose my feeling of weakness." Meade then dispatched to him: "Sedgwick's whole corps is sent to join you in the attack upon the left wing. Gibbon's division, of the Second Corps, is at the junction of the Todd's Tavern and Courthouse road with the Piney Branch Church Road. If there is pressing need, you can call on him."

Sedgwick's Corps, having moved up to Warren's assistance, was formed on his left, and, during the afternoon, efforts to break through Anderson's Corps were made with the combined strength of the two corps, but with no success. As Sedgwick arrived upon the field,

Ewell was moving up to Anderson, and extended his right as fast as Sedgwick did the left of Warren.

The cavalry reported their fight in the morning was severe. "The cavalry lost heavily." Burnside was ordered to move two of his divisions beyond (south of) the Gayles House, and have them prepared at 6 A. M. to march directly to the Courthouse, whilst the other two divisions of the corps assisted in guarding the trains.

General Lee reported of this day (the 8th): "After a sharp encounter with the Fifth (Warren's) Corps and Torbert's cavalry, General R. H. Anderson, with the advance of the army, repulsed the enemy with great slaughter, and took possession of the Courthouse this morning; receiving reinforcements, he renewed the attack upon our position, and was again handsomely driven back."

On this day Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill was relieved from duty on account of sickness and Major-General J. A. Early assigned to the command of Hill's Corps during the absence of General Hill. Brigadier-General John B. Gordan succeeded to the command of Early's division.

NINTH DAY OF MAY.

On the 9th, General Hancock moved up from Todd's Tavern with three of his divisions to the right of Warren's line. When night overtook him, the head of the column was at the bridge across the Po River—Barlow, in advance, was crossing it with his leading brigade. During the night Hancock crossed over two of the divisions, and built two additional bridges at the crossings in rear of those divisions. Mott's, the Fourth

Division, was left at Todd's Tavern, as the rear-guard and, afterwards, instead of joining the other divisions of the corps, was ordered up on the left of Sedgwick's Corps.

Warren's and Sedgwick's corps spent the day in adjusting and intrenching a line, and in uncovering the position of the enemy. Early in the morning, General Sedgwick was killed in one of the many brisk skirmishes of the day, that amounted almost to a continuous battle. Major-General Horatio G. Wright was assigned to the command of the Sixth Corps by order of Lieut.-General Grant.

General Burnside, with his three white divisions, moved to Gayles House, within a mile and a half of the Courthouse. Willcox's, the leading division soon became quite heavily engaged, when the other two divisions were brought up and disposed on a line of battle that was speedily intrenched. Willcox reported at 11:45 A. M.: "I am heavily engaged with superior numbers."

This day, Sheridan, with all the well-mounted cavalry, started on an extensive raid upon the Central Railroad, with orders to destroy it, make a dash into Richmond, if possible, and then to connect with General Butler, on James river. When the order for this raid was given, it appears from the following dispatch and other correspondence that Sheridan was to be the advance guard of the army, and Grant expected to follow immediately after him with the whole army. At 4 P. M., May 9th, Secretary Stanton telegraphed to General Butler: "A dispatch just received from General Grant. He is on the march with his whole army to form a junction with you, but had not determined his route."

MAY TENTH.

At 9:30 A. M., General Grant dispatched to Washington: "The enemy hold our front in very strong force, and evince a strong determination to interpose between us and Richmond to the last. I shall take no backward steps. We can maintain ourselves at least, and in the end beat Lee's army, I believe. Send to Belle Plain all the infantry you can rake and scrape. With present position of armies 10,000 men can be spared from the defenses of Washington, besides all the troops that have reached there since Burnside's departure. Some may be brought from Wallace's department." Thus early did Grant begin to call for the reserves in Washington. General Grant's directions for the day were: That Hancock, with his two divisions across the Po, should press on toward the Courthouse, but, having ascertained, at an early hour, that the enemy was strong in his front, he directed that the enemy should be pressed along the whole line from right to left, preparatory to a general assault centering on Warren's and Wright's front, ordered for 5 P. M. By his failure, on the 8th, Warren had lost his prestige, and Hancock was ordered to take command of the assaulting columns on his line.

The pressing upon the lines of the enemy was attended with much loss and some disorganization. Before the time appointed for the assault and whilst Hancock was withdrawing the two divisions from across the Po, to use all his force in the assault from Warren's line, General Early, with Heth's division, attacked Barlow's, the rear division, and drove it back across the

stream with heavy loss, including one gun. Heth claimed that the fighting was all in his favor, whilst Hancock claimed that it was in Barlow's, as Barlow, when attacked, was in the act of withdrawing, by his order, given previously to the attack. At least, Heth's division, that had suffered in *morale* by having been broken on the 6th, was much emboldened by its success.

At 5 P. M., Barlow had not been extricated from the crossing, and Birney's division had been sent to his relief. Hancock wrote of the assault from Warren's line, ordered for 5 P. M.: "At 5:30 P. M., the Fifth Corps and Gibbon engaged in assault in front of Alsop's; it was soon evident it had failed. Gibbon's division lost heavily on this occasion." Again: "Another attack was made by the Fifth Corps and Gibbon's and Birney's divisions at 6:30 P. M. They were again repulsed with considerable loss." Warren reported that the losses in his corps were heavy, and that nothing was accomplished. Wright centered the attack of the Sixth Corp upon Dole's brigade of Ewell's Corps, which Brigadier-General Upton assaulted with twelve picked regiments, in four massed lines of three regiments front, supported by six other regiments, broke over it, capturing a four-gun battery (Smith's, of Hardaway's Battalion), and pressed on through the gap. Gordon, commanding Early's division and held in reserve behind Ewell's line, immediately advanced and confronted this force; whilst Rodes and Johnson, with a brigade each, attacked its flanks. Seeing the hopelessness of the situation, many officers and men of Upton's column of assault escaped back into their lines whilst

the preparations were being made by Rodes and Gordon. All the rest were killed or captured, and the guns retaken. Meade reported that 900 prisoners were taken by Upton. His casualties were very much in excess of this number.

Burnside advanced from the Gayles House, and soon became engaged, as he reported, with greatly superior forces. This force was two divisions of A. P. Hill's Corps. He accomplished nothing more than developing the force in his front, and reported that his losses were quite heavy; among them: General Stevenson killed; Colonel Leisure was ordered to take his place in command of the division.

General Lee reported of the day's operations: "General Grant's army is intrenched near this place on both sides of the Brock Road. To-day the enemy shelled our lines, and made several assaults with infantry against several points, particularly on the left, held by General R. H. Anderson. The last, which occurred at sunset, was the most obstinate, some of the enemy leaping our breastworks. They were easily repulsed, except in front of Dole's Bridge, where they drove our men from their position, and from a four-gun battery there posted. The men were soon rallied, and by dark our line was re-established and the battery recovered."

"A large force of the enemy moved around our left on the evening of the 9th, and took possession of the road about midway between Shady Grove Church and the Courthouse. General Early, with a part of Hill's Corps, drove them back this evening, taking a gun and a few prisoners. Our casualties have been small.

Among the wounded are Brigadier-Generals H. T. Hays and H. H. Walker."

This day, General Sheridan reported: "I turned the enemy's right and got into their rear. Did not meet sufficient cavalry to stop me. Destroyed from eight to ten miles of the railroad, two locomotives, three trains and a large amount of supplies. I expect to fight their cavalry south of the South Anna River. Have recaptured 500 of our men and two colonels."

MAY ELEVENTH.

General Grant, at 8 A. M., reported: "We have now ended the sixth day of heavy fighting. Our losses up to this time are: 11 general officers killed, wounded and missing, and probably 20,000 men;" and, in the dispatch, he expresses his opinion that the loss of the enemy must be much greater. He then states: "I propose to fight it out on this line, if it takes all summer;" and adds: "I hope reinforcements will be sent as rapidly as possible and in as great numbers."

The day was spent by Grant's army in rearranging the forces with the view of an assault by Hancock and Burnside at 4 A. M. of the 12th upon the salient on the right of Ewell's line, occupied by Johnson's division, which assault was to be supported by the whole army.

There were few and unimportant changes, if any, in the disposition of Lee's forces until just before dark, when, through a misapprehension of orders, or through orders issued under a misapprehension (it is difficult to ascertain which), all the artillery on Johnson's line was withdrawn, except 8 guns of Cutshaw's battalion, that were on the left of the line, and faced to sweep the

front of Ewell's line to the left, which was in the opposite direction from that in which the assault was made, and the horses had been sent back to camp. Johnson about midnight reported that the enemy was massing in his front, and urged that the artillery be sent back immediately. He stated that his line was strong with the artillery, but very weak without it. Page's battalion of 16 guns was returned, but had not reached position when the line was carried, and they were captured whilst strung out in columns of march. The four guns in rear of the column escaped by reversing the pieces.

MAY TWELFTH.

A day of unexampled close, continuous, and destructive fighting, whilst the rain poured in torrents.

When General Lee took up his line in front of the Courthouse, General Ewell was ordered to the right of Longstreet's corps, and, in establishing his line, he threw forward Johnson's division on his right, so as to occupy an elevated ridge, that otherwise the enemy would occupy, and he feared the effect of his artillery massed there. The holding the ridge also commanded the fields and roads in front, and made communications between Meade's and Burnside's armies very circuitous and embarrassing to Grant. That projection of the line made a marked salient to the general line of intrenchments. General Lee, when he rode over that part of the line, saw there was danger in it, and ordered intrenchments to be dug on a new line, cutting off the salient and greatly shortening the connection with Hill's Corps to the right, but up to the morning of the 12th

very little work had been done on it further than staking it off.

General Hancock wrote in his report of the battle that he massed his corps in front of the line to be attacked, and at 4:35 A. M. made the assault; "Barlow's and Birney's divisions in front, supported by Gibbon's and Mott's. They dashed through the line at a salient immediately in front of the Landrum House. A fierce and bloody fight ensued in the works with bayonets and clubbed muskets. It was short, however, and resulted in the capture of nearly 4,000 prisoners of Johnson's division of Ewell's Corps (about twice the correct number). 20 pieces of artillery with horses, caissons, and material complete (of 12 guns of Page's battalion). Among the prisoners were Major-General Edward Johnson and Brigadier-General George E. Steuart. Our troops pursued the flying enemy in the direction of the Courthouse until they encountered a second formidable line of earthworks. My reserves were ordered up at once and directed to occupy the captured works. The enemy in the meantime threw heavy re-enforcements into the second line opposite the point of attack. They now advanced against our troops, who had been checked by the second line of intrenchments, and compelled them to retire to the line they had captured at daylight. About this hour, 6 A. M., the head of Wright's Corps arrived on the field, his troops occupying the works to the right of the salient. They had scarcely gotten into position when the enemy assailed our lines with great vehemence, pressing the attack toward that portion of the line held by the Sixth Corps, which they appeared determined to regain. The artillery was brought up

and placed on the high ground in front, and to the right, of the Landrum House. The battle raged furiously and incessantly along the whole line from the right of the Sixth Corps to the left of Barlow's division throughout the day, and until late in the night of the 12th. Our losses in killed and wounded were quite heavy. The losses of the enemy in killed, wounded, and prisoners must have amounted to at least 10,000.

On the morning of the 13th, it was discovered that the enemy had retired to the second line of works, thus yielding to us the palm of victory."

General Ewell in his report wrote: "The enemy attacked in heavy force at earliest dawn, and, though gallantly resisted, their numbers and our want of artillery enabled them to break through our lines, capturing Major-General Johnson and Brigadier-General Steuart, about 2,000 men and 20 pieces of artillery. The nature of the struggle will be apparent from the fact that, after the loss of Johnson's division before sunrise, my force barely numbered 8,000, and the reinforcements about 1,500 more. General Johnson estimated the enemy's force at over 40,000, and I have reason to believe this a moderate estimation. The attack was met by my corps and three brigades sent to my aid (Perrins' and Harris', of Mahone's division, and McGowan's, of Wilcox's), and, after it had lasted with unintermitted vigor from 4:30 A. M. till 4 P. M. of May 12th, ceased by degrees, leaving us in possession of two-thirds of the works first taken from us and of four of the captured guns, which the enemy had been unable to haul off. These guns were withdrawn by hand to the McCool House, and General Long directed

to send for them at night; but Major Page failed to find them, and they were again allowed to fall into the hands of the enemy.

My total loss in the Wilderness was 1,250 killed and wounded. The burial parties of two divisions reported interring 1,100 of the enemy. The third and largest made no report. When we moved, probably one-third or more were still unburied of those who were in reach of our lines. At Spottsylvania, though the enemy held the ground for a week, we found on regaining it many of their dead still unburied, while the numerous graves showed their loss to have been immense. It must have exceeded ours in the proportion of at least 6 to 1, taking all the engagements together."

His ordnance officer reported he had collected in front of Ewell's Corps in the Wilderness and at Spottsylvania 20,000 muskets.

General Gordon, commanding Early's division, in his report, wrote: "After Johnson's line had been carried, I formed a line with two brigades near the Harris House, and ordered an attack. They charged with great spirit, driving the enemy, with heavy loss, from nearly the whole of the captured works, from the left of Hill's Corps to the salient on Johnson's line. Several of the lost guns were recaptured by the Thirteenth Virginia Regiment, and brought back to the McCool House. The loss in these two brigades was not heavy."

"General Rodes attacked on the left of the salient with Ramseur's brigade, which retook the works to Daniels' right along the whole brigade front by a charge of unsurpassed gallantry; but the salient was still held by the enemy, and a most deadly fire from it poured on

our right flank. The brigades sent as re-enforcements from Hill's Corps were put in on his right, and held their position until the close of the action. General Daniels was killed, and General Ramseur severely wounded, but Ramseur refused to leave the field."—*Ewell*.

Warren was urged time and again throughout the day to assault the lines in his front, under the impression that Anderson must be re-enforcing Ewell, or else Ewell could not make the battle so strong. He made repeated assaults, and, in every instance, without producing any impression. Towards the close of the day he dispatched: "I also again assaulted the enemy's intrenchments, suffering heavy loss, but failing to get in. The enemy's direct and flank fire was too destructive; lost heavily."

During the afternoon Hancock and Wright were so pressed that Warren sent to them Griffin's and Cutler's divisions. These two divisions then became engaged on Hancock's line. At the close of the engagement they were returned to Warren.

General Burnside was repeatedly ordered by General Grant to attack with all his force, and make connection with Hancock. He advanced and made repeated assaults, but was in every instance driven back. He was met by Hill's Corps, commanded by Early, from which one brigade had been detached to guard the left flank of Anderson's Corps, and three brigades to the assistance of Ewell. With the remainder Early met Burnside, and, with but little loss, held him in check, repulsing every assault and making several successful dashes upon

his lines, by which his front was broken and several hundred prisoners taken.

After the successful assault in the morning, Grant's army met with no more success, and all the fighting was decidedly to the advantage of Lee's army.

During the night, Ewell withdrew his troops to the new line, cutting off the salient, and it was soon made stronger than any other part of the line.

General Lee reported of the day's operations: "This morning at dawn the enemy broke through that part of our line occupied by Johnson's division, and gained possession of a portion of our breastworks, which he still holds. A number of pieces of artillery fell into his hands. The engagement has continued all day, and, with the exception indicated, we have maintained our ground. In the beginning of the action we lost a large number of prisoners, but, thanks to a Merciful Providence, our subsequent casualties were not large. Major-General Johnson and Brigadier-General Steuart were taken prisoners. The brave General Perrin was killed, and Generals Walker (of the Stonewall brigade) and Daniels severely wounded."

General Grant reported: "The 8th day of battle closes leaving between 3,000 and 4,000 prisoners in our hands for the day's work, including two general officers and over 30 pieces of artillery. The enemy was obstinate, and seemed to have found the last ditch. We have lost no organization, not even that of a company, while we have destroyed and captured one division (Johnson's), one brigade (Doles') and a regiment entire of the enemy."

In this report Grant adds to Lee's casualties of that

day, those of the 10th instant, and makes the captures much in excess of the two days added together.

It has been said by high military authority that the quality that often makes commanders of armies distinguished is the adroitness they exhibit in writing dispatches. This dispatch of Grant's is not as brief as Caesar's "Veni, vidi, visi," nor does it strike the poet's ear with quite equal force, but Grant could have written nothing better suited to the anxious longings of the Administration.

The reports of Grant's success created wild excitement in Washington. On the 13th Stanton telegraphed to Butler: "Lee abandoned his works last night and retreated. Grant is pursuing. There has been thirty-six hours of hard rain, and the roads are heavy. At last accounts, Hancock had come up with his rear guard."

But the facts were not long in reaching Washington, as follows: May 16th Assistant Secretary of War, General Dana, who had been sent to General Grant's headquarters to make reports of the operations of the army, dispatched to Hon. E. M. Stanton: "The field returns of 'the Army of the Potomac' shows present for duty on May 13th, 38,254 officers and men. Of these

The Second Corps counts	12,116
The Fifth Corps counts	14,860
The Sixth Corps counts	11,279
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Total infantry and artillery of A. P.....	38,255
Burnsides army	17,870
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Grand total of Grant's army	56,124

130 CAMPAIGNS OF 1864 AND 1865 IN VIRGINIA.

The return of casualties to this time are:

The Second Corps	11,553
The Fifth Corps	10,686
The Sixth Corps	9,492
Artillery	120
Ninth Corps (Burnside's)	5,020
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Grand total of killed, wounded and prisoners..	36,872

The above report accounting for as present 56,124, and as killed, wounded and prisoners, 36,872, making a total accounted for of 92,998, leaves unaccounted for nearly one-third of the army, the greater part of which number are to be classed as stragglers and deserters. General Halleck dispatched from Washington that "the country from Spottsylvania to Washington was full of deserters from Grant's army." In a few days many of the stragglers were gathered in.

On the same day (16th) General Grant, as if to counteract the depressing effects of that news sent by Dana from his headquarters, dispatched: "The army is in the best of spirits, and feel the greatest confidence in ultimate success. The promptness with which you have forwarded re-enforcements will contribute greatly to diminishing our mortality list and in insuring a complete victory. You can assure the President and Secretary of War that the elements alone have suspended hostilities, and that it is in no manner due to weakness or exhaustion on our part."

Halleck had dispatched on the 12th: "I hope to send you 10,000 re-enforcements to-morrow night, and 3,000 or 4,000 more in a few days." On the 13th he dispatched: "24,700 have gone to you or are under orders."

CHAPTER V.

from May 13th to May 21st. from May 21st to May 26th. Battle of Cold Harbor

The 13th opened upon Grant's army under great apprehension that Lee would assume the aggressive, and find it disorganized and disarranged. The day was spent in reducing it to order, and there was no serious fighting. As the day advanced, and it was ascertained that a part of Ewell's line had been drawn back, it was hoped that General Lee had commenced retreat. The hope was based in a great measure upon the effect of Sheridan's operations on the railroad between Lee and Richmond and his consequent lack of provisions. When reconnoissances disclosed that a new line had been intrenched but a short distance in rear of the salient, and was held in force, General Grant, in doubt as to the true conditions, whether Lee was moving around his left flank to interpose between him and Fredericksburg, or was retreating, or, in fine, what he was doing, ordered Warren and Wright to march their corps during the night from their positions on the right, to the left of Burnside—Warren to form on the left of Burnside, and Wright on the left of Warren—and that an advance be made from that position at 4 A. M. the next morning (the 14th). At the same time, Hancock's Corps, with the exception of Birney's division left to hold the captured salient, was ordered to the rear of the centre, and the army thus concentrated to the last degree. If General Lee was attempting to turn his left by these

movements, his army would be in position to meet and counteract such movement; if not, his army would be in position to continue its aggression on the line to Hanover Junction as soon as all the re-enforcements had arrived and been distributed.

Warren and Wright attempted to make the movement during the night in order to carry out the instructions, but it was attended with such delays that, at the time appointed for the attack, the head of Warren's column had just come in sight, and that day (14th) was spent in bringing up the troops, and in quite heavy skirmishing to develop the positions of Lee's troops in that direction. During the day Hancock was ordered to still leave Birney's division at the salient, and, with the rest of the corps, to join Warren and Wright.

On the 14th Anderson, made aware of this withdrawal from his front, advanced against Warren's and Wright's picket line that had been left when the troops withdrew, succeeded in flanking a part of it, and in killing, wounding, and capturing quite a number. Rosser succeeded in capturing Warren's field hospital. Anderson then moved his corps to the right of Lee's line to confront Warren and Wright.

On this day Sheridan reported his arrival at Haxall's Landing, on James River; reported successful encounters with Stuart's cavalry at Yellow Tavern and Meadow Bridge, and that Major-General Stuart was badly wounded at Yellow Tavern, and Colonel Pate killed. General Stuart's wound proved to be mortal, and General Lee was thus deprived of the services of that brilliant cavalry leader.

On the 15th it was ascertained that Lee had taken up a line in front of Warren and Wright, had intrenched it, and was holding it with a strong force. The purpose to attack was therefore abandoned. Warren reported that day that, including the artillery brigade and the heavy artillery brigade, his whole force amounted to 14,798.

The 16th and 17th were spent in quite heavy skirmishing on different parts of the line, and in receiving and assigning the 24,700 re-enforcements sent from Washington. A division of these troops, under the command of General R. O. Tyler, was assigned to Hancock, and Mott's division of that corps was consolidated into a brigade; as, on General Lee's part, the remainder of Johnson's division was consolidated into a brigade.

General Grant, thinking that General Lee must have drawn in his left in order to extend his right, and present as formidable a line of battle as he found there, or else was using Ewell's Corps in some aggressive movement, ordered Hancock, re-enforced by Tyler's division, to return to his battlefield of the 12th, and with his and Wright's Corps to make an assault upon Ewell's new line at 4 A. M. on the 18th, and, if successful, to continue the aggression until Lee was driven entirely from the field. Burnside and Warren were to demonstrate from their positions, and, if they found favorable opportunity, to make assaults.

Hancock and Wright moved back during the night of the 17th, and formed their troops for the attack, Hancock's at the salient and to the left of it, and Wright to its right. A little after 4 A. M., Hancock advanced Gibbon's and Barlow's divisions, supported by Birney's

and Tyler's, whilst Wright advanced to their right. They soon came within range of the guns on Ewell's line, when they were subjected to a heavy artillery fire, so destructive that at 9 A. M. the attack was suspended by General Meade's order, and the troops returned to the left of the line. The troops suffered heavily, without inflicting any damage at all. They were met by the fire of 30 pieces of artillery, under the command of General Long, that were well arranged for both front and flank fire, and admirably served; so that there was but little use for the infantry behind the breastworks. Hancock and Wright, as soon as the attack was suspended, were hastened back to the positions on the left that they had left during the night before. Hancock took with him Birney's division, and thus left Ewell's front uncovered. Burnside was ordered to evacuate his line and move to the left of Hancock, with the view of swinging around Lee's flank and pressing toward Hanover Junction, now that the re-enforcements had arrived, and it was deemed impossible to force Lee's lines.

General Lee, perceiving the movement to his right, in order to find out what it meant, and delay it by threatening Grant's line of communication with Fredericksburg, ordered Ewell to move from his front and find the right flank and rear of Grant's army. This Ewell did on the 19th, but had to leave his artillery, not finding practicable roads in the direction he was moving. He soon encountered Tyler's division and Kitchen's and the Maryland brigades, disposed for a guard to that flank of the army, and drove them back until re-enforcements came to their support. Ewell

then commenced to retire, the object having been attained; but, as he was withdrawing, was attacked by Birney's division of the Second Corps and Crawford's of the Sixth, that had re-enforced Tyler, and quite a severe engagement ensued, in which Grant reported his losses at 1,535, and Ewell his, at about 900 killed, wounded and missing. Ewell then returned to the line from which he had started out. That threatening delayed Grant's movement, so that it was not until 1:30 A. M. of the 21st that the line of march to Hanover was taken up.

The losses in Grant's army from May 8th to the 21st in killed, wounded and prisoners were, 18,399; previously reported in the Wilderness battle, 17,666; total to May 21st, 36,065.

It appears from this report that the casualties suffered by Grant's army in the Wilderness during the first two days after the armies were brought in collision by General Lee amounted to almost as many as they did in the next thirteen days about Spottsylvania Courthouse.

Halleck reported that he had sent to Grant from May 13th to May 21st 40,000 re-enforcements.

There are no reports of the losses in Lee's army, except a few partial and mixed reports, and they can be approximated only by estimates. Early, who succeeded to the command of Ewell's Corps about this time, wrote that, after Hoke's brigade joined him, he had 9,000 effective infantry. Deducting that amount from the strength of the corps at the beginning of the campaign and adding the strength of Hoke's brigade at 1,500, make the casualties in the Second Corps amount to 7,000. Early reported Hill's Corps when he left it at

14,000 effectives; loss, probably about 4,000; Longstreet's losses, never heavy; say, 3,000; total of infantry, 14,000.

"N. B."—There were 9 brigades in the two divisions of Longstreet's corps. Four of Fields' (Jenkins', Law's, Bennings' and Anderson's) had casualties to June 15th amounting to 1,805. (Vol. 36, Part I., p. 1060.) Bryan's brigade of Kershaw's on the 6th of May lost 133 (p. 1064). Others not reported.

Until General Lee moved from Spottsylvania he received no re-enforcements whatever.

MAY 21ST TO MAY 26TH.

General Meade in his report wrote: "May 21st, 22d, and 23d were employed in moving the army from Spottsylvania to the North Anna River. May 24th, 25th, and 26th were spent on the North Anna. The Second Corps, on the left, having two divisions on the south side of the river; the Ninth Corps, in the centre, with one division on the south side, and the Fifth and Sixth Corps on the south side, extending over to Little River and crossing the Central Railroad. On the 25th the cavalry corps rejoined the army."

Lee's army was put in motion during the afternoon of the 21st. Ewell's corps in front, followed by Longstreet, marched by the Telegraph Road; Hill marched on a road to the west of this one. They reached North Anna at mid-day of the 22d, ahead of the advance of Grant's army. Then, and on the day before, while on the march, the first re-enforcements joined Lee; Breckenridge, with his division of infantry that had moved to Hanover Junction, after defeating Sigel at New

Market on May 15th; Hoke's brigade of Ewell's corps, and three brigades of Pickett's division. (Corse's, Kemper's and Barton's.) The whole estimated by the best authority not to exceed 8,000 effectives.

As the army arrived, it was disposed on an admirable defensive line, and one from which the offensive could be advantageously taken: the centre on the elevated ground close to the river at Oxford, upon which was massed a number of guns that were arranged to command the front across the river, and sweep the front of both wings: the left of the infantry was retired toward Little River, and rested upon it: the right was retired towards the South Anna, and rested on an impassable swamp. Neither could be turned, except by a wide detour. Whilst Lee could quickly re-enforce either wing from the other, either for defense or attack. Grant, in order to re-enforce either of his wings from the other, would have to march around Lee's advanced centre and cross the river twice. He advanced both wings across the river, encountering some opposition, without comprehending the character of Lee's formation until they were arrested by coming in contact with the line Lee was intrenching.

General Grant dispatched to Halleck on the 22d: "Prisoners have been captured from Pickett's division to-day, and there is evidence of other troops having been sent from Richmond also. Besides these, Breckenridge is said to have arrived. The force under Butler is not detaining 10,000 men in Richmond, and it is not even keeping the roads south of the city cut. Under these circumstances, I think it advisable to have all

of it here, except enough to keep a foothold at City Point. Send Smith in command."

On the 24th he reported: "The enemy has fallen back from North Anna; we are in pursuit. If this is the case, Butler's forces will be wanted where they are. Notify him to hold Smith in readiness to be moved, but to await further orders."

On the 25th, noon, he reported: "The enemy are evidently making a determined stand between the two Annas. It will probably take two days to get in position for a general attack, or to turn their position as may prove best. Send Butler's forces to the White House to land on the north side, and march up to join this army. If Hunter can possibly get to Charlottesville and Lynchburg he should do so, living on the country. The railroads and canals should be destroyed beyond the possibility of repair for weeks."

After sending this dispatch, he discovered the strength of Lee's line, and the weakness of his own, and commenced at once arrangements for the withdrawal of his army, and dispatched on the 26th: "To make a direct attack from either wing would cause a slaughter of our men that even success would not justify." All the trains were sent in the direction of Hanover town, and the cavalry, supported by a division of infantry, was hastened to Hanover town to seize and hold the crossing. It appears from the postscript to his dispatch to Halleck and his endorsement on Meade's dispatch to him, that he was providing for the contingency of being forced to fall back to the White House before he could effect a crossing, and, consequently, ordered that Smith

should put the railroad bridge at that place in condition for crossing troops and artillery.

When making arrangements for retiring his army towards the White House, as it appears, in order to lighten the shock to the administration and hold its confidence, he concluded his dispatch with: "Lees army is really whipped. The prisoners we now take show it, and the action of his army shows it unmistakably. A battle with them outside of intrenchments cannot be had. Our men feel that they have gained the morale over the enemy, and attack with confidence. I may be mistaken, but I feel that our success over Lee's army is already insured. The promptness and rapidity with which you have forwarded re-enforcements have contributed largely to the feeling of confidence inspired in our men, and to break down that of the enemy."

General Lee, when Grant had confronted his carefully prepared line, commenced making preparations to attack his right flank. An attack of sickness that kept him in bed at this time caused that the preparations did not proceed as promptly as they should have done; and then it was thought Grant's reputation for persistency would compel him at least to attempt to force the lines; for refusing them and moving down the river was an abandonment of his part, so conspicuously emphasized in his programme of the campaign, which was, that he would invest Richmond on the north side, and hold the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad for connection with his base at Acquia. Thus it happened that Grant withdrew before he was attacked.

Grant wrote that "Lee's line between the Annas was the strongest Lee had yet taken."

General Lee, finding that Grant's army had been withdrawn across the river during the night of the 26th, and was pressing down the river on the north side by a forced march to Hanover town, directed the march of his army so as to keep it interposed between him on the one side and the railroads and Richmond on the other. General Lee might have successfully contested the crossing at Hanover town, and forced Grant down the river to the White House, but did not think it advisable to force him to his tidewater base, from which he could so expeditiously move his army by transports to unite with Butler on James River, whilst he would be several days march from Beauregard. He therefore moved in a direct line towards the Chickahominy at Cold Harbor.

Grant's army, after crossing the river, pressed up to the line of Lee's march, and heavy skirmishing ensued every day, principally between the cavalry of the two armies; Grant endeavoring to get in front of Lee, and Lee keeping pace with his every movement. On the 31st of May, Sheridan's cavalry reached Cold Harbor, and was held in check there by Fitz Lee's division of cavalry. On June 1st, the head of the infantry column replaced Sheridan's cavalry, and in the afternoon of that day the Sixth Corps, supported by the rest of the army as fast as it could be brought up, attempted to force back the vanguard of Lee's infantry that was rapidly replacing Fitz Lee's cavalry, and a very severe engagement ensued, which resulted in some changes in the lines held at its beginning, but not materially affecting the strength of Lee's position. Grant

then pressed his army as close to Lee's as possible, and intrenched a line.

Grant could move no further by his left flank without going away from Richmond, and he must break through Lee's line, or abandon entirely his part of the programme, which was, to invest the city of Richmond on the north side of the James. If he moved by his left flank, it could be only to cross James river, and come up the river on the south side, under the cover of the navy and Butler's army. By his direction, Hunter, who had superseded Sigel in command of the Valley Army after the defeat at New Market, was to be on the march to Charlottesville and Lynchburg, and, if Grant crossed the river, Lee's army would be between him and Hunter, and Hunter's army would be in imminent danger. It was, therefore, imperative that a battle must be fought. Major-General William F. Smith, with all Butler's troops that could be spared from the intrenchments, numbering 17,000 men, had been sent to West Point by water, and marched up from there to reinforce Grant. Hoke's Division of North Carolina troops, numbering 7,656 in the aggregate, was sent by Beauregard to General Lee, and the final great battle, on the north side of the James, was fought on the 3d day of June, known as the "Second Battle of Cold Harbor," because Grant had massed there, which was the left of his line, two corps of the Army of the Potomac (Hancock's and Wright's), and Smith's 17,000 from Butler's army, whilst Warren's and Burnside's corps extended to their right. Grant, by order issued a few days before, had placed Burnside under Meade's command, and it was thence forward known as the Ninth Corps.

SECOND BATTLE OF COLD HARBOR.

The battle was opened at daylight of June 3d, by hurling the massed troops on the left against Breckenridge's, (supported by two divisions of Hill's Corps, Anderson's and Wilcox's), Hoke's and Kershaw's divisions. Warren and Burnside promptly took up the attack, but their assaults were so feeble that Ewell's skirmish line in front of Burnside was not driven back to the line of battle. On the left, the lines of heavily massed troops were hurled in such rapid succession that, as they drew near, they became one commingled mass, and the heavy artillery and musketry fire, that plowed through them, was murderous. So easily was the compact mass destroyed, that it was thought by Lee's troops to be only a demonstration, preparatory to the grand assault, until the number of their dead disclosed its seriousness.

Grant's order was that the assaults should be persisted in, until a lodgment in Lee's line was made somewhere, but not one hour passed before all was over. Grant then had the troops somewhat re-arranged, and ordered a renewal of the assaults upon each part of the line, without reference to any other part of it. This order was transmitted throughout the army by the corps, division, and brigade commanders until it reached the soldiery, but few made any advance. A silent and most significant protest against the order of Lieutenant-General U.S. Grant, commanding.

Grant's casualties from the 21st, when he left Spottsylvania, until James River was crossed, were

Reported at.....	18,861
Before the 21st of May, were	36,065

Total to crossing James river 54,926

The greater part of the casualties amounting to 18,861, occurred at the Battle of Cold Harbor on June 3d.

The numerical strength of Grant's army was maintained by the Administration. On June 15th, Halleck reported, that up to that time he had sent to Grant from Washington, exclusive of what he sent to Butler, 55,178 reinforcements.

The Confederate Government could replace only a fractional part of Lee's losses, as small as they were in comparison with Grant's. General Hoke wrote to General Lee toward the close of the Battle of Cold Harbor that, in front of his division, the ground was covered with the dead of the enemy, and that up to that time he had not lost a single man.

Halleck reported also (p. 569) that he had sent to Sheridan, up to that time, 7,683 cavalry horses since the army moved. The army had been promptly furnished with all the commissary, quartermaster, ordnance, and medical supplies required, whilst Lee's army was, at best, on half rations, and his cavalrymen had, in the main, to furnish their own remounts.

CHAPTER VI.

from the "Battle of Cold Harbor" to the Crossing of James River. General Review

General Grant, after the Battle of Cold Harbor that was so destructive to his army and so devoid of loss to Lee's, being, at last, fully satisfied that he could not break through Lee's line of battle, found his army at a standstill in a position that was not arranged for in the general plan of the campaign that embraced the auxiliary armies. To appreciate this it is necessary to turn to the positions and conditions of these armies.

Butler, with his auxiliary army, was firmly established in an impregnable position on the peninsula between the James and Appomattox rivers, his front protected by a line of earthworks, extending from river to river, constructed under the direction of military engineers, learned in the highest attainments of their branch of the service, and furnished with unlimited means; the navigable rivers on both flanks and rear completely dominated by their gunboats, so that there was no way of attack upon it that was within the means of Beauregard, except by assaults upon strong fortifications, whilst Butler's army could be thrown across either river during a night, and moved suddenly against either Richmond or Petersburg, the loss of either of which cities would be fatal to Beauregard's position. Beauregard had not only to keep sufficient force in front of Butler's fortified lines, but also to guard both flanks, exposed to a remarkable degree. Butler's position, therefore, was everything that Grant could reasonably

desire, and, upon his inability to invest Lee's army in Richmond, on the north side of the James, he could throw his army across the river in rear, and under cover, of Butler's army and the fleet of gunboats, and try his fortunes in combination with Butler.

But his other auxiliary army was at Staunton, and, by his instructions, directed to march down the Central Railroad to Charlottesville, destroying the road thoroughly, and from Charlottesville to proceed down the Lynchburg Railroad to that city, thence down James river, destroying the canal, to the north side of the city of Richmond where it would find his army if he had not before that time destroyed Lee's army, or driven it away, and already in possession of the city. If he left the north side and crossed the river, Hunter's army would be marching into the jaws of Lee's army when following the line of march directed by him, and nothing but a miracle could save it. He could not abandon it to such a fate, and hence inaugurated siege operations, by bombarding Lee's line with guns and mortars, by digging parallels up to it and by running mines under the salients, as the only recourse left to him, whilst he dispatched Sheridan with two divisions of his cavalry to Charlottesville to meet Hunter there, and conduct his army to West Point, keeping on the north side of the Mattaponi and Pamunky rivers, protected by those rivers from the approach of Lee's army.

Not many days elapsed before it was made apparent to General Grant that the location of his army was not at all satisfactory to the authorities in Washington. Halleck wrote to him, urging him not to put the Chickahominy between him and his supplies, nor between him and

Richmond; and advocating that he should make Fredericksburg his base and use the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad as his communication with it. He enforced that view by weighty reasons, the chief of which was: "That his army should be kept interposed between Lee and Washington." But, as Grant had found it impossible to keep on that line when he was at Hanover Junction, it did not appear probable that he could regain it after the disastrous Battle of Cold Harbor. At the same time he became satisfied that General Lee would not be long entertained by his siege operations, and, on June 5th, announced his purpose to cross James river as soon as Sheridan had made connection with Hunter, and he was assured of the safety of that army. He concluded the dispatch announcing his purpose to make this change of base with a most optimistic view of the situation: "Should Hunter not succeed in reaching Lynchburg, I will still make the effort to destroy the canal by sending cavalry up the south side of the river with a pontoon train to cross wherever they can. The feeling of the two armies now seems to be that the rebels can protect themselves only by strong intrenchments, whilst our army is not only confident of protecting itself without intrenchments, but that it can beat, and drive the enemy whenever and wherever he can be found without this protection."

On the 7th, he started Sheridan to Charlottesville, and ordered that the railroad track from West Point to the lines of his army should be relaid and siege operations to be pressed with the utmost vigor, as if intending to maintain his position there, and to press aggression from that point, but, at once, ordered But-

ler to make a reconnoissance, in force, upon Petersburg and capture it if possible. Butler sent Gillmore there on the 9th, who found but a small garrison, but, owing to the strength of the works, deemed it inexpedient to press the attack, and returned and made his report. Gillmore's report of the condition at Petersburg inspired Grant to hasten the movement of his army, so, in spite of the fact that he had not found out the whereabouts of Hunter's army, and had received no information from Sheridan in regard to the movements of the cavalry, commenced on the 12th to withdraw from Lee's front and to move his army upon Petersburg.

On the 15th, Halleck dispatched: "On the whole, I feel, since your change of base, some apprehension for Hunter's safety." When General Grant announced that he was crossing the river, and he felt sure that Petersburg would be in his possession before Lee could get his army there to protect it, President Lincoln, in characteristic style, dispatched to him: "I begin to see it. You will succeed. God bless you all."

After the Battle of Cold Harbor, and General Lee found that Grant had commenced siege operations, he, at once, determined to take the initiative. Hunter's army at Staunton called for immediate attention. On the 5th, he sent Breckenridge, by railroad trains, to Rockfish Gap to arrest his progress down the Central Railroad. When he found that Grant had started Sheridan, on the 7th, to Charlottesville, he sent Hampton with two of his divisions of cavalry to intercept his march. And on the 13th, sent off Early with Ewell's Corps to follow Breckenridge and move to Brown's or Swift Run Gap, below Rockfish Gap, with instructions

to press in between Hunter and the Lower Valley, and destroy his army if possible; or, if he failed to accomplish as much as that, to, at least, drive him off from the Valley; then to march for the invasion of Maryland and the capture of Washington, that he knew was feebly garrisoned, and relied for protection upon Grant's army keeping between his army and Washington. The sending by Lee of one of the three corps of the Army of Northern Virginia to make an aggressive campaign into the enemy's country shows more clearly than words what he thought of the comparative fighting condition of the two armies. And, in spite of Grant's determination to keep him so occupied in resisting assaults that no opportunity would be given him to project an offensive movement, the condition of his army had compelled Grant to desist, and the opportunity was at once seized upon.

GENERAL GRANT.

The general plan of campaign, as arranged by General Grant before active operations commenced, was based upon bold and persistent aggression by superior forces directed to the capture of two points, vital to the Confederacy, Richmond and Atlanta. But, from the beginning of the war, President Lincoln had required of the commander of the Army of the Potomac, in any plan of the campaign, one requirement must be of first importance—a *sine qua non*—ample protection to the Capitol. That requirement had already caused much fault-finding between McClellan and the Administration. When Grant was placed in command, he readily gave his assent to the requirement, and adopted the Administra-

tion's plan of advance. He announced that the Army of Northern Virginia would be his immediate objective, and that he would pursue it wherever it went. That he proposed to drive it rapidly to Richmond, invest it there, or to drive it from there further away from Washington, if, in the meantime, he had not struck it a mortal blow. Of course, this required that his army should be between Lee's army and Washington, and that it should not leave the north side of the James, at least, until Lee's army had been so exhausted by battle that it would be impossible for General Lee to project an aggressive movement against Washington. Grant may have thought that Lee's army was reduced to this condition, at least, he represented to the Administration that it was, when he crossed the James.

General Grant arranged that, when he moved against Lee's army, he should have with him in the field more than twice Lee's numbers, and, in addition, that there should be collected in Washington as many more troops as possible to supply the losses in his army as they occurred.

He directed: That his army should be moved in so compact a mass that, at the end of each day's march, all the corps would be in such close proximity that they would be in position to form a continuous line of battle, and he issued minute directions for the marches so as to accomplish that purpose. This could be possible with the *impedimenta* of so large an army, only by reason of the nearness of navigable waters in rear, and on the flank, of his proposed line of march, affording him a nearby and well-protected base of supplies, whilst the

flanks of his army would be protected by the rivers flowing into them.

He arranged, also, that, at the same time he attacked Lee's army in front, another army of 40,000 should, assisted by the navy, attack Richmond, Lee's base of supplies as well as the Capitol of the Confederate States, and still another army of 20,000 should sweep the Valley (the Granary of Virginia), consume all the quartermaster and commissary supplies there, destroy all the railroads, and then close in upon the right flank of his army. It was his purpose, if, with his army, he could not at once destroy Lee's army, to keep it so continuously and destructively engaged that Lee would be compelled to draw to him every available man, and then that the two auxiliary armies could not be confronted by forces sufficient to stay their progress. In other words, either that he would rapidly destroy Lee's army, or drive it before him, or else Butler would be able to gain possession of Richmond.

That these plans were based upon either an underestimate of Lee's ability and the quality of his soldiery, or an overestimate of his own ability and of the quality of his soldiery it took but a short time to prove. There was force enough collected in Richmond to repulse Butler's army and render it innocuous. The Confederate forces in the Valley proved sufficient to whip and disperse the forces there before they could unite; and still General Lee had force enough with him to interpose between Grant's army and Richmond, to repulse all its assaults, to compel Grant to abandon the part of the programme assigned to his army, and, after the loss of the unprecedented number of 54,926 men, to move be-

hind Butler's army to a position, to which he could have gone at the beginning of the campaign without the loss of a man.

General Grant, at the beginning of the campaign, purposed to march around Lee's intrenched line on the Rapidan and gain position between Lee's army and his base at Richmond, and issued orders that, at the end of the march of May 5th, a line should be formed and well intrenched, so that Lee would be forced, if he made any attack, to attack his army in an intrenched position. But his mode of advance, by moving all the corps together as compactly as possible, had the disadvantage that there could be no secrecy or rapid marches, and, to a general of Lee's ability, afforded an opportunity for a surprise by striking in upon his columns whilst on the march, and inflicting heavy losses before the character of the attack was understood. This, General Lee did on June 5th, in the Wilderness, and again on the 8th in front of Spottsylvania Courthouse, so successfully that Grant's army never reached, in either instance, the point to which the day's march was directed, and, consequently, Grant's flank movements met with almost instant defeat, and he felt compelled, in each instance, to hurl his army against Lee's that had taken position and intrenched it.

General Grant claimed that, while his losses were great, Lee's were relatively greater, because the United States Government had it in its power to renew his strength, whilst the resources of Lee's government were exhausted. But, as we will see, the result of Grant's operations up to this time was that General Lee was still strong enough to weaken his army by a large de-

tachment of troops, again, to clear the Valley of the forces that had returned there, increased in numbers and reorganized under a new commander, and, then, to make an aggressive movement extending to the fortifications of Washington; and this force was prevented from, at least, attempting to break through the fortifications and to capture the city, by the arrival of the Sixth Corps that was detached from Grant's army and sent, in haste, to save the capitol. If, as Halleck wrote, chance had delayed the arrival of these troops for twenty-four hours, the capitol would have been in imminent danger. When Grant crossed the James, he had not only left Hunter exposed to destruction but had uncovered Washington. And we will see, as we progress with the campaign, that Grant's losses were so enormous in comparison with Lee's, that Lee's small resources enabled him, as in the beginning so throughout the campaign, to successfully resist all his efforts, and Lee was overcome only when Sherman's army came to Grant's assistance.

GENERAL GRANT'S REPORT.

General Grant, in the commencement of his report, wrote: That, though his army was much superior to Lee's in numbers, this superiority was overcome by his being on the aggressive, whilst Lee was on the defensive on interior lines—"The necessity of guarding my immense trains neutralized, in a great measure, this superiority."

The facts shown by an examination of the map are: That Lee's trains were moved in an open country—their rear and flanks with no natural protection—to the railroad, and the railroad connection with his base at Richmond was subject to being destroyed as it was by Sheri-

dan's cavalry, while Grant could, as he did, move his base on tidewater, where it was protected by the navy and where transports, that could not be molested, collected supplies for his army, so as to keep it near at hand, in rear, and under cover of his army; while his wagon trains to and from were flanked by streams of water (the Rapidan, the Mattaponi, the Pamunky and the James), that could be crossed at only a few fords if at all. He was moving on a line nearly parallel with, and not far distant from, navigable waters; any point on which afforded him a base secure from the possibility of attack. Thus, the connection with his base was short and well protected, and his base susceptible of change at every step of his progress. The command of the navigable waters gave to Grant all the strategical advantages of interior lines, not only in the requirements of field transportation, but in the rapid transference of troops; as was conspicuously shown when, after Early had marched to Monocacy, within thirty-five miles of Washington, Grant shipped a corps of his army from Petersburg, Va., that arrived in Washington as soon as Early, making the utmost haste, could march to its front.

In his letter to General McClellan, written in the fall of '62, President Lincoln, with much clearness, points out to him how the route to Richmond by which Grant moved, possessed all the advantages of an interior line upon the basis that the navigable waters were controlled by the Union navy.

Grant wrote in his dispatch of June 5th, and to the same effect in many others: That Lee's army would fight, only, whilst protected by strong intrenchments, which is, to say the least, very misleading. For, in the

first place, the Union correspondence shows that Grant's army, before it moved from the Rapidan, was supplied with intrenching tools to an extent unknown before in the Virginia campaigns, that orders were issued that wherever any part of the army was in line for half an hour, it should intrench the line, and, wherever it was practicable, a second line should be intrenched in its rear, to rally upon in case the first was broken.

As the battles fought between the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia had, as a general rule, been fought when the initiation of attack, and freedom, and rapidity of motion were more sought after than strength of position, and intrenching was resorted to only in exceptional cases, perhaps General Grant expected to gain a great advantage over Lee by extensive use of this mode of protection. General Lee had noted his mode of fighting in the West, and, as soon as he arrested Grant's flank moves and forced him to battle on ground of his own selection, made his arrangements and issued his orders that Grant's army should be confronted with entrenchments. Hence it was that Ewell so promptly intrenched his line on the Stone Pike in the Wilderness; and Hill met with criticism for not doing the same on the Plank Road during the night of May 5th.

That Grant, after the Wilderness Battle, should persist in hurling his army, time and again, upon intrenchments, when, if the assaults failed, as they always did, except in one instance, there must be sacrifice of life without any compensating advantages—when the 'attrition' was all on his side, must have been caused by apprehension on his part, that Lee would seize the first

occasion presented by his relaxation of aggression to strike another unexpected blow, perhaps, a fatal one.

We have seen that Lee, who, as shown in the records, had full knowledge of the numbers and organization of Grant's army, hastened to meet it in the Wilderness, though he had available for the onset, only, if quite, 20,000 muskets; that on May 6th, as soon as Longstreet arrived, he assumed the aggressive, and so successfully that but for an unprecedented accident, (the wounding of Longstreet conducting the attack and the killing of Jenkins, who was to lead in it by some of their own men), the probabilities are that Grant's army would have been driven back across the river with great loss, if not destroyed. Again, on May 12th, except for the blunder of withdrawing the artillery from Johnson's line, it is evident that Hancock would have failed as signally there as he had done two days before on Warren's line. The only successes Grant had met with, up to the transference of his army across the James, were the repulse of Lee's attack in the afternoon of the 6th, after Lee's misfortune of that day, which was, in fact, more in the nature of a strong demonstration than of a determined attack, and the breaking over Johnson's line on the 12th—the latter fruitless of anything except what was gained at the onset, and fearfully costly in the lives of his men and the *morale* of his army. Never afterwards could Grant's army be driven to fight as it fought on that day; though, after the successful onset, it had the advantage of the cover of Johnson's earthworks, whilst Ewell's men assaulted them from the open.

In spite of so many and often repeated lessons, we will see that General Grant, after crossing the river, persisted

in these attacks until assured that his men could not be driven from the cover of their works to make an assault. After one of these assaults, General Warren, one of his corps commanders, in presenting his plan of attack upon Lee's army, took occasion to write: "Lee's army was no nearer being whipped than it was on the Rapidan before the campaign commenced." In "*General Beauregard*," by Alfred Roman, (p. 247), I find: "General Beauregard proposed to General Lee on June 18th that, as soon as Hill's and Anderson's corps should arrive, an attack should be made upon General Grant's left flank and rear. General Lee refused assent, on the ground that his troops needed rest, and that the defensive having been thus far so advantageous to him against Grant's offensive, north of the James and to Beauregard at Petersburg, he preferred to continue the same mode of warfare."

If it was possible for General Lee to overcome the great resources of the United States Government in men, money, and enterprise, Grant offered him the most promising opportunity of doing so by his mode of persistent assaults, as Buller did to the Boers in the early months of the war in South Africa.

BUTLER'S ARMY.

General Grant, in his report, attributes his want of success up to this time, in a great measure, to the inefficiency of Butler's command: That Butler, instead of carrying out his part of the programme, suffered himself "to be bottled up and the bottle hermetically sealed."

It is well here, before proceeding further, to briefly state the operations of Butler's army up to this time.

Grant's orders to Butler directed that he should move his infantry and its artillery, by transports, up the James, and land them on the south side of the river as near to the city of Richmond as could be done safely and expeditiously; that Richmond was to be his objective point; that he should, if possible, capture it by a *coup-de-main*: if that was not possible, that he should invest it on the south side, from the river below the city to the river above; so that when he, with his army, closed in upon the city on the north side, and made a junction with Butler's army on the James above it, Richmond would be completely invested, and its fall only a question of a short time. General Grant's orders, further, directed: that Kautz, with his 3,000 cavalry, should start from Suffolk and move upon the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad, should cut and destroy it so as to delay the Confederate troops moving from the South, and prevent Lee from receiving reinforcements from that direction; that Colonel West, with the 1,800 cavalry in and about Fort Monroe, should march up from Williamsburg on the north side of the James, covering that flank of the river whilst it was full of his transports.

In accordance with these instructions, Butler moved promptly, at the appointed time, with the main force and the two cavalry detachments, dropped from the boat's small detachments at Wilson's Wharf and Fort Powhatan, to protect the fleet of transports, and on the 6th of May, disembarked the division of Negro troops at City Point, and the Eighteenth and Tenth Corps at Bermuda Hundred. He, at once, on that day, sent a brigade to cut the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad and ascertain what force was in his front. The

brigade encountered Johnson's and Hagood's brigades, and was driven back. The next day (7th) he sent Major-General William F. Smith, commander of the Eighteenth Corps, who, Grant subsequently wrote, was one of the best and most enterprising officers he had in his army, with two divisions, to destroy the railroad and open the way for the investment of Richmond. Johnson, with his two brigades, encountered him and quite a severe engagement ensued. General Smith reported: "The attempt failed because the enemy resisted with unexpected strength."

On the 8th there were rumors that the Army of the Potomac had met with a severe defeat on the 6th in the Wilderness, and Butler dispatched that, in consequence, he would hasten to intrench his army. On the 9th, he advanced in full force. Then General Robert Ransom, with 7,389 available infantry, was holding the fortified lines of Drewry's Bluff, and Bushrod Johnson, with 4,000, was at Port Walthall Junction with lines well intrenched. By the 10th, Ransom's command was increased by the arrival of Gracie's Brigade to 8,967 effectives. May 11th, Hoke reported at Drewry's Bluff with his division of six brigades (11,000 muskets). By the 14th, General Beauregard had at least 21,000 effectives available for an attack, and was urged by President Davis and General Bragg to attack at once. General Butler's force that advanced from the intrenchments about Bermuda did not much, if at all, exceed 25,000.

General Beauregard met with severe censure from his government because he did not destroy Butler's army; the opportunity for doing so appeared so favorable when Butler was extending his left so as to invest Richmond

on the south side of the river. He made an attack on the 16th of June. Having ascertained that Butler, in extending his left, had weakened his right, he directed General Ransom to break through the right and sever Butler's moving column from his base at Bermuda. General Ransom succeeded in breaking the line and driving the troops, but, due to misunderstandings and mismanagement, he did not succeed in getting well in between these troops and their base. General Whiting, with his division, had been left near Port Walthall Junction to come up in Butler's rear, whilst Beauregard's with the main force attacked in front and flank. Beauregard's plan of battle appeared excellent on paper, but the troops were so far removed from each other as to insure failure, when being executed, especially since his army was composed of detached regiments and brigades, thrown together for the occasion, into divisions, whose commanders were not acquainted with the troops nor the troops with them. The division commanders had had but little experience in the field, and Beauregard should have brought all together and under his eye before opening the battle, as he was directed to do by both President Davis and General Bragg.

In consequence of the failure to strike Butler a vital blow, General Robert Ransom, commanding the division, and General Barton, one of the brigades that made the attack, were removed from command, and General Whiting, who did nothing with his division, was relieved from command and sent back to Wilmington, N. C. Beauregard's success was not complete, but was sufficient to cause Butler to withdraw his troops during the night and place them behind his intrenched line; in doing

which he was fully justified by the result of the battle, and the increasing strength of Beauregard's forces. For several days after, Beauregard pressed back Butler's lines at different points, in order to fortify in front of them the shortest and strongest line that the nature of the country admitted of.

When Butler advanced on the 9th, he sent Kautz with the cavalry, through the opening made in the Confederate lines by the advance, to destroy all the railroads leading into Richmond and Petersburg on the south side of the James, which Kautz accomplished as thoroughly as could be expected. It is difficult to see wherein he could have done more than he did with the troops he had under his command, when following Grant's instructions.

Had Butler, regardless of risks, rapidly extended from his base in the effort to carry out Grant's instructions literally—"To invest the city of Richmond from the river below to the river above;" that is, to extend his investing lines from Bermuda below Drewry's Bluff to James river above the city, a distance of from twelve to fifteen miles, with the Confederate gunboats lying in the intermediate waters and commanding the adjacent country, and Drewry's Bluff so well fortified and so strongly manned as to be impregnable to assaults—his army, if extended to a thin skirmish line, could scarcely have covered the ground, and the rapid assembling of Beauregard's troops, from the south in his rear, must have ensured the destruction of his army. In view of all the conditions, as they actually existed, it appears that Butler was fortunate that, in his attempts to carry out his instructions, he did not lose his army.

Grant's censure of Butler for his conduct of this part of the campaign, in which he was confronted by an army proportionately much larger than that by which his own army was confronted, taken in connection with the fate of Sigel's and Hunter's armies in the Valley, makes it appear thus early, not only with what recklessness Grant was willing to expose the forces auxiliary to the army under his personal command in order that his army might accomplish something commensurate with the expectations he had excited in the Administration and the people of the North, but that he had no compassion for them in defeat; on the contrary, he attempted to throw upon them the odium of his own failures.

CHAPTER VII.

The Valley Campaign

We will first follow to its results GENERAL LEE'S INITIATIVE, as General Grant's assaults upon Petersburg failed, and the use of his army degenerated into a prolonged seige, and its operations were very much affected by Early's aggression.

General David Hunter, who superseded Sigel, with increased force, having marched up the Valley and defeated General William E. Jones at Piedmont about ten miles below Staunton on the 6th day of June, and having driven Jones' small force from the field, pressed immediately on to Staunton, where he was joined by General Crook with his division of infantry and Averell's division of cavalry. As we have seen, according to Grant's direction, he was to proceed from there down the Central Railroad (now the Chesapeake and Ohio) to Charlottesville, destroying the railroad thoroughly; thence, on the railroad to Lynchburg, destroying that also; thence, down James River, destroying the canal, and join Grant's army on the north side of Richmond.

General Grant's exhaustion of the aggressive force of his army in the Battle of Cold Harbor occurred at the most opportune time for General Lee to meet this flank attack, and he, at once, sent Breckenridge, with his division, by rail, to Rockfish Gap, through which the Central Railroad crossed the Blue Ridge Mountain, to arrest Hunter's progress in that direction. Hunter, thus diverted from the route directed by Grant, on the 10th day of June, moved down the Valley to Lexington, and

thence, by the Peaks of Otter, towards Lynchburg. Breckenridge, as soon as he comprehended Hunter's purpose, hastened with his division of infantry to that place, moving on the east side of the Blue Ridge and using the railroad to expedite his progress, and he directed the Valley cavalry to keep in front of Hunter and delay his progress as much as possible.

THE BATTLE OF TREVILLIAN.

General Grant, ignorant of this change in the line of Hunter's march, sent Sheridan on the 7th of June, with two divisions of his cavalry, to unite with Hunter at Charlottesville and conduct him to West Point on the York River, as appears from the dispatches of General Dana on June 5th and 12th. General Lee immediately sent Hampton with two divisions of his cavalry to arrest the progress of this column. Hampton succeeded in getting upon and in front of Sheridan's line of march near Trevillian Depot, in Louisa county, and the cavalry Battle of Trevillian was fought on the 11th and 12th of June. On the 11th, Hampton's and Fitz Lee's divisions, not having united—Hampton's being at Trevillian, Fitz Lee's at Louisa Courthouse—Hampton attempted to drive back and close in upon Sheridan from the direction of Trevillian, whilst Fitz Lee, by his instruction, did the same from the direction of the Courthouse, and they were to unite when Sheridan had been driven back far enough to accomplish it. Whilst engaged in doing this, Custar's brigade passed in between the two columns, got in Hampton's rear, and captured prisoners, led horses, caissons, and wagons. Rosser soon attacked this brigade in front, and drove it upon Fitz Lee, and,

between the two, the command was roughly handled, broken up, and compelled to drop its plunder and lose four caissons and a number of prisoners. This dash, however, caused Hampton to desist from his aggression and to fall back from his advanced position. Hence, Sheridan claimed a victory. The next day (12th) Hampton, having drawn Fitz Lee up to him and gotten his forces well in hand in front of Sheridan on the road to Charlottesville, repulsed every attack, and, then, assuming the aggressive, drove in his flanking column, and compelled him to abandon the expedition and to retreat toward West Point without having heard from Hunter.

General Lee, at 10 P. M., June 13th, reported: "A dispatch just received from Major-General Hampton states that he defeated the enemy's cavalry near Trevilian with heavy loss, capturing 500 prisoners besides the wounded. The enemy retreated in confusion, apparently by the road he came, leaving his dead and wounded on the field." Sheridan reported that he defeated Hampton but that Hampton was reinforced by infantry, and that he fell back, only, because his ammunition was exhausted; and both he and General Grant, in spite of abundant opportunities to know that Hampton received no reinforcements persisted in that statement, and attempted to make it an historical fact.

For safety Sheridan crossed the North Anna, and retreated on the north side of that river and the Mattaponi. Hampton pursued on the south side of those rivers and reached West Point in advance of him. Grant, having abandoned that base and moved his army across the James, was compelled to hold it with some force until

Sheridan reached there. Hampton demonstrated against it, and threw some shells into the transports lying there with supplies, creating almost a panic before Sheridan's arrival. On the 20th, Hampton dispatched from West Point to General Bragg: "If you can now send a force to take the White House and drive the boats down the river, they can be captured. Sheridan will be forced to retreat again. With one brigade of infantry I can take the place. If my cavalry is here to co-operate, we can take large numbers of prisoners, horses, and wagons, etc. I suggest this operation to you for your consideration. If no troops are sent, I shall watch Sheridan, striking if I can. The brigade of infantry (the Garrison) makes him stronger than I am. There never was a better opportunity to crush the cavalry than is now offered. If I can get the troops, I will follow him up to the last. Should he attempt to march to Grant, if all the cavalry on this side of the river can be concentrated, he can be destroyed."

When Sheridan had recruited somewhat, he commenced his march to rejoin the army, but found Hampton's cavalry interposed on the line of march he was directed to take. Fortunately for him, he had with him the infantry brigade left as a garrison for West Point. From the time he reached the Chickahominy, Hampton contested every step of his progress, drove him down the river, routed one of his divisions (Gregg's), and except for the infantry brigade taken with him from West Point, he would have certainly lost all his trains. Hard pressed by Hampton, he at last succeeded in getting his command to Weyanoke, from which point Grant's army had crossed the river. His cavalry so completely broken

down and disorganized that it was weeks, replete with stirring events, before it could take the field. The Union correspondence shows that Grant suffered the greatest anxiety in regard to the fate of Hunter and that of the cavalry, hearing nothing from either, except such news as he gathered from the Richmond newspapers, until Sheridan arrived at West Point, and then, finding that Sheridan had failed in his object, his anxiety on Hunter's account became acute, for his assaults at Petersburg had failed, and he was forced to inaugurate siege operations with the *morale* of his army much weakened. Sheridan's casualties on the raid were reported at 1,512.

EARLY MOVES UPON HUNTER.

General Lee, on the 13th of June, started Early, with the Second Corps, instructed to proceed by Charlottesville to Brown's or Swift Run Gap below Rockfish Gap, thence to unite with Breckenridge and destroy Hunter's army if possible; and then to proceed down the Valley, with Washington City as his objective point. When directing Early to Rockfish Gap, General Lee was not aware of the change of direction of Hunter's march, because Sheridan had cut the telegraph wire and there was no other line of communication.

General Early, commencing his march on June 13th, arrived at Charlottesville on the 16th, and there learned that Hunter was in Bedford county, twenty miles from Lynchburg. He changed the direction of his march for that place, and, by the use of the railroad, succeeded in reaching it with one-half of his infantry about midday of the 17th. He then took command and confronted

Hunter with troops of the Second Corps that had arrived. On the 18th he received the following dispatch:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
June 18th.

"GENERAL EARLY,

"Lynchburg:

"Grant is in front of Petersburg. Will be opposed there. Strike as quick as you can, and, if circumstances authorize, carry out the original plan, or move upon Petersburg without delay. R. E. LEE."

The remainder of his infantry having arrived, Early planned to attack on the 19th, but Hunter, made aware of his arrival, fell back from his front during the night, and commenced his retreat. Early pursued as rapidly as possible, hindered much by the fact that officers' horses were not brought on the trains with them, and all field and staff officers had to proceed on foot. Expecting Hunter to retreat by the route he had come, he arranged to arrest his retreat at the Peaks of Otter, and force him to battle there; but Hunter took the road to Buford's Station, thence to Salem, and from there to Lewisburg, and thence to the Kanawa Valley. The road down the Valley by Lexington and Staunton was thus left open to Early, who, having pursued Hunter to Liberty and found the direction of his flight, gathered together his command as speedily as possible, and, on the 23rd, commenced his march down the Valley. On the 27th he reached Staunton.

This official report, at this time, showed the command to consist of 10,000 muskets, 2,000 cavalry, divided into

4 small brigades, and 4 battalions of artillery—40 guns with the infantry and 10 guns with the cavalry; total, 50 guns.

The march was resumed on the 28th, and the command reached Winchester on July 2nd. Imboden, with his brigade of cavalry and a battery of artillery, had been detached, as the column passed, and sent through Brock's Gap to the South Branch of the Potomac, down which he was to proceed, strike the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, burn the railroad bridge across the river, and move down the railroad, breaking it up, to Martinsburg, where he would unite with the army. On the 3rd of July, General Early moved upon Martinsburg. After sending out detachments to strike in between that place and Harper's Ferry and to sweep around between it and the river, hoping thereby to cut off Sigel, who was at that place with a considerable force to guard the lower Valley and protect the railroad against raids, General Early sent Breckenridge by the Valley turnpike direct to Martinsburg, and he, with the Second Corps, marched to the railroad between it and Harper's Ferry. The flanking columns were not quick enough, and Sigel made his escape by crossing the Potomac at Shephardstown and moving down to Harper's Ferry on the Maryland side of it. Early immediately pressed his forces upon Harper's Ferry, and during the night of the 4th, the enemy evacuated Harper's Ferry, burnt the railroad and pontoon bridges, and concentrated upon Maryland Heights.

Early's appearance in the lower Valley caused great excitement and alarm in Washington, taking the authorities as much by surprise as if he had dropped from

the skies. All troops capable of taking the field had been shipped to Grant as fast as they arrived, and but few of the battalions of artillerymen, that composed the garrison of Washington, were left; of those, Halleck was in the act of shipping to Grant 8 companies, in accordance with his orders. To the repeated dispatches announcing Early's progress from Winchester to Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry, Grant's reply was: "Early is in my front," and he persisted in it until the 5th, when a deserter from Lee's army confirmed the reports from Washington. He then ordered General Meade to send a good division of infantry and all the dismounted cavalry by steamers to Washington. Rickett's division of the Sixth Corps was selected, and General Grant reported that it and the dismounted cavalry amounted to 9,000. These reinforcements, he dispatched, should ensure the destruction of Early's force. It seems remarkable that an army commander should have so completely lost sight of a whole corps of the opposing army for nearly a month in the height of the campaign, and should have thought that the forces he sent were sufficient to insure the destruction of the Second Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia, which had, at the beginning of his campaign in the Wilderness, successfully contended against two corps of his army, when massed against it under his eye.

BATTLE OF MONOCACY.

Until the 8th was spent by Early in an attempt, by manoeuvring, to cause the evacuation of Maryland Heights. General Lee, in a dispatch sent afterwards, expressed his unqualified approval of his action in not

assaulting the intrenchments on Maryland Heights and in not delaying longer in front of them. Failing in this effort, Early, on that day, put the whole of his force in motion in the direction of Frederick City and passed through the gaps in South Mountain. On the 9th, he detached Johnson, with his brigade of cavalry, and sent him to strike the railroads between Baltimore on the one side and Philadelphia and Harrisburg on the other, to burn the bridges over Gun Powder river, to cut the railroad between Baltimore and Washington, and to demonstrate against Baltimore, and, if Early succeeded in getting into Washington, to hasten to Point Lookout for the purpose of releasing the prisoners held there. General Early, after driving away the small force at Frederick City, hastened on to the Monocacy near the Junction where General Lew Wallace, with the troops from about Baltimore, reinforced by Rickett's Division of the Sixth Corps, was found in position on the eastern side of the river. Early promptly confronted him with Ramseur's and Rodes' divisions, and opened upon him with his artillery, whilst Breckenridge ordered McCausland to cross his brigade of cavalry over the river at a ford to the right of Early's line, and he followed it with Gordon's divisions, and then bore down upon Wallace's left flank, which was rapidly doubled up, and driven from the front of Ramseur and Rodes. Ramseur at once crossed the river on the railroad bridge, and soon after Rodes at some little distance to his left, and Wallace was driven in the utmost confusion in the direction of Baltimore. Early took between 600 and 700 prisoners, but, as prisoners would be a serious encumbrance, he did not pursue Wallace's flying troops, and rested his

men as much as possible for the next days work. The action closed at sunset, and Early had marched fourteen miles that day before the action commenced. On the 10th he took up his march to Washington, and marched that day twenty miles to the neighborhood of Rockville, though his rear was threatened by the advance of troops from Maryland Heights. On the same day the (10th), Grant started the two remaining divisions of the Sixth Corps (11,000 men) by steamers from City Point, and from Fortress Monroe a division of the Nineteenth Corps, first arriving from New Orleans. I quote the following dispatches to show the condition in Washington on the 10th.

PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S DISPATCH.

WASHINGTON, July 10th, 2:30 P. M.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT:

Your dispatch to General Halleck, referring to what I may think in the present emergency, is shown me. General Halleck says we have absolutely no force here fit to go to the field. He thinks with the 100 days men and invalids we have here we can defend Washington, and scarcely Baltimore. Besides these, there are about 8,000, not very reliable, under Howe at Harper's Ferry, with Hunter approaching that point very slowly, with what numbers, I suppose, you know better than I. Wallace, with some odds and ends and a part of what came up with Rickett's, was so badly beaten yesterday at Monocacy that what is left can attempt no more than to defend Baltimore. What we can get from Pennsylvania and New York will scarcely be worth count-

ing, I fear. Now, what I think is, that you should provide to retain your hold where you are certainly, and bring the rest with you personally, and make a vigorous effort to destroy the enemy's force in this vicinity. I think there is really a fair chance of doing this, if the movement is prompt. This is what I think upon your suggestion, and is not an order.

A. LINCOLN, President U. S.

HALLECK'S DISPATCH.

WASHINGTON, July 10th, 1864, 3:30 P. M.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT:

Your telegram of 6 P. M. yesterday received. Whether you had better come here or remain there is a question upon which I cannot advise. What you say about getting in Early's rear is perfectly correct, but unfortunately we have no forces here for the field. All such forces were sent you long ago. What we have here are raw militia, invalids, convalescents from the hospitals, a few dismounted batteries, and the dismounted and disorganized cavalry sent up from James River. With these we expect to defend our immense depots of stores and the line of intrenchments around the city; but what can we do with such a force against a column of 20,000 veterans? One-half of the men cannot march at all. The only men fit for the field was Rickett's division, which has been defeated and badly cut up under Wallace. If the remains can hold Baltimore till we can re-enforce it, I shall be satisfied. I sent invalid troops from here this morning to assist them. I can draw nothing from Harper's Ferry till Hunter effects

a junction. When Hunter's army gets within reach, and the Sixth Corps arrives, what you propose can probably be done. Rumor says that Hunter's army has lost almost everything, and is badly cut up. Only one battalion of heavy artillery has reached here; the other two were with Rickett's, and what is left of them is probably retreating on Baltimore. We are impressing horses to remount the cavalry. It arrives destitute of everything. There is necessary delay in preparing it for service.

H. W. HALLECK,
Major-General and Chief of Staff.

Now as to the condition of Grant's army: Everything had been drawn from Washington, and still Grant had failed utterly in his attempts to capture Petersburg, though for four days (June 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th) he had hurled his divisions upon Beauregard's lines. Sheridan, as we have seen, had been driven back without accomplishing anything, and since his two divisions of cavalry had been held in the rear to recruit, Wilson had been sent with the well-mounted men of his and Kautz's division—all the other cavalry—on an extensive raid to cut railroads, and, on his return, had been routed, losing all his artillery and trains and a large part of his men. Hancock's and Wright's corps had been sent to march around Lee's flank to the Appomattox above the city, but had been met near the Weldon Railroad, had been broken into, and had lost four guns and a large number of prisoners, and were so disorganized and demoralized that they were returned to the positions from which they started, and Grant had suspended aggressive operations until the arrival of the

Nineteenth Corps (20,000 strong), which had been ordered to him from New Orleans.

Under these conditions, Grant, perhaps, supposed that, for any detachments he made from his army to send to Washington, General Lee would send a corresponding part of his to meet it, and that such process would finally result in the transference of both armies from the front of Richmond to the front of Washington. So that he did not see how he could retain his hold in front of Petersburg, and at the same time take the body of his army to Washington, as President Lincoln dispatched he thought he should do.

EARLY IN FRONT OF WASHINGTON.

On the 11th, at noon, General Early, riding ahead of the infantry, came in sight of Fort Stephens of the fortifications of Washington, and found the works but feebly manned. Rodes' division was hastened up, but, before it could be deployed in line, the enemy were seen filing into the fortifications on the right and left, and an artillery fire was opened from a number of guns. He paused then to reconnoiter, and found there was no hope of success by a surprise. On this day (11th) Halleck, in a dispatch to Grant, dated 11th, at noon, wrote: "General Wright has just arrived, and a part of his corps will soon be in. Enemy close to our lines on the Rockville road, skirmishing with our cavalry and pickets. His cavalry advance is pretty strong, with artillery and infantry behind."

Though General Early commenced his march from Monocacy (within 35 miles of Washington) as soon as possible on the morning of the 10th, and Wright's

corps commenced embarking on transports at City Point at 10 A. M. the same day, they arrived exactly at the same time—the head of each column at noon on the 11th. No more striking example could be given of the great advantage for rapid concentration possessed by Grant in his water transportation. The use of the navigable waters gave to him all the advantages of interior lines from Washington to Petersburg.

Had Early arrived in front of Washington 24 hours earlier, and found it in the condition it was in on the 10th, there is but little doubt that he could have broken through the fortifications and entered the city, and his conduct of the whole campaign shows that he had the boldness to undertake it. Though, it is true, there were troops enough there before the arrival of the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps—numerically, much superior to Early's—to have repulsed from the fortifications his force of about 8,000 infantry, the hesitation, on the part of every officer from President Lincoln down, to assume any authority, and the submission to Grant at Petersburg of every question for his determination, and Grant's inability to grasp the situation, clearly indicate that the detached, unorganized, heterogeneous aggregations, as shown by Halleck in his dispatch quoted above, would have made, if any at all, but feeble resistance.

Had Early hastened his march and spent less time manoeuvring about Harper's Ferry, and thereby gained a day, it would have advantaged him nothing, for he would still have been compelled to meet Wallace at Monocacy and drive him away. Grant dispatched to Halleck, July 9th, 5:30 P. M.: "I have ordered the re-

mainder of the Sixth Corps to Washington." It was not until after the Battle of Monocacy was in progress that the order was issued, and just as surely it would have been issued a day sooner, if Early had appeared then, so that any gain of time previously would have been of no avail.

Since the head of Early's column was in sight of the fortifications at noon on the 11th, by no possibility could he have gained more than a few hours by increasing the rapidity of march from Monocacy, and he was much impeded by the heat and dust, and delayed by demonstrations upon his rear from the direction of Maryland Heights. A few hours would not have given him time enough to make a successful attack in the face of the most feeble resistance, when it was known that re-enforcements were in sight. Though he has been criticised on this account, he had done all that was in the range of possibility.

EARLY FALLS BACK TO VIRGINIA.

Knowing that Hunter was assembling his army in his rear at Harper's Ferry, Early maintained a threatening attitude in front of Washington during the day of the 12th, whilst he drew to him Johnson's command, and, during that night, commenced to fall back, and crossed the Potomac at White's Ford, above Leesburg, in Loudoun county, carrying off with him the prisoners captured at Monocacy and a large number of beef cattle, besides having refitted his cavalry and artillery with fresh horses, and having obtained other much-needed supplies. He had put to flight three separate and distinct armies—Hunter's, Sigel's and

Wallace's—forced the evacuation of Harper's Ferry and the burning of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad bridges, and caused the detachment of one of Grant's army corps and the diversion of the greater part of another that Grant was anxiously awaiting. Thus ended the invasion of Maryland, that placed the seat of government in so great jeopardy, and, for the time, disarranged all Grant's plans. And it was at this time that the value of Gold as compared with Greenbacks reached the maximum and reflected the opinion of financiers as to the probable outcome of the war.

After taking a few days' rest in Loudoun, Early resumed his march on the 16th, and crossed the Shenandoah into the Valley on the 17th. The Union forces from Washington, under Wright, and from Harper's Ferry, under Crook, united in his rear in Loudoun county, and followed him to the Shenandoah.

For a clear understanding of Grant's conception at this time of the situation, as well as of his strategy to meet it, I quote the following dispatches: "City Point, Va., July 16th, 4:40 P. M. Major-General Halleck: There can be no use in Wright following the enemy with the latter a day ahead, after he has passed entirely beyond (south of) all our communications. I want, if possible, to get the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps here, to use them here before the enemy can get Early back. With Hunter in the Shenandoah Valley, and always between the enemy and Washington, force enough can always be had to check the invasion until re-enforcements can go from here. This does not prevent Hunter from following the enemy to Gordonsville and Charlottesville, if he can do it with his own force and such

other improvised troops as he can get; but he should be cautious not to allow himself squeezed out to one side, so as to make it necessary to fall back into Western Virginia to save his army. If he does have to fall back, it should be in front of the enemy, and with his forces always between the latter and the main crossings of the Potomac. I do not think there is now any further danger of an attempt to invade Maryland. The position of the enemy in the West and here is such as to demand all the force they can get together to save vital points to them. The last attempt brought to the field so many troops that they cannot conceive the possibility of succeeding in capturing any important point with a force of 40,000, or even 50,000 men while the main Union army is within 30 hours of the Capitol. As soon as the Rebel army is known to have passed Hunter's forces, recall Wright, and send him back here with all dispatch, and also send the Nineteenth Corps. If the enemy has any notion of returning, the fact will be developed before Wright can start back.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut-Gen."

Halleck's answer, giving his view, is as follows:

WASHINGTON, July 19, 1864.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, City Point:

The recent raid into Maryland seems to have established several things which it would be well for us to bear in mind:

1. It has proved that, while your army is south of the James River, and Lee's between you and Washington, he can make a pretty large detachment unknown to us for a week or ten days, and send it against Wash-

ington, or into Western Virginia or Pennsylvania or Maryland.

2. General Hunter's army, which comprises all the troops north of Richmond that can go into the field, is entirely too weak to hold West Virginia and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and at the same time resist any considerable Rebel raid north of the Potomac.

3. We cannot rely upon any aid from the militia of the Northern States. They will not come at all, or will come too late, or in such small force as to be useless.

4. The garrisons of Washington and Baltimore are made up of troops entirely unfit for the field and wholly inadequate for the defense of those places. Had it not been for the opportune arrival of the veterans of the Sixth Corps both cities would have been in great danger. So long as you were operating between the enemy and Washington your army covered Maryland and Pennsylvania, and I sent you all the troops from here and the North which could take the field or guard your depots and prisoners of war. But the circumstances have now most materially changed, and I am decidedly of the opinion that a larger available force should be left in this vicinity.

It may be answered that re-enforcements can be sent in time from James River, as was done in this case. This answer would be decisive, if we here or you there could always be apprised of the number and position of the raiders, as well as the object upon which the march is directed. But this cannot be done without a superior cavalry force, which we have not got, and are not likely to have. The country is so stripped of

animals that it is hardly possible to supply the demand in the field. If the enemy had crossed the river below Harper's Ferry (and it is now fordable in many places), and had moved directly upon Washington and Baltimore, or if the arrival of the Sixth Corps had been delayed twenty-four hours, one or the other of those places, with their large depots of supplies, would have been in very considerable danger. Will it be safe to have this risk repeated? Is not Washington too important in a political as well as a military point of view to run any serious risk at all? I repeat, so long as Lee is able to make any large detachments, Washington cannot be deemed safe without a larger and more available force in its vicinity.

What you say of establishing schools of instruction here, at Baltimore, and at Harper's Ferry will be applicable when we get troops to be instructed. But we are now not receiving one-half as many as we are discharging. Volunteering has virtually ceased, and I do not anticipate much from the President's new call (for 500,000), which has the disadvantage of again postponing the draft for 50 days. Unless our government and people will come square up to adoption of an efficient and thorough draft, we cannot supply the waste of our army. Very respectfully your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,

Major-General and Chief of Staff.

In these letters we have the situation clearly and fully stated, and the proper strategy to be pursued presented from different view-points by the two chief actors, and that Halleck's view was the correct one it did not take many days to demonstrate.

After some quite heavy skirmishing with Wright on the Shenandoah, Early fell back leisurely towards Strasburg, and, when doing so, sent Ramseur to Winchester to guard the road from Martinsburg. Ramseur, hearing that Averell, with a small force, was in an exposed position, moved out towards Stephenson's Depot, with the view of capturing it, but, whilst he was moving by the flank, he was met by Averell, with about an equal force, advancing upon him in line of battle. The result of the collision was that Ramseur was thrown into confusion and forced to retire, with the loss of four guns and a considerable loss in men. Averell reported that Ramseur's casualties were 475, whilst his losses were 218—the first serious misadventure of the campaign.

BATTLE OF KERNSTOWN.

After it was ascertained that Early had fallen back to Strasburg, Wright, with his corps and Emory's division of the Nineteenth Corps, in accordance with instructions from Grant, moved back towards Washington, with the view of being shipped back to City Point, and Crook and Averell moved to Kernstown, a few miles west of Winchester, and took position there, as Grant had instructed they should. July 22d Halleck dispatched to Grant: "Acting upon your previous orders, Wright has given up the pursuit, and would reach Washington to-day. It is for you to decide whether he shall remain to co-operate with Hunter's forces, or whether he shall embark for City Point. In my opinion, raids will be renewed as soon as he leaves; but you are to judge whether or not a large enough movable force shall be kept here to prevent them."

Grant, upon receipt of this dispatch, seemed to be somewhat awakened to a realization of the situation, and dispatched in reply: "You need not send any troops back until the main force of the enemy is known to have left the Valley. Is Wright still where he can act in conjunction with Hunter? If the two can push the enemy back and destroy the railroad from Charlottesville to Gordonsville, I would prefer that service to having them here."

General Early, finding that Wright was retiring towards Washington, and that Crook and Averell were at Kernstown, promptly seized the opportunity, and on the morning of the 24th, moved upon Kernstown, and, before night, had routed them and pursued them with his infantry 7 miles beyond Winchester. His cavalry continued the pursuit to Martinsburg, and Crook, continuing the flight, took refuge upon Maryland Heights, whilst Averell put the Potomac between him and his pursuers. Their casualties were reported at 1,185, and they had abandoned in their flight twelve caissons and a large number of wagons and stores of all kinds. Their force consisted of three divisions of infantry, two divisions of cavalry and four batteries of artillery—in numbers, much in excess of Early's force.

Early then moved his infantry to Martinsburg, and put them to destroying the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Whilst Crook was being pursued on the 24th, Halleck issued the following: "Major-General H. G. Wright: Lieutenant-General Grant directs that the Sixth Corps immediately return to the Army of the Potomac. Brigadier-General Emory, with that portion of the Nineteenth Corps here, will report to Major-

General Augur." On the same day General Dana dispatched to Grant: "The pursuit of Early, on the whole, has proved an egregious blunder, relieved only by Averell's success at Winchester, in which he captured four guns and some prisoners. Wright and Crook accomplished nothing, and Wright started back as soon as he got where he might have done something worth while. As it is, Early has got off with the whole of his plunder, and Hunter will hardly be able to break up the railroad beyond what can be repaired in a short time."

BURNING OF CHAMBERSBURG.

Early determined now to try the effect upon the Union authorities of retaliation for the "acts of vandalism" of its armies in the Valley, especially of Hunter's in burning private residences; doubtless justified, not only by Hunter's acts, but by the orders that emanated from Grant as they appear in the Records, and to which Hunter appealed for justification, and, also, by the effects produced by it, as shown by the following dispatch of August 14th:

"Lieutenant-General Grant: The Secretary of War and I concur that you had better confer with General Lee, and stipulate for a mutual discontinuance of house-burning and other destruction of private property. The time and manner of conference and particulars of stipulations we leave, on our part, to your convenience and judgment.

A. LINCOLN."

Grant and Sheridan, from this time until Early's army was destroyed, in their orders for the destruction of every species of property, always made exception that

residences should not be burned. And, further, this act of retaliation contributed largely to the accomplishment of what General Lee was aiming at in sending Early to the Potomac—viz.: Forcing Grant to make large detachments of troops from the siege at Petersburg for the protection of the loyal States. But this act of retaliation should be regretted, if for no other reason, because of the demoralizing effect upon the troops sent to execute it. McCausland, with his brigade and the brigade of Johnson, crossed the Potomac on the 29th, and on the 30th laid the greater part of Chambersburg, Pa., in ashes, and then, retreating towards Hampshire county, West Virginia, crossed the Potomac near the mouth of the south branch, and, after some costly demonstrations along the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, that produced but little effect, retired to Moorefield, where, on August 7th, they were surprised in camp by Averell, who had pursued them from Chambersburg. The command was routed with the loss of all its artillery (4 pieces) and 420 prisoners, with their horses and equipments. The command for some time was completely disorganized—the remainder escaping in small squads to the Shenandoah Valley, with *morale* much damaged. This disaster called for an efficient commander of the Valley cavalry, and General L. L. Lomax was assigned to that position.

From the 29th of July until the 9th of August Early moved forth and back between the Potomac at Shephardstown and Bunker's Hill, destroying the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad within reach.

General Grant, upon receipt of information of this second advance of Early to the Potomac, ordered that all the part of the Nineteenth Corps that had arrived

at Bermuda should be shipped as rapidly as possible to Washington, and all that was afloat should be sent there also, and asked that a new "military division" be formed of the departments around Washington, and that General Meade be placed in command of it. He was now evidently fully awake to a realization of the situation; indeed, it appears, he dashed off to the opposite extreme of excessive apprehensiveness, the evidence of which appears as we proceed. Also a suspicion is awakened that he was growing tired of having Meade in command of the army of the Potomac, aroused specially by Dana's dispatch of July 7th, quoted from hereafter in this narrative.

On the 26th Halleck dispatched: "The Sixth Corps is reduced to a little over 11,000. With the detachment of the Nineteenth Corps, and from here Wright will have in all about 19,000, including cavalry. If Early has been re-enforced, as stated, Hunter and Wright will not be strong enough to meet him in the field." To which Grant replied at 7 P. M.: "Six regiments of cavalry will leave here to-morrow, in addition to the Nineteenth Corps." President Lincoln requested an interview with Grant at Ft. Monroe as soon as possible.

All the forces in and around Washington were placed under the direct command of Halleck, and he ordered Wright, with the forces from Washington to Frederick, to make from there a junction with Hunter to prevent Early from following the route he followed before, or to intercept his progress into Pennsylvania, should he attempt an invasion of that State.

In the meantime, Grant, on the 25th, issued his or-

ders for a series of attacks on Lee's lines; that he expressed great confidence would cause the recall of Early, or the destruction of Lee's army: that Hancock should break through or turn Lee's line on the north side of the James, and that Sheridan, with two divisions of cavalry, should destroy the railroad on the north side, whilst Hancock went into the city of Richmond if possible: if that failed, Burnside was to discharge his mine in front of Petersburg, and make a desperate assault through the opening, supported by the whole army, and if that also failed, then Sheridan was to go on an extensive raid on the south side of the rivers.

Hancock failed utterly. Sheridan did not go through. The mine explosion led to one of the most stupendous disasters of the war, and Meade and Sheridan then reported that the troops were in no proper condition to attempt any further aggression.

After this series of failures, Grant, at 10 P. M., July 30th, dispatched to Halleck: "I have ordered a division of cavalry to proceed immediately to Washington;" and August 4th he sent another, Wilson's. To Meade he dispatched: "Our experience to-day (July 30th) proves that fortifications come near holding themselves without troops." Again to General Meade: "Get all the heavy artillery in the lines about Petersburg moved to City Point as early as possible. It is by no means improbable the necessity will arise for sending two more corps to Washington." Which order Meade immediately proceeded to execute, and Grant went to his interview with the President at Fort Monroe.

It seems almost wonderful that Early could have accomplished so much with his small force, and that

force composed of the corps that Grant claimed he had almost annihilated at Spottsylvania Courthouse on the 12th of May.

CHAPTER VIII.

Sheridan in Command

Aggressive operations being suspended for a while after the 30th of July in front of Petersburg, General Grant went to Washington on August 4th, and from there on to Frederick City on the 5th. The same day Sheridan was ordered to that point, and was, as soon as possible thereafter, assigned to the command of the new "Middle Military Division." The order for this assignment was issued August 9th.

Sheridan, with great promptness, ordered an advance of all the forces in the field through Harper's Ferry and Charlestown to Berryville. Torbert, with his own division, under the command of Merrett, and Lovell's cavalry of Hunter's army, was ordered, in advance of the infantry, to Millwood and towards Front Royal. Wilson's division of cavalry had been ordered up from City Point, and Wilson had reported from Washington that the command would be ready to start from there to the front in a few days, and did start via Leesburg on the 12th.

On the 10th General Early, finding that Sheridan, with much increased force, was moving on his flank, fell back towards Strasburg, and Sheridan pushed on towards the Valley Turnpike, upon which Early was moving, as if to intercept his retreat. Early passed by, and on the 13th took position at Fisher's Hill, a short distance beyond Strasburg. Sheridan followed up to Cedar Creek and concentrated his infantry on the

eastern side of it and extended his cavalry well out on his left flank towards Front Royal.

General Lee, aware that Grant had sent two divisions of his cavalry and other troops from his front, sent Lieutenant-General R. H. Anderson, with Kershaw's division of the First Corps and Fitz Lee's division of cavalry—both very small—to Early's assistance. Anderson arrived at Front Royal on the 14th of August. Sheridan, thinking that the whole of the First Corps was there, as promptly as he had started out, commenced on the 15th to fall back toward Berryville. Early as promptly followed him, and at Winchester handled the rear guard, composed of cavalry and about 700 infantry, pretty roughly, and drove them away in confusion. Anderson at the same time advanced with Kershaw's and Lee's divisions from Front Royal to Opequan Creek, and from there made a junction with Early.

Sheridan, in explanation of the falling back, dispatched to General Grant: "At the time I could not bring into action more than from 22,000 to 23,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry." The promptness with which Sheridan marched to Cedar Creek was sufficient to establish a reputation that covered more than a month of inaction that followed.

General Early, who took position about Winchester, advanced on the 21st with his united forces against Sheridan. Heavy skirmishing ensued on the line of the Opequan, and, during that night, Sheridan fell back within his intrenched lines at Hall Town, on the outskirts of Harper's Ferry, having lost in the skirmishing 275 men. The next day Early advanced to Charles-

town, and, throwing out his skirmishers, demonstrated during the 22d, 23d, and 24th. Finding that Sheridan would not come out from behind his intrenchments, he then left Anderson with Kershaw's division and a small brigade of the Valley cavalry at Charlestown to occupy Sheridan's attention, whilst he, with his corps and Fitz Lee's cavalry, moved to Shephardstown, as if intending to cross into Maryland. On the 25th Breckenridge's command encountered Wilson's and Merrett's divisions, that had been sent out to make an extensive raid, drove them back, and came near capturing Custar's command, but it finally succeeded in crossing the river during the night, and escaped. After sending a small force across the river and making other demonstrations, Early fell back to Bunker's Hill during the night of the 26th, and, at the same time, Anderson fell back towards Berryville. Sheridan, after most painstaking investigations by the cavalry, on the 28th commenced to advance, and, by September 3d, had his infantry in position around Berryville, as it had been before in the former advance and retreat.

In the meantime, from August 14th to 20th, Hancock had made another unsuccessful attempt on the north side of the James, and Warren, on the 19th, had made a lodgment on the Weldon railroad at a heavy cost in prisoners, and, again, Hancock had on the 2d of September met with a most signal defeat at Reams' Station, on the Weldon railroad.

The official returns of the "Middle Military Division," Major-General Philip H. Sheridan, commanding, for August, gives as the aggregate present for duty 114,501

officers and men. Of these, Sheridan's army in the field consisted of:

Sixth Army Corps (Wright's)	16,414
Nineteenth Army Corps (Emory's)	14,645
Army of West Virginia (Crook's)	14,032

Total of infantry	45,191
Torbert's cavalry	11,048
Lovell's of West Virginia.....	1,000
Averell's division	3,500
	15,548

Grand total	60,739
Within the Department of Washington, from which to draw an aggregate of.....	36,656

The official returns of Early army for August—

Second Corps, aggregate present	10,910
Wharton's division (partly estimated)	2,104

Total of infantry	13,014
Lomax's cavalry division	1,700

Grand total of Early army (proper)....	14,714
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Anderson's command—

Kershaw's division (effectives 3,445) aggregate	4,769
Fitz Lee's cavalry (2 brigades)	1,200

Grand aggregate	20,683
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Of these, Early wrote that at the Battle of Winchester he had—

In the Second Corps (effectives)	8,269
In Wharton's division (effectives)	2,104

Total of infantry	10,373
Cavalry—Fitz Lee's and Lomax's divisions....	2,900

Grand total	13,273
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Kershaw left the Valley with his division on the 17th of September.

Sheridan, as soon as his army was established in position at Berryville, commenced feeling in all directions with his cavalry, and, on the 11th, dispatched to Grant that Early's position at Jordan's Springs was hard to get at, and he would remain on the defensive, and then stated that his effectives present were only 45,487, including his cavalry, and that Averell's cavalry, which was detached in the neighborhood of Williamsport, was about 2,500 more.

On the 15th, General Grant left City Point for Sheridan's headquarters, and wrote that he found him chafing under the delays, and he had only to say, "Go in." On the 17th, Kershaw started to General Lee by Front Royal, and Early, to cover his withdrawal, carried Gordon's division and a part of Lomax's cavalry to Martinsburg to drive off the working parties who were repairing the railroad, and to destroy what they had done, and, as it appears, to direct Sheridan's attention to a threatened invasion of Maryland. Sheridan, knowing Kershaw had gone, and of Gordon's detachment, seized the opportunity, and made haste to attack before Early could concentrate. .

BATTLE OF WINCHESTER.

At 5 A. M. of the 19th of September, Sheridan advanced on the turnpike from Berryville to Winchester, Wilson's cavalry in advance, followed by the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps, whilst Crook was held in reserve on the Opequan. This force, after driving in the pickets, came in contact with Ramseur's division (2,060 strong)

in line between Red Bud and Abraham's Creeks, about one and a half miles out from Winchester, with Lomax's cavalry extending and covering its right flank. As soon as Ramseur's line was uncovered by heavy skirmishing and partial attacks, Sheridan commenced to extend his right, with the view of turning Ramseur's left. Early arranged to meet this extension with Rodes and Gordon. Gordon, who had returned the evening before from Martinsburg to Bunker's Hill, marched that morning to the neighborhood of Stephenson's Depot, when the attack upon Ramseur having become known, he was hastened by Early to Ramseur's assistance, and arrived on the field a little after 10 A. M., and was held in rear of Ramseur's left until the arrival of Rodes, who marched that morning from Stephenson's Depot, and arrived a half an hour after Gordon.

By that time Sheridan had swung his right well around Ramseur's left, and was advancing in preparation for a charge along the whole line. Rodes was ordered to form on Ramseur's left, and Gordon on Rodes' left. Nelson's battalion of artillery covered the front of the line, and Braxton's battalion went '*in battery*' on the left of Gordon's line as it was forming. Early ordered the two divisions, supported by this artillery, to charge and break the force of Sheridan's charge by anticipating it. Rodes struck Ricketts' division near the centre of Sheridan's line, broke it, and drove it back upon the rest of the Sixth Corps, which likewise gave way, and it and a part of the Nineteenth Corps were driven from the field in disorder, and the remainder of Sheridan's line was very much shaken. But, in the charge, Evans' brigade, on the left of Gordon's line, and consequently, on the left of the infantry,

was outflanked, broken, and driven back by Upton's brigade and other troops of the Sixth Corps, and then Braxton's artillery, unsupported by any infantry, had to meet and repel this assault, which, by skill and valor, was done, but some confusion was produced by it on the left of Early line, which required time to adjust. Such was the condition of the battle at 11 A. M. Early did not have the force to push the advantage promptly, and Sheridan restored his lines. Wharton's, Early's only other division of infantry, had been closely engaged with Merrett's cavalry on the Charlestown road during the morning, and did not reach the field until 2 P. M. Hence the battle degenerated into heavy skirmishing at different points until quite late in the afternoon. Sheridan, who had intended to use Crook in reserve on his left, was forced to hasten him to his right. Before Wharton could be brought into action on Early's infantry line, Merrett drove back Fitz Lee's cavalry, and he was hastened back to confront Merrett.

In the meantime, Crook was extending Sheridan's right, and Early had to stretch his line of battle, in many places, to a skirmish line, in order to confront it. Quite late in the afternoon, Averell, with his division of cavalry (3,500 strong) moved from the direction of Martinsburg, as it appears, by his own motion, charged upon Winchester, brushed away the small cavalry force that opposed him, and entered the town. This unexpected assault of Averell's caused Early to hasten Wickham's brigade from the right of the line, where it had been sent during the day to assist Lomax in protecting Ramseur's right, and to keep back the enemy's cavalry from the Valley Pike, Early's only line of retreat, and Wharton was called from the front of Merrett, with

two of his brigades, to drive Averell back. This was accomplished, and these troops, then forming across the Martinsburg road, held Averell in check. But this relieved Merrett, who had found the cavalry in his front, when supported by Wharton, too strong for him, and was being driven back with loss.

Now, Merrett's cavalry and Crook's Corps had but little force in their front, and the wing of Early's army, confronting them, hearing the firing in their rear, and seeing rapid movements of troops in that direction, became more or less disorganized, and commenced to fall back to escape capture. Soon the line gave way in disorder. Ramseur and Lomax fell back in good order, maintaining their organizations and contesting the progress of the enemy, and, together with the artillery, covered the falling back in splendid style, and Early was thus enabled to form a line of battle about one and a half miles west of Winchester that held Sheridan in check until nightfall; after which Early fell back towards Fisher's Hill, carrying off with him his trains and wounded that could be moved. He lost in the engagement, by Sheridan's report, five guns. Major-General Rodes and Brigadier-General Godwin had been killed, and Colonel Patton, commanding a brigade, mortally wounded, and Major-General Fitz Lee and Brigadier-General York severely wounded. All of them officers whose places could not be so well filled.

By the returns, the casualties of Sheridan's army were 5,018 officers and men.

The casualties in Early's army are nowhere fully reported, but, undoubtedly, they were very much less than Sheridan's.

It is clear that Early, after Kershaw left, should

have drawn his army well in hand, and made all necessary preparations to fall back, and take position where the Valley narrowed, and then arranged to strike Sheridan when he exposed himself in following after or in passing by, as was suggested to him by General Lee in his letter of the 17th instant. Again, General Lee, when he, with his whole army located as Early's was at this time, confronted McClellan's army, centering on Harper's Ferry, on October 17th, 1862, wrote to General Pendleton that he does not design delivering battle about Winchester, wishing to draw the enemy up the Valley, district from his base, etc. That should have been a precedent to guide him. He should not have accepted battle where he did, with extensive open country on both flanks, against an infantry force so greatly superior in numbers and cavalry that his cavalry was too small to contend with successfully. Early, when he set out on the campaign, knew well that he could accomplish nothing except by acting with such boldness as to overawe his adversaries. Up to this time he had met with success that was truly wonderful. For the greater part of the season for campaigning, he had kept fourfold his numbers in a constant state of anxiety and alarm, and had contributed largely to paralyzing Grant in his siege operations. Early had now in his front a large, well organized army of their best veterans, and he should not have allowed his opinion of the lack of ability on the part of its commander to cause him to join so unequal a battle.

If, after Kershaw left him, he had disposed his troops with the view of a prompt falling back, and, when Sheridan advanced, had retired to Fisher's Hill, or to some other point where his flanks would have natural

protection, it is certain Sheridan would have been slow in making an attack there, and, if he made it in the contracted lines between the mountains, would most probably have been defeated. Judged by the battle as fought at Winchester, Sheridan's army would have been so shattered by it, if fought at Fisher's Hill that flight alone could have saved it. If not, but only held in check, then the recall of Kershaw to Front Royal would probably have caused Sheridan to retire, as he had done before, and Grant would have been compelled to make further detachments from his army, and, perhaps, given General Lee the opportunity he was seeking—to raise the siege of Richmond. It was a great error of judgment to take counsel of boldness, and to show his hand at the time and place he did, and we will see that the tables were turned on him by it. Sheridan and his army were greatly emboldened by the results of the battle, and the *morale* of Early's army much weakened. In his intense determination to retrieve his fortunes, Early was afterwards heartily supported by only a few of his officers, whilst the rank and file abandoned hope. In addition to this failure, Sherman's successes in Georgia were then beginning to produce effect in the East—encouraging the Union and depressing the Confederate forces—and that, doubtless, had its effect upon Early.

During the night of the 19th, Early fell back towards Strasburg, and on the 20th took position at Fisher's Hill. Before reaching there he had detached Wickham, with Fitz Lee's two brigades, to go to Front Royal, and hold the Luray Valley where it was narrow, at Millford. Sheridan sent Wilson with his division, and, later, Torbert, with two brigades of the first division, to take command of the whole cavalry force, and drive

Wickham back up the Valley, and come in behind Early before he reached Port Republic. But Wickham was successful in holding him back, so that Early was not molested by him.

BATTLE OF FISHER'S HILL.

Sheridan advanced to Cedar Creek on the 20th, and on the 21st continued his advance to Early's front at Fisher's Hill, and promptly intrenched his line. On the 22d, during some quite heavy skirmishing, Averell pressed upon Early's left flank, held by Lomax's dismounted cavalry, and Crook's Corps was passed behind him to the woods covering the side of the mountain, and in it until his corps enveloped that flank and got well in its rear. Early's line then gave way, and, without any serious fighting, the troops were driven pell-mell up the Valley. His artillery gallantly covered the retirement, and held until retreat had been cut off, and Sheridan captured 20 pieces of it and 1,100 prisoners. Sheridan then proceeded up the Valley to Harrisonburg with his infantry, and sent his cavalry on to Staunton and Waynesborough. Early left the Valley Pike by the road to Port Republic, at which place Wickham's cavalry, falling back before Torbert and Wilson, joined him, and, on the 26th, Kershaw, with his division (2,700 muskets) and Cutshaw's battalion of artillery, also joined him. These troops, on their return to Lee, had gotten to the neighborhood of Gordonsville, when orders were received to hasten back to Early. On the 27th, Early moved up to Waynesborough, and drove off the cavalry that, in accordance with Grant's orders to Sheridan, were trying to make a desert of the whole valley by burning mills, barns, crops, and farming uten-

sils, and driving off or slaughtering all live stock. This work was accomplished so effectually that Sheridan wrote, using Grant's mode of expression: "A crow flying over it would have to carry his rations with him." On the 6th, Sheridan commenced retiring down the Valley, and took position on the eastern side of Cedar Creek.

As it appears now, having no further apprehension of retaliation on Early's part, Sheridan wrote to Grant:

"Woodstock, October 7th, 1864.

"I have the honor to report my command at this point to-night. I commenced moving back from Port Republic, Mount Crawford, Bridgewater, and Harrisonburg yesterday morning. The grain and forage in advance of these points up to Staunton had previously been destroyed. In moving back to this point, the whole country from the Blue Ridge to North Mountains has been made untenable for a rebel army. I have destroyed over 2,000 barns, filled with wheat, hay and farming implements; over 70 mills filled with flour and wheat; have driven in front of the army over 4,000 head of stock, and have killed and issued to the troops not less than 3,000 sheep. This destruction embraces the Luray Valley and Little Fork Valley, as well as the main Valley. A large number of horses have been obtained, a proper estimate of which I cannot now make. Lieutenant John R. Meigs, my engineer officer, was murdered beyond Harrisonburg, near Dayton. For this atrocious act, all the houses within an area of five miles were burned." To the credit of those sent to execute this infamous order, it must be said it was but partially executed. The circumstances attending the killing of

Lieutenant Meigs were: That a scouting party of Confederate soldiers captured Lieutenant Meigs, who was similarly engaged in scouting, and, whilst a prisoner, in charge of Joshua Martin, a member of the first regiment of Virginia cavalry, of Wickham's brigade, in order to escape, Meigs shot Martin through the body; then Martin, in turn, shot him, and his wound was fatal, whilst Martin suffered from his during the remainder of his life.

Sheridan wrote further in this connection to General Grant, on October 11th, 7 P. M.: "I have given you but a faint idea of the clearing out of the stock, forage, wheat, provisions, etc., in the Valley. * * * I know of no way to exterminate them, except to burn out the whole country, and let the people go North or South."

BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK.

Early followed after Sheridan as he fell back, and on the 13th, arrived at Fisher's Hill, and, at once, determined to make an attack upon him in his position. His plan of attack was: For Gordon, with the Second Corps, to cross the river below, and turn Sheridan's left flank, while he, with Kershaw's and Wharton's divisions, attacked in front, and Rosser, with his and Wickham's brigades, held the back road to Early's left against the two cavalry divisions stationed on it. Lomax, who had been sent down the Luray Valley, was to advance through Front Royal, with the view of coming upon the flank and rear of Sheridan's forces on the Valley Pike. Of their location, he was to judge by the sound of the firing.

The attack was made promptly at 5 A. M. on the

19th of October, and was eminently successful. Crook's and the Nineteenth Corps were routed with the loss of almost all their artillery and camp equipage. The Sixth Corps, that was somewhat to the rear on the right of their line, did not suffer to the same extent, and, falling back, formed a formidable line of battle near Middletown. Colonel Carter, Early's chief of artillery, concentrated upon it the fire of 20 guns, and drove it two miles beyond Middletown. Early could not get his jaded troops in a connected line in front of this position because of straggling, which he attributed to the plunder of the enemy's camps. He had on his left flank two divisions of cavalry untouched, for Rosser, with his small force, could do but little more than hold them back and keep them in observation, and a division of cavalry on his right flank, opposed only by Payne's brigade of a few hundred. Lomax, through the miscarriage of orders, had not come up on that flank. In this condition, Early commenced sending to his rear the captured artillery and wagons, and preparing to withdraw. Before he had completed his arrangements, Sheridan advanced his line, and broke through Gordon's division, on Early's left, when the whole line gave way and commenced a wild flight. A bridge between Strasburg and Fisher's Hill, in a narrow part, where there was no other passway, broke down, and all the artillery and ordnance and medical wagons, that had not passed before, were captured.

Early reported that he lost 23 pieces of artillery, 1,860 killed and wounded, and 1,000 prisoners, and carried off 1,500 prisoners taken in the battle. The gallant Ramseur was among the killed. In this action

he had 8,500 muskets, 40 pieces of artillery, and 1,200 cavalry.

By the returns, the casualties in Sheridan's army were 5,665, and the strength of Sheridan's army in the field for October was 61,720 officers and men.

Early halted at New Market, and sent Kershaw back to General Lee. With the Second Corps, Wharton's division and the cavalry, he remained about that part of the Valley. Sheridan was not able to advance against him, because, as he wrote, he had made so complete a desert of that part of the Valley that it was impossible to subsist an army there.

In November, hearing that Sheridan was about to return troops to Grant, Early moved down the Valley, and, for several days, confronted him at Newtown, on the Valley Pike, and then retired without having brought on a general engagement. From the battle of Cedar Creek until the close of the campaign, there were several encounters between the cavalry of the two armies, and on the 27th of November, Rosser made a very successful raid into Hardy county, and brought back 800 prisoners, 4 pieces of artillery, some wagons and horses, several hundred cattle, and a number of sheep. As winter approached, the Second Corps was returned to Lee at Petersburg, and Early, with Wharton's division and the Valley cavalry, wintered about Staunton.

CHAPTER IX.

Period of Assaults at Petersburg

To return and continue the operations of Grant's army, June 12th, 1864: Grant commenced moving from Cold Harbor towards James River with his army, and sent Smith, with his corps, to the White House to be embarked from there for Bermuda. Every nerve was now strained to get in front of Petersburg before any part of Lee's army could get there; if that could be accomplished, Grant asserted positively, that the capture of Petersburg and the sweeping the whole south side of the Appomattox was an accomplished fact. Smith, when he reached Bermuda, was joined by Kautz's division of cavalry, reported by General Butler to be 3,000 strong, and Hink's division of negro troops was added to his infantry, making fully 15,000 infantry for the column of assault.

SMITH'S DAY.

Smith hastened the march of the column of 18,000, so that its head appeared in front of the fortifications of Petersburg at 9:30 A. M., June 15th, and found nothing on the south side of the Appomattox, except Dearing's small brigade of cavalry, Wise's brigade of infantry and some militia. Beauregard reported the total force at 2,200. The fortifications consisted of detached redans commanding the approaches to the city, from two to three miles out, but only partially connected together by intrenchments. In these redans, by the route Smith approached, there were some old guns in position of very little use or value. Smith, encountering

very determined opposition, succeeded gradually in pressing in between these redans, caused them to be evacuated, and captured the stationary guns and a four gun battery of field pieces in one of them. Beauregard drew in his small force nearer to the city, keeping it well in hand, and resisted so successfully that, when night closed in, the city had been protected. He reported of the day's engagement: "Ten guns, many of them old, useless pieces, permanently in position on the lines, were taken. No colors lost. Our missing were 153. Total casualties, killed, wounded and missing, 238. Our total force, 2,200."

At 1 P. M., Smith reported to Butler: "The fight at Baylor's House broke up my arrangements, so that I have not been able to straighten my lines; but this, however, will be done at once." Butler to Smith, in reply: "I grieve for the delays. Time is the essence of this movement. I doubt not the delays were necessary, but now push and get the Appomattox between you and Lee. Nothing has passed down the railroad to hurt you yet." Smith to Butler, at 9 P. M.: "I must have the army of the Potomac re-enforcements immediately." Butler to Smith, 9:40 P. M.: "Did you make the attack contemplated? What was the result? Please answer by telegram." Smith to Butler, 12 midnight: "It is impossible for me to go further to-night, but, unless I misunderstand the topography, I hold the key to Petersburg."

General Dana's dispatch to Hon. E. M. Stanton, announcing the results, is, in part, as follows:

HEIGHTS SOUTH OF PETERSBURG,

June 16th, 8 A. M.

"The success of Smith last night was of the most

important character. He carried these heights, which were defended by works of the most formidable character, and this gives us perfect command of the city and railroad. The enemy still holds south of the city, and west of the river, but their position is of little comparative value. General Smith says the negro troops fought magnificently. His loss, in round numbers, 750, of which 500 were among the negroes." And again: "The hardest fighting was done by the black troops. The forts they stormed were, I think, the worst of all. After the affair was over, General Smith went to thank them, and tell them he was proud of their courage and dash. He says they cannot be excelled as soldiers, and that hereafter he will send them in a difficult place as readily as the best white troops. * * * The enemy cannot think of holding the town, for it is directly under our guns."

Hancock's corps reached James River at Weyanoke on the 14th, and, early in the morning of the 15th, had all crossed the river and commenced their march to Petersburg. Hancock, in person, at the head of column, arrived to Smith at 6:30 P. M. Owing to some misapprehensions, all the corps did not get up until late in the night. He then, with two divisions, relieved Smith's troops, and with the other two extended to his left, whilst Smith drew off to his right.

Beauregard was in dire straits. It would not do to await the attack in the morning of the 16th with his 2,000 wearied troops, and apparently there were no reinforcements on their way from Lee. He determined to evacuate, during the night, his whole line between the James and Appomattox, and draw Johnson's division, that held it, to him at Petersburg. Hoke's

division, that had been ordered back to Beauregard by General Lee, encamped on the night of the 14th within half a mile of Drewry's Bluff, and pressed on from there as rapidly as possible; so that, on the 16th, Beauregard had those two divisions, in addition to what he had on the 15th, to meet Hancock and Smith, giving him a force of about 10,000. But the other corps of Grant's army were pressing up rapidly. Burnside followed Hancock, and the head of his column arrived at 10:30 A. M., June 16th.

Butler, ascertaining early in the morning of the 16th that the lines in his front had been evacuated, pressed over them to the turnpike and railroad beyond, and commenced to tear up the track. He dispatched to Grant at 8 A. M.: "As the enemy has evacuated our front, I would respectfully suggest whether the steamers at Wilcox's Wharf might not take the troops of one of the corps to Bermuda; then, in conjunction with the troops of this line, we could, I think, advance on the railroad and isolate Petersburg, and, as only a part of Lee's army has passed down, cut it in two, and hold it cut. Our line would be a short one, and we could protect our flanks. At least, we should hold an opening from which to envelope Richmond on the south side, and save marching. The suggestion is a crude one, and is most respectfully submitted."

To this Grant replied at 1:15 P. M.: "Whilst the body of the troops are engaged at Petersburg, I do not think it advisable to make an attack upon the centre of the enemy's lines. Their troops are now moving from Richmond to Petersburg, and at any time enough could be stopped opposite to you to hold their works. It would detain a force from going to Petersburg, but would

attract attention to a point where we may want to make a real attack some day hence."

When it was known in Richmond that Beauregard had evacuated the Bermuda lines, and that Butler had gained the railroad, a fearful disaster seemed impending, and all hope of successful resistance was lost. But General Lee, in person, reached Drewry's Bluff at 9:40 A. M., followed closely by Pickett's division, and lost no time in driving Butler's small force from the railroad and pressing it back to its old line. Smith had taken with him across the Appomattox all the troops of Butler's army, except what it was thought were necessary to hold the fortifications. Hence Butler's great weakness at this time.

Had Grant, if necessary, paused in his operations before Petersburg, and pressed every energy toward holding the advanced line on the railroad, there would have been no siege of Richmond or Petersburg. Beauregard's move, that appalled Richmond, saved Petersburg, and lost nothing on the other part of the line, and will go into history as one of the most successful acts of daring ever recorded.

Grant perceived the great advantage that he would have gained by holding the railroad, when it was too late, and sent to Butler Wright, with two divisions of his corps, and directed him to retake the line, but Longstreet's Corps was pretty well up by the time Wright was ready, and nothing was done. On the 17th Grant dispatched to Halleck: "General Butler moved a force upon the railroad between Richmond and Petersburg, which I hope to retain possession of." Dana, in his report of the 18th, makes severe reflections upon Butler "for not retaking the position the enemy had reoccu-

pied." We have seen upon whom the responsibility should properly rest.

June 14th an order was issued by General Butler, relieving Major-General Q. A. Gillmore, commanding the Tenth Corps, from his command, and directing him to proceed to Fort Monroe to await the action of a Court of Enquiry, and for Brigadier-General Terry to take temporary command of the corps. The occasion for this order was Butler's disapproval of Gillmore's report of the expedition to Petersburg on the 9th instant: On that occasion, Gillmore, with 2,000 infantry and 1,500 of Kautz's cavalry was sent to capture the city of Petersburg by a *coup de main*. He accomplished nothing more than uncovering the smallness of the force defending it, returned, and made his report. Wise had there exactly the same force that met Smith with his 18,000 on the 15th. It was, therefore, wise in Grant to dispose of the matter without a Court of Enquiry, for, if Gillmore was guilty of incapacity for not capturing the city, how much more guilty was the Lieutenant-General commanding when he made his attempt with six times his numbers.

Dana's account is found in his report to Hon. E. M. Stanton, June 17th, 5:30 P. M.: "On the 14th instant, General Butler relieved from command of the Tenth Army Corps General Gillmore, and ordered him to Fort Monroe to await a Court of Enquiry concerning his disgraceful failure to capture Petersburg after he had volunteered for the duty. On hearing Gillmore's explanation, Grant has modified the order, so that Gillmore is relieved at his own request, and ordered to Washington to report to the Adjutant-General for orders."

HANCOCK'S DAY.

The 16th day of June may be denominated "Hancock's day," for he was directed by General Grant, in the absence of both Meade and himself, to take command of all the forces about Petersburg, and was in supreme command until 2:30 P. M., when Meade arrived on the field, and also because his corps was to lead in the assaults of the day. In addition to his corps of 28,000, he had Smith's corps on his right, and Burnside's corps, which commenced to arrive about 9:30 A. M., and was all well up by mid-day, that was moved to his left.

Hoke's division commenced to arrive to Beauregard about dark on the 15th, and was all on the lines by light on the 16th. Johnson's division, less Gracie's brigade, that was left to hold Chaffin's Bluff, arrived at 10 A. M. from the Bermuda lines, which they had evacuated during the night. Beauregard had now 10,000 men.

Early in the morning, Hancock commenced pressing to his front, and extending to his left with the view of developing Beauregard's position and strength, preparatory to the grand assault ordered by General Grant to be made at 6 P. M., with the full strength of his corps, one division of Burnside's on his left and Smith's corps on his right. For the assault Smith reported at 4 P. M.: "I have in the neighborhood of 8,000 men for the attack." The heavy skirmishing during the day at times assumed the magnitude of a battle, and Hancock reported: "I do not think the loss heavy but in officers. I do not think the men attack with persistence. The attack (in full force) was made at 6 P. M., as ordered, and the battle raged with fury until well in the night."

General Meade reported: "Birney made considerable progress, taking some of the advanced works of the enemy, and one of their main works on the front line." On the whole, it was an acknowledged failure; and Grant made no report of it to Washington.

BURNSIDE'S DAY.

The 17th day of June may be denominated Burnside's day, because his corps led in the assaults. Warren's corps was now up, and Grant, in his dispatch to Halleck at 11 A. M., stated that all the army was up, except two divisions that were covering the wagon trains. Smith and Hancock had intrenched the most advanced positions taken by their corps; and Burnside, supported by Warren, was extending to the left to find Beauregard's right flank, or to force him to so extend his right as to weaken his line in front of Smith and Hancock that they might break through. He met with more notable success than either Smith or Hancock, and, by 11 A. M., had captured two redoubts, two or four guns (differently reported), and from 400 to 450 prisoners, and Grant immediately seized the favorable opportunity to make his report to Halleck. The fighting was close and continuous throughout the day, and, at dusk, the right of Beauregard's line had been penetrated, and completely broken, when Gracie's brigade of Johnson's division, arriving most opportunely from Chaffin's Bluff, was thrown into the gap and restored the battle. Then Beauregard made a dash, and drove Burnside from his advanced positions, with the loss of 2,000 prisoners, as reported by Beauregard, and the disorganization of Burnside's command.

MEADE'S DAY.

The 18th day of June was Meade's day. Grant stated that he was responsible for the assaults that day only in so far that he assented to Meade's plan of making them. The whole of the available force of Grant's army was now well in hand, and as yet not a prisoner had been taken, except from Beauregard's army, and there was no evidence to show that Lee's army would be up during the day. General Meade asserted that this day afforded the last opportunity to crush Beauregard before re-enforcements arrived to him. But Kershaw's division of Longstreet's corps arrived at 7:30 A. M. and Field's at 9:30 A. M., two hours later. Field's was, however, held in reserve until mid-day; so that Beauregard had, in addition to his 10,000, in the morning, Kershaw's division, estimated at 5,000, and, after mid-day also Field's 5,000, making a total force of 20,000. Kershaw as soon as he arrived, was ordered to the right of the line, his right resting on the Jerusalem Plank Road, and Field was placed in reserve in his rear.

During the 17th, General Beauregard and his chief engineer had staked off a new line, several hundred yards in rear of that from which he fought during the 16th and 17th. The new line was shorter, and, in the main, possessed natural advantages. That it was well selected is evidenced by the fact that it was held until the close of the siege. At 11 P. M., when the fire slackened, he quietly withdrew to it, leaving a skirmish line to cover the front, and spent the remainder of the night in intrenching—indeed, not a moment was lost, day or night, until the new line was amply protected.

General Meade made his report to General Grant at 9:50 P. M. June 18th: "I advised you of the withdrawal of the enemy this morning from the position occupied last night. I immediately ordered an advance of the whole line, which, in a short time, found the enemy in force in an interior line, about one mile from Petersburg. Having taken numerous prisoners, all of whom agreed in the statement that there was no force in our front but Beauregard's, I determined to endeavor to force them across the Appomattox. I accordingly directed strong columns of assault to be advanced at 12 M. by Warren, Burnside, Birney, and Martingale, the latter commanding two divisions of the Eighteenth Corps and one of the Sixth. This attack was made punctually by Martingale, with success, he occupying the enemy's line and taking some 40 prisoners. Birney (commanding Hancock's corps during Hancock's disability), who assaulted in Gibbon's front (his left), was unsuccessful. Warren was not quite ready, and Burnside, whose movements were connected somewhat with Warren's, delayed also. About 2 P. M. Warren and Burnside commenced advancing, and made considerable progress without coming in contact with the enemy's main line. About 4 P. M. Birney made a vigorous assault upon Hare's Hill, with nine brigades in columns of regiments, but was not able to carry the enemy's line. Martingale also failed in an attempt to advance. Both officers reported the enemy in very strong force, with heavy reserves massed in their rear, from which I inferred that Lee had re-enforced Beauregard. These assaults were well made, and I feel satisfied that all that men could do under the circumstances was done. I directed Birney and Martingale to secure

their acquired ground, and intrench their positions. At 7 P. M. Willcox, of the Ninth Corps, assaulted, but with no better success than the others. Warren's assault, about the same time, was also without result. This terminated operations on our part. Our advanced lines are held, and will be intrenched. The result of the three days' operations has been the driving the enemy from two lines of intrenchments, the capture of four guns, four colors, and about 500 prisoners. Our losses, particularly to-day, have been severe, though not more so than would be expected from the numbers engaged. It is a source of great regret that I am not able to report more success, but I believe every effort to command it has been made."

General Willcox, of Burnside's corps, reported on the 19th: "Both these communications (complimenting his troops) will revive the drooping spirits which prevail in the division after our heavy losses, felt doubly in connection with the fact that we have not been able to perform any brilliant exploits, notwithstanding all our efforts and losses. When this division commenced the final advance yesterday evening, the ranks were reduced to less than 1,000 officers and men. The second brigade lost three successive commanders in the two days fighting."

These four days terminated what has been called the "Period of Assaults," and immediately picks and shovels, brought into requisition, were unremittingly employed by both armies. On the 19th, General Meade asked for a truce to care for the wounded and bury the dead.

He reported his casualties on the 16th, 17th and 18th at 9,500. Smith reported his casualties on the 15th were 750; total casualties for the period, 10,250

CHAPTER X.

The Siege

General Lee, in person, arrived at Petersburg at 11:30 A. M. on the 18th, and the next day A. P. Hill's corps came up, and, from that time forward, the combined armies of Lee and Beauregard confronted the combined armies of Grant and Butler.

The 19th General Grant directed that Colonel Abbott's siege train be forwarded to him from Washington, and ordered General Butler to throw a brigade across James River from Jones' Neck to Deep Bottom, and to fortify and hold that point, connecting the two shores with a pontoon bridge.

President Lincoln now made a visit to the army, and Dana reported on the 21st: "As he came back, he passed through the division of colored troops, commanded by General Hinks, which so greatly distinguished itself on Wednesday last. They were drawn up in double lines on each side of the road, and welcomed him with hearty cheers. It was a memorable thing to behold the President, whose fortune it is to represent the principle of emancipation, passing bareheaded through the enthusiastic ranks of these negroes, armed to defend the integrity of the AMERICAN NATION."

Grant, having arranged for pressing siege operations by digging up to the lines of the enemy, and bombarding them with heavy guns and mortars, through General Dana, announced to the War Department his plan for future operations. Dana reported on the 19th: "General Grant has directed that no more assaults be made.

He will now manœuvre." On the 20th he reported: "Meade is ordered to devote himself to swinging his army around upon the south and southwest of Petersburg. He reports that his cavalry is already upon the Jerusalem road, and thinks that, by fortifying as he extends his left, he can soon and safely reach the Appomattox on that side. This will give him possession of the railroad from Petersburg to Weldon, and that to Lynchburg. As the object is to get possession of the railroads, and enclose the enemy, fighting will not be sought, but, of course, it will not be avoided."

It was arranged when the extension commenced, that Wilson, with all the well-mounted men of his and Kautz's divisions, should pass behind the infantry columns on an extensive raid to destroy all the railroads, and, if possible, to join Hunter at or about Lynchburg. Wilson, accordingly, started off on the 22d, and W. H. F. Lee, with the small cavalry force on Lee's right, followed after him, so that there was no efficient cavalry left, on either side, on that wing of the armies.

Arrangements for the extension were made by withdrawing the Second Corps from the lines, and massing it behind the extreme left. The Sixth Corps was, the next night, likewise withdrawn from the lines and moved to the left. By this time the lines in front of Petersburg had been well intrenched.

Warren's Corps, by thinning the line, was extended to the Jerusalem Plank Road. Birney, commanding Hancock's Corps, rested the right of his right division (Gibbon's) on that road, and swung it around until it came in close proximity to Lee's line of redans, and so on with the next division, intrenching as they extended, but beyond there was, to him, a *terra incognita*. In or-

der to explore it, General Barlow, with his division, was detached and sent forward to find the line as far as the Weldon Railroad. He advanced to within about a mile of it, where he encountered dismounted cavalry with two guns, and withdrew as he was ordered to do in case he found any force of the enemy in that direction. The cavalry followed up the withdrawal, and quite severe skirmishing ensued until Barlow halted and drove back this cavalry. Gibbon claimed that the disaster to his command, which ensued, was due to the falling back of Barlow. On the 22d, Wright, with the Sixth Corps, moved to the left of the Second Corps on an interior road.

General Lee, made aware that this extension was going on, sent a part of Hill's corps to arrest it, and during the afternoon of the 22d, Mahone, with his division, struck Gibbon's flank in his partially intrenched line and ran over him, capturing 4 guns, 1,600 prisoners, 8 stands of colors, and many small arms, and completely disorganized the command. The next day (the 23d), Wright sent his small force of cavalry, followed by a heavy skirmish line, to the railroad, which they immediately commenced to tear up. Mahone moved around upon this force, broke through the skirmish line, and succeeded in capturing the greater part of it. General Lee reported 28 commissioned officers and 600 men were captured. The extension to the Appomattox was at once discontinued, and the two corps were posted about the Jerusalem Plank Road. Grant's first manœuvre thus quickly came to an untimely end.

I here quote from a letter of General Warren to General Meade, dated June 23, 1864, advocating a plan of his by which to attack General Lee, to show his opinion

of the results of the campaign up to this time: "All our efforts are attended with such great difficulties that I believe no one can regard any future operations, viewed in the light of our experience in this campaign, with anything but the deepest anxiety and solicitude. And I venture to say that officers and men are getting very weary and nervous. I don't think the country appreciates our very trying condition. With our unparalleled losses and exhausting efforts we can scarcely say we are much nearer destroying Lee's army than when we were on the Rapidan. Before that is consummated we must make some decisive movement, in which we are willing to run the risk of losing all by a failure—fight the Wilderness Battle over again."

It is shown by the Confederate correspondence that General Lee desired above all things that this should be done. General Grant evidently feared the results of another Wilderness Battle, and preferred the slower, if not surer, method of attrition and starvation by siege operations. On the 23d he dispatched to Halleck: "The siege of Richmond bids fair to be tedious, and, in consequence of the extended lines we must have, a much larger force will be necessary than would be required in ordinary sieges against the force that now opposes us. All the troops Canby can spare, not necessary to protect what he now holds, should be sent at once. In my opinion the white troops of the Nineteenth Corps can all come, together with many of the colored troops. I wish you would place the matter before the Secretary of War, and urge that no offensive operations west of the Mississippi be allowed to commence until matters here are settled. Send the Nineteenth Corps and such other

troops as you can from the Department of the Gulf to me."

Grant wrote in this dispatch: "*In consequence of the extended lines we must have, a much larger force will be necessary than would be required in ordinary sieges against the same force that now opposes us,*" as if he labored under peculiar disadvantages in conducting the siege, while the fact was that the navigable waters dominated by the U. S. Navy gave to him peculiar advantages—every division of his army had its base of supplies brought in its midst, under the protection of the navy, without the use of any part of his army. Lee compelled him *to extend his lines* by defeating every effort on his part to invest the city of Richmond and get possession of its communications. Not only had Grant drawn to his army all the resources from Washington and the North, but now called for Canby's troops, that, according to the programme of campaigns, were to co-operate with Sherman by marching from the Mississippi upon Mobile.

General Lee, knowing that two corps of Grant's army were massed on the extreme left of his line, sought for an opportunity to break through his thinned line in front of Petersburg. General Hoke suggested that his line, from the Appomattox to Hare's Hill, offered a favorable opportunity, and accordingly Field's division was sent to the rear of this line. Hagood's brigade of Hoke's division, occupying that part of the line, was to capture, by a dash, the first line of the enemy's works, and Field was to follow immediately after, and occupy the line for the purpose of further aggression. This was in accordance with Beauregard's instructions to Hoke. On the morning of June 24th, three regiments

of Hagood's brigade, numbering 950 men, captured a part of the first line, and awaited in it Field, who never came. These 950 men were soon expelled, with the loss of about one-third of their number. No other troops engaged, and the work planned had thus an abrupt ending. General Lee concurred with Field in that, Hoke was to use the whole of his division in the attack, when Field's division would support it and follow up the attack. There evidently was not a clear understanding between Generals Lee and Beauregard, the latter having the aggression under his personal supervision, as to the manner in which the troops were to be used in the attack, so it ended in failure before it was fairly begun.

DISASTROUS ENDING OF WILSON'S RAID.

Wilson, on his raid, having destroyed much of the Richmond and Danville Railroad east and west of Burksville, proceeded as far West as the Staunton River bridge, which he found was so well guarded that he was unable to injure it. He then commenced his return march, closely followed by W. H. F. Lee. Hampton, as soon as Sheridan was safe at Weyanoke, hastened to Drewry's Bluff, and from there was hastened to the right of Lee's line near Reams Station to intercept his return. On the 28th Hampton struck the column near Sappony Church, drove it back, and, continuing the pursuit throughout the night, succeeded at daylight in turning its left, and broke it up. When the disorganized troops reached Reams' Station, Mahone attacked them, and Fitz Lee turned their flank. Kautz, with the larger part of the troops of his division, became detached, and succeeded in slipping through the lines. Wilson, with the remainder of the command, made a wide detour to

the south, and finally came up behind his lines. General Lee reported that: "Besides their killed and wounded left on the field, over 1,000 prisoners, 13 pieces of artillery, 30 wagons and ambulances, many small arms, horses, ordnance stores, and several hundred negroes, taken from the plantations on their route, were captured."

The two corps on the left were now pushed out to cover Wilson's return, and Sheridan, with his wearied troops and broken-down horses, was hastened in that direction; and that became the centre of interest until July 1st, when the tension was relieved by hearing that Wilson was safe behind the lines, though with the loss of all the property and with numbers fearfully diminished, and, in a great part, dismounted, the men having abandoned their horses to make their way through the intricate marshes.

The whole of Grant's cavalry was now thoroughly broken down, and had to go into retirement for repairs. The fate of this raiding party, following so quickly upon Sheridan's failure, attended with such heavy losses in men, horses, and equipment, put an end to that mode of warfare. There were no more cavalry raids to cut the railroads leading to Richmond and Petersburg. Though Grant ordered others later in the campaign, none materialized.

By the abstract of returns of casualties in Grant's army from June 15th to June 30th there were:

For Army of the Potomac..... 13,657

For Army of the James 2,912

Total of armies operating against Richmond, 16,569

Grant's losses previously to crossing the James, 54,926

Total casualties in the campaign to June 30th, 71,495

On June 15th, Halleck had dispatched to Grant: "I enclose herewith a list of the regiments and detachments forwarded to the Army of the Potomac from May 1st to date, making in all 55,178. This is exclusive of those sent to Butler. I do not know the amount of its losses, but I presume that these reinforcements will make that army as strong as at the beginning of the campaign."

By the abstract of returns of the armies operating against Richmond at the close of June 30, 1864, there were:

PRESENT.	<i>For Duty. Ag'reg'te.</i>	
In the Army of the Potomac.....	86,610	112,478
In the Army of the James.....	32,710	39,673
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	119,320	152,151
Of the Confederate armies defending:		
In the Army of Northern Virginia..	42,934	51,035
In Beauregard's army.....	12,179	15,106
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	55,113	66,141

"N. B."—Early, with the Second Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia was in the Valley and not reported.

Grant's army, by the returns of April 30th, had

in it an aggregate of..... 148,828
 On June 30th, as above shown..... 112,478

Less on June 30th than on April 30th..... 36,350
 Reinforcement sent by Halleck added..... 55,178

91,528

which leaves a difference of 20,033 to be accounted for by desertion, sickness, and discharges.

FRICTION AMONG COMMANDING OFFICERS.

The Union correspondence shows that about this time great friction was developed among the commanding officers of the Union Army. On July 1st, General Grant requested that Butler should be removed from the command of the Army of the James and transferred to some other field, and Halleck, in his reply of July 3d, wrote: "It was foreseen from the first that you would eventually find it necessary to relieve General Butler on account of his total unfitness to command in the field, and his general quarrelsome character. What shall be done with him has, therefore, already been, as I am informed, a matter of consultation. Where can he be sent? . . . If he must be relieved entirely, I think it would be best to make for him a new department in New England."

In accordance with Grant's request an order was issued July 7th: "General order No. 225: The troops of the Department of North Carolina and Southern Virginia, serving with the Army of the Potomac in the field under Major-General Wm. F. Smith, will constitute the Eighteenth Corps, and Major-General Wm. F. Smith is assigned by the President to the command of the corps. Major-General B. F. Butler will command the remainder of the troops in that department, having his headquarters at Fort Monroe."

Immediately upon receipt of this order, Butler sought an interview with Grant at City Point on the 9th inst. That evening, after the interview, he dispatched to Col-

onel Chaffer: "Do not trouble yourself about the order. It is all right now, and better than if it had not been disturbed."

On the 10th, Grant dispatched to Halleck: "I would not desire this change made. I will take the liberty of suspending this order until I hear again." On the 12th, Halleck replied: "This order was made precisely to carry out your views as expressed in your letter and telegram. If not satisfactory, please make for the Adjutant-General a draft of one that will embrace exactly what you desire."

General Wm. F. Smith, in order to get from under Butler's command, had sent in a surgeon's certificate, and asked for a sick leave, and upon Grant's request that he would not press the application, he in reply wrote: "I want to ask you how you can place a man in command of two corps who is as helpless as a child on the field of battle, and as visionary as an opium-eater in council." Dana wrote July 1st: "Butler is pretty deep in controversial correspondence with "Baldy" Smith, in which Grant says Butler is clearly in the wrong."

As shown above, Butler carried the day, and on July 19th "By General Grant's order, General Wm. F. Smith was relieved from command of the Eighteenth Corps, subject to the approval of the President, and ordered to await orders in New York City." This result seems remarkable in view of the fact that Grant had, up to this time, expressed the opinion that Smith was one of his best and most enterprising officers, and with great emphasis before and at a later period condemned Butler as an incompetent.

This episode closes for the present with the following from Butler to Grant: "My Dear General: I know how

difficult it is for gentlemen in high positions to get the exact opinions of friends and foes. For myself I am always glad to do so. From the feeling of grateful recognition of your kindness to me, I send you the enclosed letter. (Not found.) It was not intended for your eyes, and was written by a devoted and warm-hearted friend of mine and a sincere friend and admirer of yours. He is a good politician, and I know sincerely and truly wishes the success of yourself, and therein the success of the country. He gives these things as he sees them for my guidance. I cannot presume to have a solemn talk with you, but I think you should get the ideas of my friend, and, with the exception of the manner of their expression, many of them are my own, therefore pardon the expression; they are those of a warm-hearted, rough Western man, and are honest and true convictions. Permit me here to say that I desire to serve you, not only in this, but in all things. My future is not in the army. Yours is. Our paths can never cross; therefore, amid all the selfishness of life, I can see no reason why I can not always subscribe myself as I do now.

Most truly your friend,

“BENJ. F. BUTLER.”

The Union correspondence in the Records indicates that from this time until the failure of the Wilmington Expedition in December, Grant held Butler in high esteem, and their relations were most cordial.

July 7, 1864, 8 A. M., Dana sent to Hon. E. M. Stanton the following: “A change in the commander of the Army of the Potomac now seems probable. Grant has great confidence in Meade, and is much attached to him personally, but the almost universal dislike of Meade which prevails among officers of every rank who come

in contact with him, and the difficulty of doing business with him felt by every one except Grant himself, so greatly impair his capacities for usefulness and render success under his command so doubtful that Grant seems to be coming to the conviction that he must be relieved. The facts in this matter have come slowly to my knowledge, and it was not until yesterday that I became certain of some of the most important. I have long known Meade to be a man of the worst possible temper, especially towards his subordinates. I do not think he has a friend in the whole army. No man, no matter what his business or his service, approaches him without being insulted in one way or another, and his own staff officers do not dare to speak to him, unless first spoken to, for fear of either sneers or curses. The latter, however, I have never heard him indulge in very violently, but he is said to apply them often without occasion or reason. At the same time—as far as I am able to ascertain—his generals have lost their confidence in him as a commander. His order for the last series of assaults upon Petersburg, in which he lost 10,000 men without gaining any decisive advantage, was to the effect that he had found it impracticable to secure the co-operation of corps commanders, and therefore each one was to attack on his own account and do the best he could by himself. Consequently each gained some advantage of position, but each exhausted his own strength in so doing, while for want of a general purpose and a general commander to direct and concentrate the whole, it all amounted to nothing but heavy loss to ourselves. Of course, there are matters about which I can not make enquiries, but what I have above reported is the general sense of what seems to be the opinion of fair-minded and zealous of-

ficers. For instance, I know that General Wright has said to a confidential friend that all of Meade's attacks have been made without brains and without generalship. The subject came to a pretty full discussion at Grant's headquarters last night on occasion of a correspondence between Meade and Wilson. The *Richmond Examiner* charges Wilson with stealing not only negroes and horses, but silver plate and clothing on the raid, and Meade, taking the statement of the *Examiner* for truth, reads Wilson a lecture and calls on him for explanations. Wilson denies the charge of robbing women and churches, and hopes Meade will not be ready to condemn his command because its operations have excited the ire of the public enemy. This started the conversation in which Grant expressed himself quite frankly as to the general trouble with Meade and his fear that it would be necessary to relieve him. In such event he said it would be necessary to put Hancock in command."

June 20th Dana reported: "General Meade notified Warren this morning that he must either ask to be relieved, or else he (Meade) would prefer charges against him." On July 1st, 11 A. M., he reported: "Grant thinks the difficulty between Meade and Warren has been settled without the extreme remedy which Meade proposed last week."

"For the past three days Hancock has been so far disabled by his old wound that Birney has commanded the Second Corps. General Grant has just sent Hancock ten days' leave unasked." Hancock was under fire. There is a communication in the *Union Correspondence* (Vol. XL., Part 2d, page 639) at Hancock's instance with many endorsements to establish as a fact that Hancock used due diligence in his march to Petersburg on

the 15th instant, and that he was in no wise responsible for the delays that occurred, and further, that he was not guilty of neglect of duty or disobedience of orders.

June 18th, 2 P. M., Meade dispatched to Generals Warren and Burnside: "I am greatly astonished at your dispatch of 2 P. M. What additional orders to attack you require I cannot imagine. My orders have been explicit, and are now repeated, that you, each, immediately assault the enemy with all your force, and if there is any further delay, the responsibility and the consequences will rest on you."

On the 23d General Meade reported to General Grant: "Whilst the Sixth Corps was moving into position, signal officers reported the movement of a heavy column of the enemy to our left. I immediately notified General Wright, and directed him, if the enemy threatened him, to take the initiative and attack him, unless the movement of the enemy should be such as to endanger his flank. About 4 P. M., General Wright reported the appearance of the enemy on his left, having driven in his advance guard and a working party on the railroad. I immediately reiterated my order to him to act at once and promptly. Instead of taking either of these courses, he permitted the enemy to move at will until he became alarmed, not only for his left, but his rear, and called for reinforcements. I again urged him to attack at all hazards, and received for reply there was no time to form columns. I ordered an attack in line, but darkness was the excuse. As General Wright's position and line is faulty, and as he can give me no information of the enemy, except he believes him in great force on his flank, I have authorized him to withdraw to the position occupied last night, which is better fitted for manœuver-

ing to-morrow. I can not understand there has been anything but heavy skirmishing. I think you had better come up here to-morrow if convenient.

GEO. G. MEADE, *Major-General.*"

Thus it appears Grant tried to get rid of his two army commanders. Butler succeeded in getting rid of his two corps commanders, and we have seen how dissatisfied Meade was with each of his four corps commanders, and the same fault-finding might be shown to permeate the division commanders.

GRANT'S EMBARRASSMENTS.

General Grant, having arranged that his army should be reinforced by the army from the Trans-Mississippi Department, and having thus quickly lost faith in manœuvering, ordered that a reconnoissance of the Bermuda lines be made, with the view of massing Hancock's, Warren's and Wright's Corps between the two rivers, and with this heavy force breaking through Lee's line on this point. Nothing came of it, and he then consulted with Meade about the advisability of an assault upon the enemy's center in front of Warren. This called forth a memorandum from J. G. Barnard, Brig.-Gen. and Chief Engineer, in part (p. 584), as follows: "The army, having failed in the purpose of holding the Weldon Road, is now lying without definite object. Smith's and Burnside's corps are lying in trenches close up to the enemy, carrying on a quasi-siege—not decided enough to accomplish anything, but by heat and sharpshooters, losing men every day. The other three corps are stretched out in lines, on which neither one supports the other two, or is supported by them, or controls the enemy's communications. This

state of things might last for a few days, but not for several weeks, which must elapse before the Nineteenth Corps can arrive. If we can break through near the salient on the Jerusalem Road, and reach the elevated swell beyond, we can take the enemy's position, facing Smith and Burnside, in reverse, and we occupy a point from which we look down into the city. It is useless to talk about any operations of this kind, however, if it is to consist in merely ordering corps commanders 'to assault.' * * * At Gettysburg, Meade's army (occupying a stronger position than the enemy holds) was assailed by 150 guns, and their columns hurled upon the left centre. This is the kind of operation which we must make, if we make any."

It was finally determined that Burnside's mine was to be pushed forward as rapidly as possible, and, in the meantime, that no aggressive movements should be made, except demonstrations to hold the attention of the enemy and guard against their taking the initiative. Engineer officers were now in requisition on both sides, and the lines made as strong as their skill and the means under their command could make them.

July 3d alarming reports commenced coming in from Washington, and by the 6th, Grant was compelled to send Rickett's division of Wright's Corps and all the dismounted cavalry to arrest Early's progress; and, on the 10th, after Early had whipped Lew Wallace at Monocacy on the 9th, the remainder of the Sixth Corps was hastened off, and the Nineteenth Corps from New Orleans was ordered, as fast as it arrived at Fort Monroe, to hasten to Washington, without disembarking. So that, not only was Grant compelled to weaken his

army by a full corps, but the fresh troops that he was so anxiously awaiting were diverted from him.

On the 14th, Grant dispatched to Halleck: "If the enemy has left Maryland, as I suppose he has, he should have upon his heels veterans, militia men, men on horseback, and everything that can be got to follow to eat out Virginia clear and clean as far as they go, so that crows, flying over it for the balance of the season, will have to carry their provender with them." From this it appears that Grant was the author of that much-quoted figure of speech, so descriptive of desolation, that has generally been attributed to Sheridan, as well suited to the characteristics of the man, who dispatched to Meade July 18th: "Can I have permission to burn a few houses in this neighborhood."

Grant's embarrassments at this time were known to General Lee. He reported on the 7th: "A great many of Grant's forces are deserting, and it is stated that his army is completely demoralized." On the 11th: "The balance of the Sixth Corps went to Washington on the 10th. I had hoped that General Grant, rather than weaken his army, would have attempted to drive us from our position. I fear I shall not be able to attack him to advantage, and, if I cannot, I think it would be well to re-enforce Early. In that way it would oblige him further to diminish his force."

With Grant's army in a position as strong as skill in engineering and unlimited means could make it, and with its centre on a peninsula between two navigable rivers controlled by gunboats, and each wing connected with it by pontoon bridges and ferry boats, taken in connection with the power of the navy that could be brought into use there in conjunction with the army;

and James River affording a perfectly safe and ample avenue for supplies and everything needed, it is readily seen that aggression by turning either flank could result only in throwing it back to the protection of the gunboats, and breaking through the fortified front at any point, only in such damage as could be inflicted by the assault, and that the ground thus captured could not be held. So that it is not surprising that General Lee wrote: "*I fear I shall not be able to attack him to advantage.*"

Grant's efforts were now directed to keeping up appearances to hold Lee in check, but more especially to retain the confidence of his government, and, for the latter object, reported much for effect—some of which did not have the effect intended, as appears from the calling forth of the following dispatch from President Lincoln of July 17th, 11:25 A. M.: "In your dispatch to Sherman yesterday, I find the following, to-wit: 'I shall make a desperate effort to get a position here which will hold the enemy without the necessity of so many men.' Pressed as we are by the lapse of time, I am glad to hear you say this, and yet I do hope you may find a way that the effort shall not be 'desperate' in the sense of great loss of life."

Whilst Early's invasion was thrust upon Grant by almost hourly dispatches from Washington, the progress of Burnside's mine was eagerly watched during the month of July. Burnside had succeeded in impressing upon Grant, and later upon Meade, who, for a long time, remained a "doubting Thomas" that, in the mine, the realization of their hopes would be found; and that was doubtless expected to give the "position" to which Grant alluded in his dispatch to Sherman.

After Early had retired from Maryland, all of the Nineteenth Corps that arrived at Fort Monroe was forwarded to Bermuda, and Grant, being thus strengthened, determined to resume the aggressive at once, and made arrangements accordingly; otherwise he knew not what movement Lee might initiate. But the return of Early, at this critical time, compelled him to send off at once these Nineteenth Corps troops. He, however, retained one strong brigade that co-operated with Foster.

CHAPTER XI.

Siege Continued. July Aggression. Hancock on the North Side of the James, Burnside's Mine

On the 26th of July, disposition of troops and other arrangements were completed for a series of attacks that Grant assured his government would cause the withdrawal of Early and the speedy collapse of the Confederacy. The most elaborate preparations were made, and the utmost secrecy enjoined. The first attack was to be made by Hancock with his corps and Sheridan with two divisions of cavalry, in conjunction with Foster and all the other available troops of Butler's army. Hancock was directed to cross James River at Deep Bottom, and surprise the small force under Kershaw at New Market, and crush it, if possible; if not, to press it back to Chaffin's Farm, break through it there, or turn it and go into Richmond. Sheridan, with his cavalry, was to cross the river immediately behind Hancock's infantry, swing around behind the infantry, and strike for the railroads north of the James, and destroy them thoroughly as far as the South Anna River. Should Hancock and Sheridan fail, or a favorable opportunity be otherwise presented, Burnside's mine, that was now finished and charged, was to be exploded, and an assault made through the opening with all the available forces of the army.

All arrangements being made with the most elaborate particularity, on the night of the 26th, Hancock crossed his corps over the river on a pontoon bridge

laid for the purpose below the mouth of Four-Mile Creek. Sheridan followed immediately after. Kershaw was taken completely by surprise. The Rockbridge Artillery, with four 20-pounder Parrot guns, supported by a small infantry force, had been sent down the River Road during the night to a point that proved to be about opposite Hancock's bridge for the purpose of impeding navigation on the river and shelling Foster's camps on the other side of Four-Mile Creek and the bridge connecting his camps with Jones' Point. The horses had been returned to camp to be fed and cared for. When it was light, Hancock dashed upon them. The infantry supports immediately fell back, and the guns had to be abandoned.

Hancock then advanced upon Kershaw's lines at New Market, about two miles distant, and demonstrated against them, whilst he extended to his right through the woods, in order to turn Kershaw's left. There were at New Market three small brigades of infantry, and Gary's small brigade of cavalry. Hancock's advance through the woods was made very noisy, and the troops would constantly dash in full view from the intrenchments. One of Kershaw's brigades marched down the intrenchments (that were sufficient only to mark the line of defense), keeping abreast with the head of Hancock's flanking column, followed by some guns that went *in battery* opposite where the noise was particularly demonstrative, and threw a few shells in that direction, then limbered up and went on. Hancock reported that, as far as his right extended, the fortifications were strongly manned with infantry, and that artillery opened upon them from all prominent points.

Foster moved out from Deep Bottom and extended

to his left in the same manner, and was confronted by another of Kershaw's brigades, used as the one in front of Hancock. The 27th closed without anything being accomplished, except the early morning's surprise. During the day Ewell brought out from Richmond the local troops, and with them strengthened the lines at Chaffin's, and sent a part of his force to the support of Gary's cavalry on the roads leading to Richmond on the left of Kershaw's infantry. The 28th, Sheridan moved around, and took possession of all the roads between New Market and White Oak Swamp, and advanced upon them, but in so slow and hesitating a manner that he appears to have had no heart for his part of the undertaking.

About mid-day of July 28th, General Lee, at the head of some troops from about Petersburg, arrived at New Market, and sent these troops to confront Hancock's right and Sheridan's cavalry. They very quickly commenced to drive back that wing, and the process was continued until it was evident that Hancock's was merely a demonstration, and General Lee, at once, ordered the troops from Petersburg back to Drewry's Bluff, and went himself to his headquarters at Petersburg.

As appears from the Union correspondence of the day, the movement, after it was put on foot, was characterized by excessive caution on the part of all the commanding officers—Grant, Meade, Hancock, and Sheridan. (Both Grant and Meade went on the field.) After the flanking column had been driven back, Hancock fell back during the night, and on the 29th held an intrenched line close to the river, under the cover of the gun-boats, and Sheridan massed his cavalry in

concealment on Curl's Neck. That night they marched back to take the places assigned them for co-operation in the assault that was to follow the firing of Burnside's mine.

BURNSIDE'S MINE.

Having by Hancock's demonstration—for it proved to be nothing more—drawn from Petersburg in that direction all of the infantry of Lee's army, except three divisions, Grant wrote to Meade: "We will be relatively stronger against the enemy at Petersburg than we have been since the first day."

The battle order issued by Meade, under the personal supervision of Grant, directed that the mine should be sprung at 3:30 A. M. July 30th, and gave most elaborate directions, designed to cover every possible contingency, from the disposition of troops in preparation for the attack to their arrival at the Appomattox after the capture of all the lines of defense. In the execution of this order, all the troops were in motion during the whole of the night of the 29th, relieving each other in the trenches, and forming columns of assault. Necessarily, these night operations were attended with much weariness and confusion. By the order, Hancock was to march from Deep Bottom and relieve Ord (who had succeeded Smith in command of the Eighteenth Corps) in the trenches next to the Appomattox. Ord, when relieved, was to relieve Burnside's troops, that occupied the intrenchments, with two of his divisions, and with the other two, to form columns of assault in rear of Burnside's column. Burnside, when Ord relieved his troops that were in the trenches, was to mass his four divisions in rear of the line confronting the mine,

prepared to advance by divisions immediately upon the explosion of the mine. Warren was to arrange to hold his line with the fewest possible men, and to mass all that could be thus spared on Burnside's left, to follow up Burnside's assault on that flank. All the artillery, for which positions could be found, was to be brought up, and instructed, as soon as the mine was exploded, to sweep with shot and shell all the Confederate approaches to it, and to silence the fire of their guns wherever it opened. Sheridan was to march from Deep Bottom to the extreme left of the infantry line, assume the aggressive there, and be prepared to meet any emergency that might arise.

Burnside proposed to place the negro division in front, but Meade forbade it, and, consequently, he placed his white divisions, by lot, in the order of Ledlie's first, Wilcox's second, and Potter's third, and by Meade's order, Ferrero's (negro) fourth. Ledlie was ordered, immediately upon the explosion of the mine, to dash through the breach, and, without halting or turning to the right or left, to press straight on and take possession of Cemetery Hill beyond. Wilcox was to press on directly behind Ledlie, and, when he reached the breach, to face to the left, and sweep down the line of intrenchments on that side. Potter was to follow Wilcox, and, on reaching the breach, to face to the right and sweep down the line of intrenchments on that side. Ferrero was to follow Potter to the breach, and, without delaying a moment, to press on to Ledlie on Cemetery Hill. As soon as the way was open, Ord's two divisions were to follow after, bearing to the right of Ledlie, filling any gaps and making the line continuous and strong; whilst Warren's troops were to ad-

vance as soon as possible after Ord's, and bear to the left and make that flank strong. Hancock was to hold his command in readiness to break through his front when the enemy weakened there, and to be prepared for any emergency. When all these movements were accomplished, and the troops formed on Cemetery Hill, then all the Confederate forces were to be driven beyond the Appomattox.

Now, as to the execution of these carefully laid plans. in which, however, there was nowhere made any provision for the miscarriage of any part of its details. On account of a defective fuse, the mine that was ordered to be sprung at 3:30 A. M. was not successfully fired until 4:45 A. M.. The Union correspondence shows that this delay made Meade excessively nervous. Of the assault that followed, General Burnside, in his report, wrote: "Immediately, the leading brigade, under Colonel Marshall, started for the charge. There was a delay of perhaps five minutes in removing the abatis. Clearing that, the brigade advanced rapidly to the fort that had been mined, now a crater of large proportions, and an obstacle of great formidableness. Mounting the crest of at least 12 feet above the level of the ground, our men found before them a large aperture of 150 feet in length by 60 feet in width, and 25 or 30 feet in depth, the sides of loose, pulverized sand piled up precipitately, from which projected huge blocks of clay. To cross such an obstacle and preserve regimental organization was a sheer impossibility. The lines of the enemy on each side were not single, but involved and complex, filled with pits, traverses and bombproofs, forming a labyrinth as difficult of passage as the crater itself. After the training of the previous six weeks,

it is not to be wondered at that the men should have sought shelter in these defenses. Their regimental organizations were broken, and the officers undertook to reform before advancing. It is reported that the enemy on the left, opposite to the Fifth Corps, on the explosion of the mine, left their lines, and ran to the rear. But few shots were fired from that direction on the head of my column; it was otherwise on my right. An infantry fire was opened at once from the enemy's line up to within 200 feet of the crater, and as soon as the guns could be brought to bear, artillery was opened upon our columns from across the ravine on our immediate right, and from several works at a distance in front of the extreme right of the old line of the Ninth Corps. The other brigades followed, filled the crater, and commenced to cover themselves from the fire of the enemy's artillery. The second division followed, and, being deflected by the enemy's fire, was borne to the left, so that it struck the line near the crater, and the men of the two divisions became, in some degree, intermingled. Wilcox's division found it impossible to extend to the left, and commenced intrenching."

Whilst Burnside's column was in this condition, and when the breach was not much more than 200 yards wide, at 6:30 A. M., Meade, with Grant in his company in Burnside's headquarters, ordered that the whole force should press on to Cemetery Hill, when room enough for a brigade front was not occupied, and the space occupied was swept by artillery and musketry at close range.

To continue from Burnside's report: "When this order was received, an effort was being made to form

Potter's division to charge down the intrenchments to the right, and widen the breach, but, being thus called off, with a very imperfect formation, an attempt to reach the hill was made, which quickly failed, and the men took refuge behind a covered way. The negro division was now advanced and pressed past the crater towards the hill. It captured a few prisoners and a stand of colors, when it was met by a counter-charge, broke in disorder to the rear, passed through the crater and the lines to the right, throwing in confusion and driving off from them many of the white troops, and ran into our lines. The enemy regained a portion of his lines on the right. This was about 8:45 A. M. At 9:15 A. M. I received, with regret, a peremptory order from the general commanding to withdraw my troops from the enemy's lines."

General Ord, in his report, wrote: "About 6:30 A. M., I received an order directly from General Meade's headquarters, as follows: 'You will at once forward your corps rapidly to the crest of the hill, independently of General Burnside's troops, and make a lodgment there, reporting the result as soon as obtained.' The order was at once sent to Generals Turner and Ames. General Turner (whose division was in front) replied: 'The only place I can get out of the lines is opposite the crater. It is already full of men who cannot develop. I shall put in my column as soon as I can. It is impossible, by reason of the topography, to charge the manner you indicate. I must go in by head of column and develop to the right.' " General Ord then went to join Turner and Ames, see for himself, and give directions. He wrote: "The enemy had just then brought up an addition six-gun battery, and was sweep-

ing the 75 yards of bare up-hill, where the Ninth Corps debouched, with a cross fire of canister, grape and musketry. I also saw that the crater and trenches adjacent were in a sort of re-entrant angle of the enemy's works, and that the men, who had crowded in them, were useless, and, in a great measure, helpless, and I saw that the black troops were charging out by the flank, increasing this mass of men huddled under the enemy's fire. I directed General Turner not to put his men in the crater or the trench, already filled with men, but to make a charge to the right, where the enemy was massing. This he did, and I gave him all the aid in my power, the men climbing up and over the parapet, and dashing towards the enemy's trench in good style. The leading brigade was run into by the retreating negroes, and squandered. The next brigade extended the breach 100 or more yards, and held on for a while, when it was ordered in, it being now apparent that the assault had failed."

It is to be noted that not a single division commander of Burnside's corps advanced to the crater to see into the condition and to take direction of the troops, but sent their orders to the Brigadier-Generals, and received their reports by staff officers. And, also, that General Meade made his headquarters at General Burnside's headquarters during the action, and did not leave them until after the order for the withdrawal of the troops had been issued, and that General Grant was there with him during the greater part of the time; when, at about 11 A. M., General Meade returned to his headquarters, and General Grant returned to City Point. General Burnside's headquarters were about a mile from the line of intrenchments, and arranged with

the view of protection from the fire on the lines. They were connected by telegraph lines with all parts of the army; but from them nothing whatever of the action could be seen. It is certain that Grant and Meade saw nothing, and knew anything of the progress of the battle, only, from such information as they received through telegrams and the occasional arrival of a courier. There are reports in 'the Records' that Grant was seen outside of Burnside's bombproof during the morning, but nowhere that anything of importance emanated from him.

Generals Lee and Beauregard made their headquarters at a building on Cemetery Hill (Grant's objective) from which they had a good view of the crater and the field of operations, and from which they gave directions for the use of troops by personal observation. The Confederate reports, where they cover the same ground, correspond very closely with those of Burnside and Ord. Beauregard and Johnson reported: That instructions had been given, in case of a breach of the line, that the troops on each side of the breach were to be pressed immediately towards it; that, on account of rumors of mining operations under Elliott's salient, special provisions had been made to protect that part of the line and, with this in view, twelve mortars had been placed around it, in addition to the many guns, and that a gorge line had been dug in its rear. They concur in that their troops opened fire as soon as the clouds of dust and smoke cleared away, and they saw that the enemy had rushed in the crater, which was within about five minutes after the mine was sprung; that the troops, moving in the trenches, closed up rapidly,

and, "sheltering themselves behind the angles and flanks of the work, in the covered ways running out perpendicularly to the rear of the trenches, and behind the piles of earth above the bombproofs, opened a fatal fire on every point where the foe exposed himself." "The assaulting force of the enemy was held in check by little more than three regiments of Elliott's, two of Ransom's, and two of Wise's brigades, with the efficient aid of the artillery, especially of Wright's battery and the four mortars, under Captain Lamkin, on the Jerusalem Plank Road, until the arrival of Mahone with two brigades, and the Sixty-first North Carolina Regiment of Hoke's division, that arrived about the same time—nearly 10 A. M." "Soon after Mahone's arrival, when only one of his brigades had formed in the ravine in rear of the crater, the enemy advancing, he met them with a counter-charge by all the troops in line, and the enemy was driven from three-fourths of the 'trench cavalier' and most of the works to the left of the crater, with moderate loss to our forces and heavy losses to the enemy, especially in prisoners. During the charge, a large number of the enemy's troops, black and white, abandoned the breach, and fled precipitately to their rear. Upon the flying mass, in full view of our works, a raking artillery and musketry fire was opened. Between 11 A. M. and 12 M., Wright's brigade of Mahone's division made a charge that was unsuccessful, and a little before 2 P. M., when Weisiger's brigade had been deployed in line with it, another charge was made, and swept over the crater and adjacent works, capturing all that remained," and "the Battle of the Crater" was at an end.

"At General Grant's request, a 'Court of Enquiry'

was ordered by the War Department to examine into and report upon the facts and circumstances attending the unsuccessful assault upon the enemy's position on the 30th of July, 1864." "The Court will report their opinion whether any officer or officers are answerable for the want of success of said assault, and, if so, the name or names."

The detail for the Court was, at General Grant's suggestion, as follows: Major-General W. S. Hancock, Brigadier-General R. B. Ayres, Brigadier-General N. A. Miles, and Colonel E. Schriver, Inspector-General of the Army of the Potomac.

General Hancock commanded a corps, and Ayres and Miles, each, a division of Grant's army.

The Court found: "That the detailed order, or plan of operation, issued by General Meade, is in accordance with General Grant's instructions, and was seen and approved by him previous to its publication. That, had the order been carried out, success would have attended the attack."

The Court's opinion was: "That Major-General A. E. Burnside, Brigadier-General J. H. Ledlie, Brigadier-General Edward Ferrero, Colonel Z. R. Bliss, and Brigadier-General O. B. Willcox were answerable for the want of success.

Congress appointed a "Congressional Investigating Committee" to examine into the causes of the failure, and make its report. It reported that the failure of the assault was due to the following causes: First. The fact that the charge was led by white instead of black troops. This is stated by the committee to be 'the first and great cause of the disaster.' Second. The fact that General Meade directed that the assaulting column

should push at once for the crest of Cemetery Hill, instead of first clearing the enemy's lines to the right and left of the mine.

It is seen there is a marked difference in the opinions of the two investigating bodies. The army "Court of Enquiry" commending the commanding generals, and condemning the officers in charge of the execution of their orders, whilst the Congressional Committee condemns the commanders.

But, in the light of facts now known, General Warren's findings and opinions, as given from the witness stand, are more nearly correct than those of either investigating body, and should be the accepted version of the affair.

To the question: What, in your opinion, were some of the chief causes of that failure? he made answer: "To mention them all at once, I never saw sufficient good reasons why it (the assault) should succeed. I never had confidence in its success. The position was taken in reverse by batteries, and we must, as a matter of course, have expected a heavy fire of artillery when we gained the crest, though we did not get near enough to develop what that would be. I never should have planned it." To the question: "As planned, was the plan carried out in the best manner?" Answer: "There were great defects in the preparations, and, I think, the first force, instead of moving straight on to the hill, should have cleared the intrenchments right and left of the crater, so as not to have exposed the advancing column to a flanking fire." "I do not believe any troops will stand on an open plain, with artillery, covered by redoubts, playing upon them." * * * "Their batteries were mainly placed for enfilading any line at-

tacking, and probably reserved their fire until that line approached." To the question: "Were there any force of the enemy strong enough to resist the number of our troops?" Answer: "When we attacked in the first operation on Petersburg, we had more force than on this occasion, and the enemy had about the same, I think, and I don't believe the blowing up of the mine made up for the difference in the increased strength of the earthworks, as they were on the 18th of June and the 30th of July; and, if the operations of the 18th of June decided anything, I think it decided that the operations of the 30th day of July would have met with the same result."

"I think some one should have been present to have directed my command, as well as General Burnside's and Ord's—some one person—but, whether it would have affected the result or not, I am not prepared to say." To a more minute enquiry, he replied: "I think the controlling power should have been there, and nowhere else, so that there should have been no reference to anywhere else."

The next day General Meade sent a request for a truce to care for the wounded and bury the dead. He reported his losses were 4,400 killed, wounded, and missing. The Confederate losses were 1,172 killed, wounded, and missing.

After the assault was repulsed, and the Union troops had either escaped or were captured, General Grant, at 2:15 P. M., ordered that the cavalry, supported by infantry, should go upon the Weldon Road, and destroy as much of it as possible. If conditions were favorable, the movement was to extend to Weldon; but Meade, supported by Gregg, in command of the cavalry during

Sheridan's sickness, declared the troops were in no proper condition for further aggression, and the matter was dropped.

By the returns, the casualties in Grant's army from July 1st to July 31st were 6,367; previously reported, 71,495; total to July 31st, 77,862.

By the abstract of returns of the armies operating against Richmond for July 31st, 1864, there were—

Present.	Effective.	Aggregate.
In the Army of the Potomac.....	50,532	72,970
In the Army of the James.....	30,961	42,628
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Grand total	81,493	115,598

There are no returns of Lee's army, including Beauregard's, for July 31st in "the Records." Estimated from June and August returns at: Effectives, 46,181; aggregate, 56,000.

CHAPTER XII.

Siege Continued. A Crisis Impending. August Aggressions. Hancock's Second Advance North of the James. Warren on the Weldon Railroad. Hancock at Reams' Station. Hampton's Beef Raid

A crisis seemed now impending. General Grant dispatched to General Meade July 30th, after the action of that day had closed: "The enemy has commenced crossing the Potomac at the different fords above Harper's Ferry. Order one division of Sheridan's cavalry to proceed at once to City Point to embark for Washington."

All of the Nineteenth Corps with Butler was likewise hastened off, and General Grant ordered: "Get all the heavy artillery in the lines about Petersburg moved back to City Point as early as possible. It is by no means improbable the necessity will arise for sending two more corps there." He went that night to his interview with President Lincoln at Fortress Monroe, and, upon his return, ordered that another division of Sheridan's cavalry should be embarked for Washington. On the 4th of August, he went himself to Washington.

The abandonment of the siege was in the air. It appears that Grant's visit to Washington, where something of the paucity of Early's numbers must have been found out, re-established his determination to hold on. The following correspondence, after his return, shows

how the situation was viewed by the three leading actors:

HALLECK'S DISPATCH.

(Confidential.)

WASHINGTON, August 11th, 1864.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT:

GENERAL: Some forty-odd regiments of Ohio 100 days men are to be mustered out before the end of the month. The term of service of a number of regiments from Indiana and other States expire this month and the early part of next. To meet this loss, there is scarcely anything coming in under the President's call, and I fear you will be obliged to send troops from the field to guard certain places—as West Virginia, the prison camps, etc., which cannot be left without garrisons. There is another very serious matter for which we must be prepared. Pretty strong evidence is accumulating that there is a combination formed, or forming, to make a forcible resistance to the draft in New York, Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Kentucky, and perhaps some other States. The draft must be enforced, for otherwise the army cannot be kept up. But to enforce it may require the withdrawal of a very considerable number of troops from the field. This possible, and I think very probable, exigency must be provided for. I call your attention to it now, in order that you may be prepared for it, and make your arrangements accordingly. I have not been a believer in most of the plots, secret societies, etc., of which we have so many pretended discoveries; but the people in many parts of the North and West talk openly and

boldly of resisting the draft, and it is believed that the leaders of the peace branch of the Democratic party are doing all they can to bring about this result. The evidence of this has been increasing very much in the last few days. It is probably thought that such a thing will have an effect upon the next election by showing the inability of the present Administration to carry on the war with an armed opposition in the loyal States. Whatever the object, it is thought the attempt will be made. Are not the appearances such that we ought to take in sail and prepare the ship for a storm?

Yours truly,

W. H. HALLECK,
Maj.-Gen. and Chief of Staff.

GENERAL GRANT'S REPLY.

CITY POINT, Aug. 15th, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK:

If there is any danger of an uprising in the North to resist the draft, or for any other purpose, our loyal governors ought to organize the militia at once to resist it. If we are to draw troops from the field to keep the loyal States in harness, it will prove difficult to suppress the rebellion in the disloyal States. My withdrawal now from James River would insure the defeat of Sherman. General Heintzelman can get from the governors of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois a militia organization that will deter the discontented from committing any overt act. I hope the President will call on governors of States to organize thoroughly to preserve the peace until after the election.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-Gen.

This called forth the following from the President:

WASHINGTON, August 17th, 10:30 A. M.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT:

I have seen your dispatch, expressing your unwillingness to break your hold where you are. Neither am I willing. Hold on with a bulldog grip, and chew and choke as much as possible. A. LINCOLN.

At the time this dispatch was sent, it was evident that Sherman would force the evacuation of Atlanta in a few days.

AUGUST AGGRESSIONS.

General Grant, before going to Washington, had issued instructions that the army should act strictly on the defensive, and use every means to ascertain what were Lee's purposes.

General Lee sent Lieutenant-General R. H. Anderson, with two brigades of cavalry, under the command of Fitz Lee, and Kershaw's division of infantry, that it might be inferred from his sending a corps commander that he sent at least a corps of infantry. It was promptly circulated throughout the armies that General Lee was sending off large re-enforcements to Early; and, by the 11th of August, it was accepted as a fact, by Grant and Meade, that the cavalry and Kershaw's, Field's and Wilcox's divisions had gone to the Valley.

HANCOCK'S SECOND ADVANCE ON THE NORTH OF THE JAMES.

General Grant, in order to take advantage of this, as he supposed, large detachment, and damage Lee in his weakened condition, ordered Hancock to move, with

his corps, the Tenth Corps of Butler's army, and Gregg's cavalry, and cross James River at Deep Bottom, destroy Lee's line of battle on the north of the James, and go into Richmond. He turned over to Hancock a copy of his instructions, given on the 25th of July, to govern him in this attempt. Hancock met with a piece of good luck similar to that he met with when he crossed the river in July. General Pemberton had hauled from Richmond, with oxen, four heavy howitzers to the head of Four-Mile Creek, and, in order to plant them as mortars at the most suitable place, advanced them several hundred yards in front of the line of rifle pits. The mortar-beds had not been quite completed, and the cannoneers had not been sent to them, when Hancock made his advance. Birney, who had been promoted to the command of the Tenth Corps, came with it upon them undefended, took possession, and, with immense labor, extending through several nights, carried them off as valued trophies.

As soon as Birney passed beyond them and came upon the rifle pits, he was greeted with a heavy fire, from which his troops quickly fell back. The further attempts on that side of Four-Mile Creek, which was the left of Hancock's line, met with no success, and Hancock called Birney to him on the right. In order to transfer troops from the left to the right, it was necessary to pass back across James River on the bridge to Jones' Point, and then to recross on Hancock's bridge, because the left was above Four-Mile Creek, and the right below, the Creek being impassable.

Hancock, after crossing the river where he crossed before, swung around, as on the former occasion, to turn the left of the position at New Market, now commanded

by Field, and used the cavalry as he had done before. Moving this time with the greatest caution possible, and intrenching at every step, he made repeated attempts to force the lines, especially with the infantry on the right of his line, commanded by Birney, who had been transferred during the night from the left to the extreme right. These assaults were attended with quite considerable loss, and inflicted some, but were conducted with such caution that they amounted to little more than demonstrations. They were kept up from the 14th until the 20th, when Hancock withdrew across the river, as he had done on the former occasion. This movement had the effect of forcing General Lee to meet it with all the force not absolutely necessary to hold the trenches elsewhere.

The losses in Hancock's command at Deep Bottom were reported at 2,901; the heaviest in Tenth Corps, 1,676.

The casualties in Field's division that bore the brunt of the fighting on the Confederate side for the whole month of August were reported at less than 1,000. In the "Records" there are no reports of the casualties in the troops brought from across the river.

WARREN ON THE WELDON RAILROAD.

Whilst these operations were in progress on the north side of James River, Warren's Corps was drawn from the trenches in front of Petersburg, and, on the 18th of August, was sent to the Weldon Railroad. It would appear from the instructions given Warren that it was not expected he would be able to hold on there; but, rather, that the move was intended to act as a diversion

to draw off forces from in front of Hancock. Warren, consequently, was not embarrassed by the usual minute instructions, but was given quite a free hand. He moved towards the road at some distance from the Confederate line, and met with no opposition until he had almost reached it, when Dearing's small brigade of cavalry commenced a resistance as strong as was in the power of so small a force to make. Warren soon brushed it out of the way, and took possession of the road. He sent a division out in the direction of Weldon to form a rear guard, and, facing towards Petersburg, advanced up the road towards the Confederate lines. Ayres, who led the advance with his division, soon encountered Heth, of Hill's Corps, with his division, and his progress was arrested. He was then driven back for some distance, and his command much disorganized, when Crawford's division was sent to his assistance, and a very severe engagement ensued, with varying results, but, on the whole, somewhat favorable to Warren. Warren reported his losses for the day were 936 officers and men. During the night, Warren intrenched the line he held at the close of the day, and early the next morning (19th), sent out a brigade to establish connection by a picket line with the general line of intrenchments in front of Petersburg.

General Hill, in addition to Heth's two or three brigades, that confronted Warren's two divisions, called to him Mahone, with three brigades. It appears that a brigade of Hoke's division was also used here. At 4:30 P. M., Mahone broke through this picked line that was being established, and, wheeling to the right, swept down Warren's line, breaking up all of Crawford's division and a part of Ayres', and capturing

about 2,700 prisoners, but, before their work was completed, the brigades had become so scattered in the dense woods as to render it necessary that they should be withdrawn to the Confederate lines before they could be reformed.

Warren then, with the assistance of a part of the Ninth Corps (about 2,000 troops), reoccupied his lines. He lost in the engagement 2,900 killed, wounded and missing, of which number only about 200 were killed or wounded, and, it appears, Hill's total loss was about this number.

On the 21st, Hill attempted to break up Warren's line across the railroad by a concentrated artillery fire, but the troops, well protected by intrenchments, suffered but little, and, when Hill advanced his infantry, finding that the artillery fire had been ineffective, the assault was not pressed. In the advance of the infantry, Hagood's brigade, without proper supports, broke through the line at a re-entrant angle, or the line of troops moving out "*en echelon*," as is stated in one report, was almost surrounded, and lost between 300 and 400 prisoners. No further effort to dislodge Warren was made, and he succeeded in making a permanent lodgment on the road, but at the cost of 4,455 killed, wounded, and missing.

HANCOCK AT REAMS' STATION.

Grant, immediately upon hearing of Warren's success in making a lodgment upon the road, ordered Hancock to withdraw from the north side of the James and to hasten, with his corps, to Warren's assistance and to destroy the road as far south as possible. By August 25th, Hancock had advanced to Reams' Station, and

was arranging to proceed further, when Hill confronted him with Hampton's cavalry and Cook's and MacRae's brigades of Heth's division, and Lane's brigade of Wilcox's division; and at 5 P. M., Pegram, who accompanied the infantry with his battalion of artillery, opened upon Hancock with all his guns. After shelling for about 15 minutes, the infantry brigades advanced against the intrenched line held by Miles' division, and, in a little while, broke through it and disorganized the command. This was followed by an assault by Hampton, with dismounted cavalry, upon Gibbon's line, which he struck in flank as it was changing position, in order to restore the battle on Miles' front, and it quickly gave way. Gregg, who had with him his division and Spear's brigade of cavalry, and covered the flanks of the infantry, was confronted by as much cavalry as he could stand up against, and Hancock was in imminent danger of being utterly destroyed. He had with him Gibbon's and Miles' divisions of his corps and Gregg's and Spear's cavalry; and Mott's and Willcox's divisions were within four miles, hastening towards him. The approach of these divisions and the nearness of night deterred Hill from pressing the attack any further, and Hancock retreated during the night.

A. P. Hill reported "as a correct list of results":

CAPTURED—Stands of colors, 12; pieces of artillery, 9; caissons, 10; prisoners, 2,150; stand of small arms, 3,100; horses, 32.

LOSSES—Cavalry, artillery, infantry—total, 720.

Hancock wrote August 26th: "It is acknowledged to have been one of the most determined and desperate fights of the war, resembling Spottsylvania in character, though the numbers engaged gives it less im-

portance." When he had learned something of the numbers making the attack, and of their losses, he wrote in his official report: "I attribute the bad conduct of some of my troops to their great fatigue, owing to the heavy labor exacted of them, and to their enormous losses during the campaign, especially in officers," as well as to the indifferent quality of the new recruits. His losses were reported at 2,742 killed, wounded, and missing.

In this series of engagements, Hill was contending against divisions in intrenched positions with brigades that made the attacks from the open, and consequently he could not reap the full fruits of his victories.

Except that General Lee was compelled, by the extension of Grant's line across the railroad, to make a corresponding extension of his line to confront it, he suffered no very serious inconvenience from it; for a long time he had been expecting it, and making arrangements to supply his army with food by the other roads, and by wagoning around the break in the road. Under ordinary circumstances, the loss of 10,000 men would have been considered a ruinous piece to pay for so small an inconvenience, but there was nothing niggardly about the United States Administration when it came to furnishing Grant with men and means.

General Lee continued to hold and use the Weldon Railroad south of the break in it after Grant had made a permanent lodgment upon it, and caused that the holding of a line across it should be a source of weakness to Grant much greater than the embarrassment that accrued to him by being compelled to wagon around the flank of the force that held it. The infantry force that held it was compelled to hold double lines—one

facing towards Petersburg and the other towards Reams' Station—to protect both front and rear.

General Lee, by encircling that wing of Grant's army, was enabled to frustrate all his plans for aggression by the use of Hampton's cavalry, supported upon occasion by brigades of infantry, detached for immediate service with Hampton. In fact, that wing of Grant's army was more nearly invested than was Lee's army in Petersburg. In view of Grant's plan for the extension of the left wing of his army, by which he hoped to accomplish the investment of Lee's army, it appears somewhat incomprehensible that he should have sent off so large a part of his cavalry to the Valley of Virginia that Lee's cavalry, under Hampton, was recognized to be incomparably stronger, and dominated all the country beyond the lines held by infantry. Grant, evidently, was bewildered by the conditions imposed upon him by Lee.

The casualties in Grant army for August were 10,999; previously reported, 77,862; total to August 31st, 88,861.

Abstract of returns for August 31st, 1864, reports:

Present.	Effectives.	Aggregate.
In Army of Potomac	37,827	64,856
In Army of the James	22,340	30,604
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	60,167	95,460

Abstract of armies defending—

In the Army of Northern Virginia.	31,232	41,295
In Beauregard's Army	11,949	14,591
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total of armies defending	43,181	55,886

It will be seen that Grant's superiority in numbers is much diminished, and that the Confederate prospects, so far as concerns the operations of the armies in Virginia, are very encouraging. But, whilst the aspect of affairs in Virginia were so encouraging, most depressing influences were brought to bear from the armies in Georgia.

The Confederate army there had been pushed back by Sherman until it was apprehended that Atlanta would be abandoned by General Johnston without trying conclusions with Sherman in a general engagement. Under these conditions, President Davis, on July 17th, had removed General Johnston and placed General J. B. Hood in command of the army in Georgia. The order for this change of commanders called forth acrimonious discussion, not only in the newspapers, but at all the camp fires, and the parties to them were soon arrayed in factions that were very bitter in their denunciations. This, of necessity, affected to a greater or less extent the *morale* of the army, especially among those whose homes had been destroyed, or were threatened with destruction by Sherman's advance, and their families driven or about to be driven away they knew not where. Under these circumstances it is not to be wondered at that absentees and recruits could not be gathered in from the Gulf States and Georgia, and that a feeling of unrest began to grow in the ranks of Lee's army, and that some of the weaker characters should desert their posts to seek and care for their families. No people were ever subjected to a severer strain, and, in the main, stood up under it with such high self-abnegation.

With the fall of Atlanta, which took place on the

31st of August, the field for keeping up the strength of the Army of Northern Virginia was reduced to Virginia, North Carolina and South Carolina, with the north and west counties of Virginia and the tidewater districts of all three of them almost, if not entirely, within the grasp of the irresistible power of the enemy. And, still, in spite of all this, it will be seen that Lee's army that had up to this time so successfully withstood Grant's army continued to do so; and it appears that had the final decision of the contest been left to be determined by these two armies unaided, Lee would have overcome Grant's superiority in numbers and in all things else that go to make armies victorious except generalship and the courage of men defending their homes from invasion. But from this time forward it became more and more apparent each month that the whole force of Sherman's army would be added to Grant's, and the doom of Lee's army was inevitable.

HAMPTON'S BEEF RAID.

September 3d General Lee directed Hampton to make a close inspection of the roads leading to City Point, as from reports of scouts the wagon parks in that direction were not well guarded. On the 5th the scout, Shadburne, made a report that was very minute as to all the roads, and how they were guarded, and among the many items of information that there were at Coggins Point about 3,000 cattle, and that Sycamore Church, the nearest point of the enemy's picket line to Coggins Point, was held by the first regiment of the District of Columbia Cavalry, about 250 strong. It was determined to capture this herd of cattle, and on the 14th Hampton, with W. H. F. Lee's division and Ros-

ser's and Dearing's brigades of cavalry, moved around the left flank of the enemy's pickets, and, after making quite an extended circuit, was prepared to make the attack at light on the morning of the 16th. W. H. F. Lee moved up on their cavalry picket line, drove it back, and interposed his division between the body of their army on the left and Sycamore Church and Coggins Point. Dearing moved off to the right, and placed his brigade so as to prevent escape down the river, whilst Rosser moved directly on Sycamore Church. He soon routed the cavalry regiment, capturing a large part of it and dispersing the rest, and gathered in the herd of cattle (2,486 head), and at 8 A. M. commenced retiring with them.

In accordance with General Lee's instructions to A. P. Hill to call off attention from the move, Hill that morning made a strong demonstration against the left of Meade's line of intrenchment, drove in the pickets, captured some prisoners, and kept Meade guessing until Hampton had secured his prize and gotten safe out of reach.

Hampton captured and brought back, in addition to the cattle, 304 prisoners and some horses, with a total loss in his command of 61 killed, wounded, and missing.

CHAPTER XIII.

Siege Continued. Grant's September Aggressions. Butler on the North Side of the James. Warren and Parke on the Squirrel Level Road. Anderson on Williamsburg Road

During the latter part of the month of September, Grant, having received large reinforcements, decided that the time had arrived when he could resume aggression with the certainty of success. He elected that attacks should be made from both flanks of his army—from each with a force superior in numbers to the force Lee could command for the defense of both. The flanks were now far removed from each other, and should Lee resist either attack with all his force, and it would require that much force to stay either column in Grant's opinion, the other column would have a walkover. He arranged that Butler should strike the first blow with his army, with Richmond as his objective point, and as soon as its effects were noted, that Meade should attack with his force, with Petersburg as his objective.

It was known that General Lee had only seven divisions of infantry in his army, and of these four as the minimum were required to hold the line from James River to the Weldon Railroad, leaving only three divisions available for the protection of both flanks. These three divisions, or their equivalents in detached brigades, were held in reserve in rear of the line of fortifications. As far as possible they were arranged so as to be promptly available to A. P. Hill, who commanded the right wing of Lee's line, and was to meet any advance from the direc-

tion of the Weldon Road. The extension of Meade's line across the Weldon Road compelled General Lee, in order to use the road south of the break in it, to establish connection with it by a wagon road from the point at which the railroad crossed Stony Creek, so that the strength of the cavalry force was kept at Reams' Station in rear of Meade's line, and in guarding the wagon road around its flank until it entered the infantry lines. The Boydton Plank Road was the main avenue of this connection, though the Squirrel Level Road, between it and the railroad, was much used for this purpose.

General Grant issued his directions to Butler and Meade on the 27th day of September for the movement to be made on the 29th. To Butler: To be prepared to make an attack on the north side of the James with all the available forces of his army, leaving his line of fortifications to be guarded by the artillery and the new regiment. His object to be: To surprise the force on that side of the river, and to capture Richmond. Therefore he directed that his arrangements must be made with the greatest secrecy, and the different columns started simultaneously under cover of night, and then pressed forward with the greatest vigor. To Meade his direction was: "To attract attention to his part of the line by movements of his troops on the 28th to call off attention from Butler, and on the 29th to move out on his left flank in the direction of the Southside Railroad. He stated that General Lee would thus be placed in the position that he must elect between the protection of Richmond or Petersburg. He concluded his instructions with: "The prize sought is either Richmond or Petersburg, or a position that will secure the latter."

BUTLER ON THE NORTH SIDE OF THE JAMES.

On the 28th Butler issued his battle order, perhaps the most remarkable one that ever was issued. It was divided under many different headings. The first: "Its object: To get possession of Richmond, and to hold it." Another was: "The positions and numbers of the enemy." Under this heading he locates all the various detachments of the enemy, and gives the strength of each detachment, *i. e.*, Johnson brigade (400 strong) behind Cox's landing; the City battalion (200 strong) extending from it down the river to Ruffin's house; behind it 175 reserve militia. "Neither of these have ever fired a musket." They are joined by Benning's brigade (400 strong) that extends to J. Aikin's House. These are there joined by Gregg's brigade (400 strong), who extends to New Market. The cavalry guarding the flank and the roads leading into Richmond is divided into three detachments of 400 each. On Chaffin's farm there is no garrison except about 100 heavy artillerists. He sums up this heading with: "There are not 3,000 effective men, outside of the limits of the city of Richmond, on the north side of the river." His statements under this heading are certainly remarkable for their minute accuracy; the locations are perfect, and the strength only slightly, if at all, in excess of the actual strength, as shown by the returns. What is to be done in Richmond is treated at great length. And lastly: "The reward of the first troops entering the city is to be the promotion of all the officers, and six months' extra pay to officers and men."

In the Records there are no official reports of the engagements that ensued, on the Union side, that throw

any light upon them except one from General Ord, written after the war (dated Richmond, June 5, 1865), and some few reports of brigade and regimental commanders that refer to nothing beyond their immediate commands. The Union Correspondence of the day, as it appears in the records of the day, is also very limited in regard to the engagements of that day. It opens with the following dispatch from President Lincoln :

“WASHINGTON, Sept. 29th, 9:40 A. M.

“LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT, City Point, Va.:

“I hope it will lay no restraint upon you, nor do harm, anyway, for me to say I am a little afraid lest Lee sends reinforcements to Early, and thus enable him to turn upon Sheridan. A. LINCOLN.”

To this dispatch General Grant promptly replied :

“DEEP BOTTOM, Sept. 29, '64, 1:40 P. M.

“PRESIDENT A. LINCOLN :

“Your dispatch just received. I am taking steps to prevent Lee sending reinforcements to Early by attacking him here. Our advance is now within six miles of Richmond, and have captured some very strong enclosed forts, some fifteen or more pieces of artillery, and several hundred prisoners. Although I have been at the front, I can give no estimate of our losses. About 600 wounded men, however, have been brought in.

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant-General.*”

In his dispatch to Halleck at 10:45 A. M., General Grant, after stating substantially the above dispatch, adds: “General Birney advanced at the same time from Deep Bottom, and carried the New Market Road and intrenchments, and scattered the enemy in every direc-

tion, though he captured but few. He is now pushing on towards Richmond." Again to Halleck at 4 P. M., after the signal defeat at Fort Gillmer, about 2:30 P. M., to which no allusion is made, he wrote: "Kautz's cavalry was in sight of Richmond at last accounts on the Darbytown Road. A division of infantry has been sent to his support. I did not expect to carry Richmond, but was in hope of causing the enemy so to weaken the garrison of Petersburg as to be able to carry that place." And then, having doubts about success at Petersburg, which his correspondence with Meade on that day discloses, he adds: "The great object, however, is to prevent the enemy sending reinforcements to Early." At 1:30 P. M., he dispatched to Meade: "Reinforcements are beginning to come from Petersburg. I doubt whether it will be advisable for you to make any advance this evening, but I leave this to your judgment." At 12 M. to Butler: "If our troops do not reach Richmond this afternoon, my opinion is it will be unsafe to spend the night north of the enemy's lower bridge." At 1:35 P. M.: "From the enclosed dispatch you will see that all must be done to-day that can be done toward Richmond." At 4.45 P. M.: "If the enemy do not reinforce by more than a division, we will give them another trial in the morning, flanking instead of attacking works."

So much for General Grant's plans, views, and directions as expressed in reports and orders. The occurrences on the 29th as herein related are based upon General Ord's official report. The numbers in the two Union columns of attack, the formation of his column, its mode of advance, etc., are in the exact language used by him. The column of assault commanded by General Ord, in person, consisted of two divisions composed of

4,000 men, selected by himself, and the other, commanded by General Birney that crossed the river on the bridge at Deep Bottom, was composed of 10,000 men. Both columns crossed the river during the night of the 28th. Ord's at the upper bridge near Aikin's landing, and at light moved rapidly upon Johnson's brigade. This brigade made as strong resistance as was advisable, but was driven back gradually until the men entered the works at Chaffin's farm. Ord pressed on until, at 7:30 A. M., his leading division arrived in sight of Fort Harrison. This so-called fort was a redan at a prominent point on the main line of the defenses of Chaffin's Bluff, and was about one and a quarter miles from James River, and was connected with the intermediate line of the Richmond defenses by breast works and redans. Ord promptly formed Stannard's, his leading, division in columns of assault on the left of the Varina Road, and ordered Heckman, as soon as his division closed up, to move it, under cover of the woods, to the right of the road, and to assault the fort from that direction as soon as possible. Heckman did not get in position in time to take part in the action.

There were now in Fort Harrison, in addition to the artillerists, some of the men of Johnson's brigade, and the others, together with a few local troops, were in the works adjacent to it. The assault of Stannard's division was met by a destructive fire, under which it staggered until Ord and all his staff pressed to the front and restored the battle. Ord wrote: "Its losses were very heavy." After a time the column reached the ditch around the fort, and the men jumped into it, and then moved around in it towards the rear, which was open. The men in the fort continued to use their guns and

muskets until they saw they were about to be closed in, and then escaped to the works adjacent with scarcely any loss. Only three men were captured in the fort, and two of them were wounded. After the capture of the main work, several points on the line near it, where small semi-lunar works had been thrown up to protect gun-platform, were, one after the other, taken, the defenders passing back as each was entered. In taking one of these General Ord, in person, leading the attack, received a disabling wound. All the artillery that was captured this day was placed in these works.

The capture of Fort Harrison caused an order to be sent to General Grigg at New Market to fall back with his and Benning's brigade to the intermediate line, of which Fort Harrison formed a part. Up to the time the order was received every assault of Birney's corps had been repulsed by these brigades with heavy losses to it. The first advance of Birney's troops beyond the woods in which they had moved was in the direction of New Market, and as soon as they were subjected to the musketry, and especially heavy artillery fire from that point, quickly fell back to the cover of the woods. Their next appearance was in several lines of battle one and a half miles up the line in the direction of Richmond. All of Gregg's men between the two points were hastened up the line to meet this force, leaving only videts on the line between the two points. The attack at this point was made with heavy force, and was soon repulsed with heavy loss, but before Gregg's men could be returned to the line they had left, Birney's negro brigade had charged over it and into the woods behind it. Gregg's men as soon as the attack one and a half miles from New Market was repulsed, returning at a

double-quick down the line, drove off the part of the negro brigade in it, occupied the entrenchments and cut off that part of the brigade behind it in the woods, the greater part of which was captured, and the line was fully restored.

When Gregg received the order to fall back, the troops retired without being closely pressed, and hastened to the intermediate line, a part of them to the works near the captured fort and a part to the point at which the line of fortifications was crossed by the River Road, and Ord's forces were hemmed in so that they were unable to extend on either side or towards Chaffin's Bluff, and the Confederate gunboats steamed down the river so as to sweep with shot and shell all exposed parts of them. Birney's march up the New Market Road was much delayed by Gary's cavalry and the Third Company of Richmond Howitzers that formed Gregg's rearguard. As Gary approached Chaffin's, he received notice that but little infantry had arrived there, and was directed to delay the enemy as long as possible. He, in consequence, made a very determined stand at Laurel Hill Church with the Howitzer Company and some dismounted cavalry, and thus gave Gregg time to make preparations to receive Birney's attack. So determined was this stand that Birney thought he had reached the line of fortifications, and arranged his troops under that impression. When he advanced and found that he had been opposed by only a battery and a few dismounted cavalry, in his bewilderment, he awaited the opening of communication with Ord's column; but Ord had been wounded and taken from the field, and though Grant, in his dispatches to Washington and to Meade, makes very promi-

nent the fact that he was riding to and fro on that line, and Butler, of course, was always exactly where he should be, it was about 2:30 P. M. before dispositions were made for co-operation of the two commands in the attack upon Fort Gillmer, by which time Field had arrived from across the river. In the afternoon about 2:30 P. M., an assault was made upon Fort Gilmer, the next salient above Fort Harrison, by Birney with white troops from the direction of Laurel Hill Church, and by troops of Hink's negro division from the direction of Fort Harrison. Field, upon his arrival, had thrown into the fort men sufficient with the artillery there to make a strong garrison, and arranged the others to cover its flanks. Birney's white troops broke to the rear very soon after coming under fire, but the negroes advanced steadily under a terrific artillery and musketry fire from the fort and from the breastworks on its flanks without firing a gun, and jumped into the ditch. After they got well under fire none escaped to the rear and all were killed or captured. The prisoners stated that all their commissioned officers were white, but there were none among the killed and wounded left on the field, or among the prisoners, and the prisoners said that they had not seen or heard from them after they were put in motion for the charge. With this bloody repulse, the fighting at Chaffin's farm ended for the day. Kautz's cavalry moved around to the right until they came upon the fortifications immediately in front of the city of Richmond and had a sight of the church spires, and then retired. Not one man was either killed or wounded in Fort Gillmer.

General Ord was wounded early in the day and General Stannard the next day, and many of their officers

were disabled. By the returns the casualties in the two columns were reported at 3,327, of which number 1,456 were in the negro division of the Eighteenth Corps and the negro brigade of the Tenth Corps. The casualties for this day on the Confederate side were very few, not more than 200 to 300. The next day, however, an effort was made to recapture the fort which was unsuccessful, and two Confederate brigades met with quite heavy losses, whilst the troops defending the fort suffered but little. General Butler reported the capture of 209 prisoners and two flags.

Fort Harrison was retained in possession only as a matter of pride. It was ever after a costly piece of property to hold. It was closely invested in front and on both flanks by strong works, and the approach to it was exposed to the fire of the Confederate gunboats, and though their engineer officers soon made it impregnable, and the approach to it comparatively safe, the engineers on the other side made it powerless to inflict damage. Thus ended Butler's attack on the north side of the James.

Meade made no attack on the 29th. On the 30th at 8:15 A. M., General Grant dispatched to him: "You may move out now and see if any advantage can be gained. It seems to me the enemy must be weak enough at one or the other place to let us in." Later in the day: "If the enemy can be broken and started, follow him up closely. I can't help believing that the enemy are prepared to leave Petersburg if forced a little." Again at 9:40 P. M., after Parke had been repulsed by Heth: "We must be greatly superior to the enemy in numbers on one flank or the other, and by working

around at each end we will find where the enemy's weak point is."

As directed, Warren moved out on the 30th to the left with two of his divisions, and was followed by Parke, commanding the Ninth Corps since Burnside's retirement immediately after the Mine Disaster, with two of his divisions, with the view of reaching the Southside Railroad, and making a lodgment upon it. About the Squirrel Level Road Warren came upon a line of breastworks with Dearing's brigade of cavalry, dismounted, behind them. At the first attack this brigade fell back, leaving a gun behind them, and Warren took possession of it. General Lee directed Hampton to have the matter of the feeble resistance inquired into, and the commanding officer punished. (General Dearing was absent sick, or doubtless it would not have happened.) Parke's divisions passed by Warren when in this position, and was moving toward the Boydton Road when Heth, assisted by a part of Hampton's cavalry, attacked them, broke them and drove them until Warren sent Crawford's division to their assistance. Besides the killed and wounded Parke lost about 1,000 prisoners in the attack. Hampton held Gregg in check, and the next day, when he had collected together his cavalry force, drove him back upon the infantry. Meade, thus opposed, arrested the march before the Boydton Road was reached, and commenced fortifying this extension of his line, which was about two miles beyond the Weldon railroad. He had written to Grant that it would be "extending our lines without a commensurate object."

By the returns Meade's casualties in this effort were 2,889. Thus ended in failure the September aggressions.

Grant's casualties in September were.....	7,018
Previously reported	88,879

Total casualties in Grant's army to Sept. 30th.. 95,879

By the abstract of returns for September 30th there were in Grant's army:

<i>Present.</i>	<i>Effective.</i>	<i>Aggregate.</i>
In the Army of the Potomac.....	51,002	73,878
In the Army of the James.....	33,120	36,210
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	84,122	110,088

From the partial returns of Lee's army for September 10th and September 20th and the returns for October 30th, it appears there were no material changes in the effectives and aggregates of his army. There are not in the Records the returns of Lee's army for September 30th.

After the capture of Fort Harrison, Butler's army commenced extending to the right on a line confronting the intermediate line of the defenses of Richmond, and intrenching as it extended. At the same time an interior line was intrenched, covering the New Market Road down to that place, at which a strong redoubt was thrown up. This interior line was designed to protect the river base from Aiken's Landing to Deep Bottom, and afford a rallying point in case the line to the right was broken or turned.

ANDERSON ON THE WILLIAMSBURG ROAD.

By the 7th of October the extension to the right had progressed so as to cover the Darbytown Road with the right of Kautz's cavalry resting on the Williamsburg

Road. On that day General Anderson was sent with several brigades of infantry, a battalion of artillery, and Gary's cavalry to turn the flank on the Williamsburg Road, and break up this extension. At 8 A. M., he attacked the dismounted cavalry, broke it up, and let Gary's cavalry into their rear. Kautz's men quickly broke all down the line, and made for the rear, leaving their artillery in the hands of Gary's men, and were not rallied until they got behind the infantry at New Market. Birney quickly perceiving the conditions, did not attempt to relieve Kautz, but threw back his right to New Market, and placed the infantry behind the interior line before the assaulting columns reached it. Though there were some sharp partial engagements on different parts of the line, Anderson, finding Birney was on an intrenched line, did not press the attack and soon withdrew. The losses on neither side were large, and Kautz's artillery (9 guns and 10 caissons) were the only substantial fruits reaped by Anderson.

But "the brave General Gregg, of the Texas brigade fell dead at the head of his men." He was so loved and admired that his death cast a gloom over the whole army, and the Confederate cause suffered the loss of another, and one of the very best, of its defenders.

General Grant directed Birney to drive the enemy back on the Darbytown Road and continue the extension that had been interrupted, and on the 13th, Birney made the attempt, but met with no success, and retired with the loss of 437 men.

GRANT RE-ENFORCED.

Heavy re-enforcements of recruits and new regiments were now pouring in to Grant, so there was no lack of

men. The question now was: What to do with them? Grant had forbidden any more assaults. Since the period of assaults at Petersburg, Grant, in common with his army, had grown more and more apprehensive of the results of assaults. When attempted, they had grown to be recognized as the merest farces in all things except the loss of life. Mining operations ended with Burnside's disastrous failure. Approaches by parallels had been discontinued. Bombardment with heavy guns and mortars had produced no effect. Though, as Butler claimed, he had transferred Fortress Monroe, in all its strength, from Hampton Roads to Bermuda Hundreds, the investment of Richmond and Petersburg was not progressing. All the railroads and the canals were in active use, even the Weldon Road, that Grant's army was lying across, and provisions were coming in to Lee's army with more regularity than they had done in the previous twelve months, and the animals were better foraged. Every attempt to extend the lines to an investment had been arrested by General Lee, whose soldiers were becoming so expert that their attacks upon the flanking columns, whilst on the march and before they could get position to intrench, were surprises, and invariably successful, inflicting heavy losses and paralyzing the effort. After Sheridan's defeat by Hampton at Trevillian, on the Central Railroad, and the disastrous termination of Wilson's raid on the Danville Railroad, cavalry raids around Richmond had been abandoned.

Generals Grant and Meade were afraid to attempt Warren's plan of attack, that he had been urging ever since the army sat down before Petersburg—*i. e.*: "To leave only garrisons for the enclosed works, and cut loose

from the base with the whole army, and strike for some distant point vital to Richmond's communications, and thus to compel Lee to leave his fortifications and follow after, and then make the attack upon the army in position." Every other mode of attack that was within the range of their knowledge had been tried and failed.

It would not do that the largest and best appointed army of the United States, under the personal command of the commander-in-chief of all the armies, should remain inactive behind fortifications until the other armies closed in upon the flanks and rear of the comparatively small army holding its front, unable to do anything, because its commander did not know what to do with it! Something must be done.

CHAPTER XIV.

Siege Continued. October Aggressions. Butler on the North Side of the James. Hancock on the Boydton Plank Road

In this dilemma, Grant determined to repeat the aggressions of the latter part of September, with this slight difference that Butler's extension was called a diversion in favor of Meade's attack upon the Southside Railroad. General Grant directed Butler to prepare his army to move out at an early hour on the 27th of October, and find any weak points that there may be in Lee's line; if any were found, to go in at them and break up the line; if none were found, to extend until he passed the left of Lee's line, then to turn it and go into Richmond, if possible. In the instructions, he charged him not to assault intrenchments if there was any force behind them.

Butler, of course, issued an elaborate battle order, and, on the 27th, his army was extended to the right in front of the Confederate line of intrenchments that had been made very substantial, and, at short intervals, dashed up to within a few hundred yards of it, when they were greeted with a murderous fire. This process was continued until the Williamsburg Road was reached, when the procession was discontinued.

Field, with his five small brigades, held the line on the north side of the James. They quickly perceived the nature of the attack, and so moved behind the works that there was always a strong line of battle to meet every dash, and the men exercised their ingenuity to the fullest extent to arrange that as many as possible

should get under close fire. Their chief device to accomplish this end was to lie hid behind the works, and make it appear that they were unoccupied, and then, at the command, to rise and pour in a volley.

As an instance: At a salient near the Williamsburg Road, in which a four-gun battery was in position, when, by shouting and noise, the enemy made their approach known, the troops on both flanks moved toward it until, when the skirmish line fell back to the intrenchments from the edge of the woods in front, there was assembled in it, and the line adjacent, a strong battle line. Directions were then passed down the lines that all should lie concealed behind the breastworks until the artillery officer gave the signal, and that the guns, with double charges of canister, should be carefully aimed to sweep the paths left open in the felled timber for the use of the pickets. When the Union troops reached the edge of the woods, and saw the works apparently unoccupied, their officers announced the apparent fact in loud tones, and ordered a rush. When they had move^d over half the distance, and were huddled together in the paths by the felled timber, the signal was given, and the slaughter of them all was almost complete. More than 400 prisoners were taken and many dead left in front of the works.

Field's casualties for the day in infantry, artillery, and cavalry were 64 officers and men. So cautious has Butler's army become that its casualties amounted to only 1,603 officers and men.

HANCOCK ON THE BOYDTON PLANK ROAD.

General Grant instructed Meade to move out on the left with the three corps of the Army of the Po-

tomac, leaving men enough only to garrison the enclosed works and picket their front, and make a permanent lodgment on the Southside Railroad, which he would immediately proceed to connect by intrenchments with the old line. Meade, in his order for the march, directed that the three corps should start out at 3:30 A. M. October 27th in parallel columns—Parke nearest the lines of the enemy, Warren in the middle, and Hancock on his left. Parke, as soon as he came in contact with the enemy, if in any force, was to confront them and intrench, extending as far to his left as he could with safety, in order to connect with Warren. Warren was to keep himself informed as to Parke's advance and the position he occupied, and move so as to come in on his left when extended, and, at the same time, to hold his forces prepared to render assistance to Hancock should he need it. The movements of these two columns were made as directed, without notable incidents. Hancock was to strike directly for the Southside Railroad, and Gregg, with his cavalry, to precede him and be under his command.

Hancock's column, moving at the greatest distance from the Confederate lines, crossed Hatcher's Run at light, and pushed on to the Boydton Plank Road, encountering only a small cavalry force at the Run. As soon as he reached the road, however, a fire was opened upon him from different directions by Hampton's cavalry, which caused him to delay his march. Grant and Meade came to him a little after 1 P. M., and directed him to halt there and await connection with Crawford's division of Warren's Corps, that was moving to

make the connection. Hancock then sent Egan with his division to drive the dismounted cavalry back across the bridge at Burgess' Mill, and Mott to move his division down the White Oak Road far enough to give room for its deployment in line facing Hatcher's Run. Egan succeeded, after considerable delay, in driving the cavalry across the Run. Hancock then ordered him to charge across and drive the enemy from the crest beyond, but, before his troops were well under way, Mahone had crossed the Run below and between him and Crawford's division, with three brigades, and was advancing towards the Boydton Road through a dense woods. Mahone struck the road in rear of Egan, captured some artillery, and not only cut off Crawford's divisions, but cut Hancock's Corps in two. It appears that Mahone did not at once perceive that Egan was between him and the Run, where the road crossed it, and not until he had faced in the other direction and was engaged with a strong force of the enemy. When he found out the situation, he drew back his line where it crossed the road. This withdrawal was attended with some losses in prisoners, for, whilst faced to the south and driving Pierce's and DeTrobeiard's brigades in that direction, Egan's division closed in upon his rear, and his men had to fire to the rear as well as to the front. Hancock reported that he captured several hundred prisoners at this time. Mahone then formed his brigades in the edge of the woods, and successfully resisted every attack. In the meantime, Hampton was pressing Gregg back, and rapidly closing in on Hancock on three sides, and he was nearly surrounded. Hancock

sent a message to Warren that he "must be re-enforced at once, or I cannot answer for the consequences." Ames' division was hastened by Warren to Armstrong's Mill to re-enforce him or cover his retreat. Crawford, who had crossed the Run, and was moving on the south side of it, keeping close to it, hastily built a bridge across the stream just in rear of his line, and, that night and the early morning following, crossed back and rejoined Warren.

The Union correspondence shows that their maps of the country were very defective, and that the country was so densely wooded that large commands were for a time lost; indeed, that Warren's Corps was so far lost that it could not be communicated with for hours, and that some of Mahone's men, having lost their command, were capturing ambulances and officers and men in rear of Crawford's lines, and that the captors afterwards became captives. That evening, by Meade's order, Hancock was given the choice between holding on where he was and renewing the battle in the morning, when Ames' and Crawford's divisions would re-enforce him, or retreating during the night. As he was so hemmed in that he had scarcely space to deploy in, he promptly decided to retreat, and at 10 P. M. commenced his backward movement, assigning as his reason for doing so that he "could not get up both ammunition and reinforcements in time over his limited road facilities."

Mahone captured 400 prisoners, and all the wounded except 155 that they were able to carry off with them, and all their dead were left on the field. Hampton captured 239 prisoners, and caused them to burn several caissons and ambulances and to drop a remarkable

number of small arms and accoutrements in the retreat.

Babcock reported the total number of prisoners captured by the Second and Fifth Corps was 689. The incident of the capture of prisoners by the Fifth Corps, that was not engaged, resulted from the fact that Mahone's troops, not knowing the position of Crawford's division, 148 of their men straggled into its lines, and were thus captured.

By 10 A. M. of the 28th, Hancock was in his lines, in the camps from which they had started out. Hancock having failed, the other corps were withdrawn and brought back during the day. Hancock wrote in his report that it was "*a success.*" Wherein the success consisted it is difficult to see, unless it was in the fact that Mahone, with his three brigades, and Hampton's cavalry failed to capture his corps. Hancock's casualties were reported at 1,482. Another attempt had failed, and, though the casualties were not so great as they had been in previous attempts, even less was accomplished. As appears in the Union correspondence, Hancock was kept busy for many days thereafter defending himself from newspaper accounts of the *disaster*. Whilst thus engaged, as it is said, "misfortunes never come singly," so it happened to Hancock that, in the evening of the 30th, Mahone penetrated Miles' picket line in front of Petersburg, and swept it for half a mile, capturing 230 officers and men, without the loss of a single man.

The casualties in Grant's army for the month of October were 5,568; previously reported, 95,879; total casualties to October 31st, 1864, 101,447.

By the abstract of returns for October 31st there were:

Present.	Effectives.	Aggregate.
In the army of the Potomac.....	57,076	80,962
In the Army of the James	33,867	41,411
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total of Grant's army	90,943	122,373
In General Lee's army:		
Army of Northern Virginia, includ-		
ing Beauregard's	48,113	58,082
Ewell's Richmond Locals	3,351	4,076
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	51,464	62,158

On the 8th day of November, now near at hand, the President of the United States was to be elected. All military operations in front of Richmond were suspended, and the Union correspondence is filled with preparations for that important event. Sherman and Sheridan had swept the Confederate armies from their front, and the North saw the collapse of the Confederacy and the end of the war approaching; but Grant had lost more than 100,000 men, as appears from his list of casualties, and many besides from desertion and sickness, and had failed to accomplish one single substantial victory in the campaign. It was, therefore, most important that his army should give a vote of confidence in this election. To that end, long lists of promotions were now announced; medals and badges were distributed; the battles to be inscribed upon the regimental flags were announced; congratulatory orders were issued in terms as if the War was ended; furloughs were granted in great numbers; Grant directed that the ma-

chinery of election in the army must be strictly guarded; Assistant Secretary of War Dana cautioned General Patrick, Provost-Marshal of the army, against permitting agents of Seymour, Governor of New York, to come within the lines of the army.

But that was not enough. In addition to securing the army vote, the army must be used to affect the vote of the Empire State, as well as that of other States, and General B. F. Butler was selected to supervise the election in New York. There could be no doubt about his special qualifications for that kind of work. 5,000 troops were selected by him from Grant's army on account of their quality of "*reliability*," and shipped from City Point to New York on steamers.

On the 10th day of November, General Grant announced to Secretary Stanton his appreciation of the result, suggesting that the army was entitled to much of credit for it in the following terms:

"HON. E. M. STANTON:

"Enough now seems to be known to say who is to hold the reins of government for the next four years.

"Congratulate the President for me upon the double victory. The election having passed off quietly, no bloodshed or riot throughout the land, is a victory worth more to the country than a battle won. Rebeldom and Europe will so construe it.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-Gen.

So Grant claims to have won a victory; but this victory was not over Lee's army.

CHAPTER XV.

Siege Continued. December Aggressions. Conditions at the Close of the Campaign

In November there were no battles fought, but in December the Union armies were active everywhere. Sherman was marching through Georgia to the sea, and to the capture of Savannah, and Thomas inflicted a signal defeat upon Hood at Nashville, and broke up his army. Grant arranged for five distinct expeditions to keep up appearances and occupy the attention of Lee's army:

First. Warren, with 25,000 infantry and Gregg, with two brigades of cavalry, was directed to move south on the Jerusalem Plank Road, cross the Nottoway River, strike the Weldon Railroad below Stony Creek, destroy as much of its as possible, and then make a junction with Palmer's column, moving from Plymouth, North Carolina. On December 8th, he struck the railroad at Jarrett's Station, and destroyed much of the road between the Nottoway and Meherrin rivers. He reported that he "effectually destroyed 20 miles of it." General Lee reported: "About 6 miles of it was torn up." Warren found the bridge over the Meherrin so well guarded that he desisted from the further prosecution of the enterprise, and returned without having come in contact with any part of Lee's army, except small bodies of cavalry, and the small body of reserves that effectually guarded the bridge over the Meherrin. Though A. P. Hill moved out to watch the movement, none of his infantry came in contact with Warren's. It seems

General Lee trusted to the elements and their imagination to make a failure of the expedition.

Second. General Palmer, commanding in North Carolina, sent an expedition up the Roanoke River from Plymouth to go in boats as high up the river as possible, then to land and strike for the railroad south of Weldon, and destroy it from Weldon to Goldsboro. That expedition, after suffering great terror from torpedoes, by the 18th reached Rainbow Bluff, whence it was driven back and pursued by forces on the land. It did nothing.

Third. The largest naval force ever assembled on the Atlantic coast was collected in Hampton Roads, under the command of Admiral Porter, and in conjunction with it a force of infantry on transports, under command of General Weitzel, consisting of 6,500 troops selected for the purpose, and moved upon the harbor defenses of Wilmington. It appears that General Grant tried to so arrange, without special directions to that effect, that General Butler should not take command of the expedition; but Butler had a will of his own, that General Grant hesitated to come athwart of, and took command of the expedition. The result is summarized in a dispatch from Grant to President Lincoln, dated City Point, December 28th, 1864: "The Wilmington expedition proved a gross and culpable failure. Many of the troops are now back here. * * * Who is to blame, I hope will be known."

Thenceforth Grant and Butler ceased to exchange love-tokens, and at once became each the other's severe critic, and the historian will find in their reports, especially in Butler's, much to throw light upon the ability of each as an army commander, and upon the

general quality of their Public Acts. It is said Butler's boast was that, whatever else might be said of him, it could not be said that he was a fool. The use of that was made of Butler, in order to effect the re-election of Lincoln, and, when that was accomplished, his quickly following retirement in disgrace seems to savor somewhat of that quality.

Fourth. Meade was ordered to hold in reserve, behind his lines, 22,000 infantry, prepared to strike the Southside Railroad, or Petersburg, if Warren's, Butler's, and Palmer's aggressions should cause Lee to so weaken his lines that there appeared a probability of success. This preparation resulted in a reconnoissance on the Vaughan Road with some cavalry and a division of infantry, that saw only a small cavalry force, and returned without attempting anything.

Fifth. Sheridan sent a strong cavalry force from the Valley to strike the Central Railroad, in the neighborhood of Gordonsville or Charlottesville, and destroy it so effectually that it could not be used during the winter. Lomax met this force, and drove it back before it reached the road, and before the infantry sent by rail from Richmond encountered it.

Grant's use of troops during December resulted in nothing except exhaustion and sickness among them. And it was made evident that his army had lost all power of aggression, and had become an unwieldly mass of ineffective matter.

The casualties in Grant's army for November were 423; December, 613; previously reported, 101,447; total to December 31st, 1864, 102,483. If there are added to this total Butler's casualties previous to June 15th (Vol. 26, Part II., p. 18), 6,215; Sheridan's in the Valley

288 CAMPAIGNS OF 1864 AND 1865 IN VIRGINIA.

(Vol. 43, Part 1., p. 60), 16,952; the grand total is, 125,650. If to this total are added Sigel's, Hunter's, Lew Wallace's, and Crook's, at Kernstown, the aggregate would be much in the excess of 130,000.

ABSTRACT OF RETURNS FOR NOVEMBER 30TH.

Present.	Effectives.	Aggregate.
In the Army of the Potomac	57,557	81,632
In the Army of the James	38,822	44,624
		<hr/>
Total, exclusive of Sixth Corps..	96,379	126,256
In the Army of Northern Virginia, including Second Corps and Wise, in North Carolina.	60,527	71,479

Wise had, effectives, 1,719; aggregate, 1,987.

ABSTRACT OF RETURNS FOR DECEMBER 31, 1864.

Present.	Effectives.	Aggregate.
In the Army of the Potomac.	74,162	105,091
In the Army of the James	37,757	46,328
		<hr/>
	111,919	151,419
In the Army of Northern Virginia, (exclusive of Wise's)	57,402	68,243

The two armies have about the same relative strength in numbers that they had at the beginning of the campaign. Grant's army had absorbed Butler's and Lee's, Beauregard's. Grant had been re-enforced by the Nineteenth Corps from Louisiana (20,000), and by troops from Washington. To summarize: Grant's army at the beginning of the campaign, 148,828; Butler's army,

44,519; Sigel's, Crook's and Averell's (effectives), 20,000; re-enforcements previously to June 15, 55,178; Nineteenth Corps, 20,000; under Lincoln's call (approximately), 75,000; grand total, 363,425.

This is exclusive of 100 days men, and the large re-enforcements sent to the "Middle Military District" after Sheridan was placed in command, and the re-enforcements sent to Butler previously to Grant's going to him.

Lee's army at the beginning of the campaign, 72,913; Beauregard's army (including Richmond Locals), 30,000; Breckenridge's army, 7,115; total (exclusive of boys and details), 110,028.

The waste in Lee's army had been replaced only from recruits of boys arriving at the age of 18, and by a careful revision of the list of details in the reduced territory from which they could be gathered.

CONDITIONS AT THE CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1864.

Whilst Grant's army had lost all aggressive spirit, all hope of final success had been taken away from Lee's army. That it must soon be overwhelmed was apparent to all. The Confederate army in the Trans-Mississippi Department was completely isolated, and could be of no further assistance to the armies in the East. Thomas had defeated Hood at Nashville, and almost annihilated his army, and was preparing to send East from his army in Tennessee Schofield, with his corps, to Wilmington, North Carolina, to capture that place, and then to co-operate with Sherman by advancing from there with his corps (22,000 strong), the 8,000 troops he would find there and the 4,000 at Newbern,

making a column of 34,000, along the lines of railroads to Goldsboro, and to unite at that place with Sherman in his advance; and, in addition, he was to bring the remainder of his army to bear upon Lee's by sending, as soon as winter permitted, a heavy force of cavalry, under the command of General Stoneman, along the Virginia and Tennessee railroad to be followed by his infantry.

Sherman had marched his army through Georgia and captured Savannah, and was preparing, after a brief period of rest, to march from there through South Carolina and North Carolina, and close in upon Lee's flank and rear. Sheridan completely dominated the Valley of Virginia.

The doom of Lee's army was sealed, and with it the fate of the Confederate States. Nothing was left for it but to elect what should be the manner of dying.

Thus ended the campaign of 1864 in Virginia, with the Army of Northern Virginia masters of the situation as far as the personal supervision of General Lee extended, but with no other organized Confederate army in the field east of the Mississippi, except the small force under General Dabney Maury, that held Mobile, and the army west of it was hopelessly disorganized. The whole weight of all the Union armies was now to be directed against this army.

These conditions were well understood, not only by the Confederate Administration, and especially so by General Lee, but were freely discussed in the newspapers, and were the subject of constant discussion around the camp fires; indeed, even between the two opposing armies on the skirmish line.

CHAPTER XVI.

Campaign of 1865. Conclusion

The campaign of 1865 did not wait for spring. Fort Fisher, the chief defense of Wilmington on the harbor front, was bombarded by Admiral D. D. Porter's fleet on the 13th of January, 1865; all its guns on the sea front dismounted or rendered useless, and its garrison driven into the bombproofs. General Terry, who succeeded General Weitzel in command, then, with a force of 8,000 picked men, was landed from transports, under cover of Porter's fire, quickly deployed between it and the city, and on the 15th, stormed and captured the fort.

Wilmington was now in the power of the combined army and naval forces, and arrangements were at once commenced to make it and Newbern the base for the advance of a large army into the heart of North Carolina. To this end, General Thomas was ordered to send Schofield with his corps (22,000 strong) from Tennessee, which force, combined with the forces already at those places, made up an army under the command of General Schofield, available for the advance of somewhat more than 30,000 men. By the middle of February, Schofield's Corps had arrived at its destination and been disposed for an advance in two columns—one from Wilmington and the other from Newbern, along the lines of the railroads from these places to Goldsboro—to unite there with Sherman's army, and to co-operate with it thereafter, under the direction of General Sherman.

Sherman moved out from Savannah on the 1st of

February, reached Columbia, S. C., on the 17th, and, though no defense of the city was attempted, and Hampton had withdrawn his small force before the vanguard of his army reached it, deliberately laid it in ashes as he had before done to the City of Atlanta, and in his march through the States left a tract of desolation behind him from 60 to 80 miles wide, where nothing was left but houseless, homeless women and children that had seen and felt Sherman's Hell Fire. His most noted saying was "*War is Hell*," and history will record that he used one of the largest armies of the United States for the purpose of making it so. On the 17th, the City of Charleston was evacuated. Then the whole Atlantic Coast with its tidewater districts was in the possession of the Union forces.

From Columbia, Sherman moved north, with his army stretched out so as to control all the railroad communications between Richmond and the South, and, on the 22nd of February, made connection with Schofield's army at Goldsboro.

General Joseph E. Johnston had been assigned to the command of all the forces that could be assembled to oppose this advance, consisting of such remnants of Hood's army as could be brought from Alabama and the garrisons of Savannah, Charleston, and Wilmington. Though detachments of Johnston's improvised army stayed the advance at several points by brilliant encounters, Sherman was not seriously delayed.

General Thomas was directed to send a strong force of cavalry, under the command of General Stoneman, through East Tennessee into Virginia, and thence to follow the line of the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad

to Lynchburg, Va., and he was directed to follow after this column with the rest of his army, so as to be in supporting distance of it when there was necessity.

Sheridan was to close in upon Richmond through the Valley of Virginia, and thence down the Central Railroad. Thus completing the exterior line that was being drawn around Lee's army whilst it confronted Grant's army on the Richmond and Petersburg line.

These various columns were to close in upon Lee in such a manner that it would be impossible for Lee to strike any one of them a serious blow before it could be reinforced. Starting them during the winter months contributed largely to accomplish that end; for it was known that it was impossible for General Lee to move any considerable force until animals could be subsisted on grass to a large extent, if not entirely.

GRANT'S FEBRUARY AGGRESSION.

All these arrangements having been made, and Sherman having moved out on February 1st and commenced his march, General Grant, knowing that Lee's cavalry was dispersed in order to forage its animals, and that his army was insufficiently fed and otherwise in no condition to take the field, moved out on February 5th to accomplish what he had so often tried and failed to do—to gain possession of the Boydton Plank Road and the South Side Railroad.

The advance was made with two corps, the Second, now, since Hancock had been retired, under the command of General Humphreys, and the Fifth Corps, as yet, commanded by Warren, and all the other available forces were held prepared to reinforce them. Hum-

phreys, with his corps, moved out, on a line nearest the Confederate line of intrenchments, to Armstrong's Mill and the crossing of the Vaughan Road over Hatcher's Run, with instructions to confront the Confederate intrenchments on the west side of Hatcher's Run, to throw some force across the run, and build necessary bridges, and strongly intrench the position taken; and, then, be prepared to reinforce Warren on his left, who was lead in the aggressions. Warren, with his corps and Gregg's cavalry, moved on a line south of this corps, and was instructed to cross Hatcher's Run below and press on to the Plank Road as the initial step in the aggressive movement.

General John B. Gordon, with Gordon's and Pegram's divisions, having been sent by General Lee to the extreme right of his line beyond Burgess' Mill to guard that flank of the army, when Warren crossed Hatcher's Run, moved out to reconnoitre—one brigade on the Vaughan Road and another between that road and the run. These advanced brigades were attacked by Crawford's division of Warren's Corps, that was ordered out on the Vaughan Road at 1.15 P. M. of the 6th, with Ayres' division following immediately behind to support it. Gordon's two brigades were forced back slowly until General Pegram reinforced them with the rest of the division, and Gordon sent to him Gordon's division under the command of Brigadier General Evans; then Crawford and Ayres, in turn, were driven back until reinforced by Griffin. The tide of battle then changed again, when Pegram, leading the attack was killed, and Hoffman commanding a brigade was wounded, and Gordon was forced back until Mahone

came to his assistance. Then an advance was made by the three divisions, and Warren was driven back to the run in much confusion. Warren reported that Gordon succeeded in bringing up reinforcements more rapidly than he could.

To show the condition of Warren's leading divisions, I quote from the report of Fred T. Locke, Brevet Colonel and Assistant Adjutant General, who was left by Warren to represent him on the field during the afternoon. In the report, after having written that he dispatched to Warren at 5.15 P. M., that the line was falling back in confusion, he wrote (p. 259 of the Record) ;

"Gwyn's brigade advanced just to the edge of the woods and halted. In the meantime several hundred men of the second brigade, first division, had fallen back in great disorder, their officers having no control of them whatever. With the assistance of several officers, this mass of men was halted and faced to the front. Some straggling shots coming over, these men became frightened and commenced firing into their own troops who were in their immediate front. Very many of the men fired almost perpendicularly into the air. They then broke and ran panic-stricken to the rear."

By the reports Warren's casualties were 1376 and Humphrey's 125.

On the 7th, Warren again advanced and found that Gordon had withdrawn, leaving only a skirmish line to cover the field that had been fought over, and had formed his troops on a defensive line in rear of it. He then retired to the Run and made no further advance. He and Humphreys then fortified a line on Hatcher's Run ; and this line was soon connected by intrenchments

with the lines in front of Petersburg. The advance resulted only in a further extension of the lines, but still the Boydton Plank Road was not held.

To show the condition of Lee's army at this time I quote:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA.

February 8, 1865.

SIR:

All the disposable force of the right wing of the army has been operating against the enemy beyond Hatcher's Run since Sunday. Yesterday, the most inclement day of the winter, they had to be retained in line of battle, having been in the same condition the two previous days and nights. I regret to be obliged to state that, under these circumstances heightened by assaults and fire of the enemy, some of the men have been without meat for three days, and all are suffering from reduced rations and scant clothing, exposed to battle, cold, hail and sleet. The physical strength of the men, if their courage survives, must fail under this treatment. Our cavalry has been dispersed for want of forage. Fitz's Lee's and Lomax's divisions are scattered because supplies cannot be transported where their services are required. I had to bring W. H. F. Lee's division forty miles Sunday night to get him in position.

Taking these facts in connection with the paucity of our numbers, you must not be surprised if calamity befalls us.

With great respect,

your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE, General.

HON. JAMES A. SEDDON,

Secretary of War, Richmond, Va.

In the latter part of February, General Sheridan started from Winchester with two divisions of cavalry (10,000 strong) up the Valley to Staunton (his infantry having been, previously up to this time, shipped by water to General Grant at Petersburg). He reached Staunton, March 2nd, and immediately moved upon Early at Waynesborough, who had assembled there his small force, consisting of two skeleton brigades of Wharton's division and a few hundred cavalry. He quickly routed this force and captured nearly all of it. In the confusion incident to the rout, Early, in person, and some few of his officers escaped through the woods, and gained the cover of the mountain, and thus escaped almost alone. Sheridan then moved down the Central Railroad, destroying all the bridges and tearing up much of the track to Charlottesville. By March 5th, he had thoroughly destroyed everything in sight, and on the 6th shoved across to the James River Canal, and spent until 11th destroying it. On the 19th he reached the White House. Lee's cavalry, that had been dispersed for the winter, could not be assembled in time to confront him, and after the destruction of Early's force, his march was virtually unopposed. From the White House, Sheridan moved to James River and crossed it on the 26th of March. He then moved to Hancock Station, behind the lines in front of Petersburg. He reported that during the ride, he captured 1,600 prisoners, of which 1,336, at Waynesborough.

CAPTURE OF FORT STEADMAN.

After the 7th of February and aggression had ceased about Hatcher's Run, General Lee recalled Gordon to

Petersburg, and in March, having ascertained that Grant in extending his lines, had left his lines between Petersburg and City Point to be held by the Ninth (Parke's) Corps, determined to break through them and interpose between the two wings of Grant's army. Gordon was directed to examine minutely into the conditions, to form a plan, and to take command of all the troops employed.

Gordon arranged for the capture of the works of which Fort Steadman was the centre, by a dash of two bodies of picked sharpshooters of 200 men each—one on each flank of Fort Steadman—at 4.30 A. M. of the 25th of March. He arranged that they were to be accompanied by eight gun detachments, carrying with them lanyards and friction primers, who were to turn the guns, as soon as captured, upon the enemy—that two other detachments of picked troops were to follow after them, and passing through the opening made, were to press on, surprise and capture the enclosed works in rear of this line. Then, that the divisions of infantry were to follow and form to extend the breach to the right and left, and hold the redoubts in rear, for the purpose of further aggression.

At the appointed hour, the sharpshooters were so successful in surprising and capturing the skirmish line in front of the works that only one shot was fired on the whole line. They immediately pressed on over the works, and captured or drove away the men before they could take position on the line. McLaughlan's brigade of Willcox's division held this part of the line. The sharpshooters, then, quickly swept the line to the right and left so as to capture, besides Fort Steadman, three other enclosed works. The artillery detachment immediately turned the guns, and, finding an abundance of ammuni-

tion for them, made ready to open fire. But there, it may be said, success ended.

The two detachments that were to capture the redoubts in rear, lost their way, through the ignorance or treachery of the guides, and did not reach the works. The divisions entered the captured works very reluctantly and, when at light, they were ordered forward, moved without any spirit, and would not charge upon Fort Haskell, in which was huddled a mass of men, who had escaped from the captured lines into it and were deterred from raising their heads above the parapet by the sharpshooters who surrounded it, and, consequently, were firing their guns into the air. Later, when Hartranft's division that was in reserve, moved up, they could not be induced to charge upon it. About 10 A. M., Gordon, perceiving the conditions, ordered the withdrawal of the troops. Up to that time there had been but few casualties, but, in passing back into their lines, they had to cross the space between the lines, which was now being swept by artillery and musketry from each side, and the casualties occurred at this time, principally in prisoners who would not run the gauntlet of fire, and remained behind in the works that had been captured. 1900 hundred were captured in this way.

Parke reported his casualties were 1,017 men.

This attack demonstrated that Lee's army had lost hope of final success, and the men were not willing to risk their lives in a hopeless endeavor; for, though Hartranft's division was not stronger in numbers and did not attack with spirit, and an advantage over Grant's army might have been gained, they knew that Sher-

man's army would be up to Grant's assistance in a short time, and then they must be overwhelmed.

General Grant doubtless perceiving that this was Lee's expiring gasp, and Sheridan having joined him with his large cavalry force, and Lee's cavalry not assembled, commenced at once to concentrate the strength of his army on his left flank, so as to be prepared to open the attack on the 1st day of April. Sheridan was ordered to Dinwiddie C. H., with all the cavalry; and Ord, who had succeeded Butler in command of the Army of the James after his retirement, was directed to withdraw all of the Army of the James from the north side of the Appomattox, except garrisons for the works, and a strong line of skirmishers, with Weitzel in command, and move around to the left and take position near Hatcher's Run, so as to come up in the space between the Second and Sixth Corps. Ord withdrew from the north side of the Appomattox during the evening of March 27th.

BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS.

General Sheridan, having concentrated his cavalry corps at Dinwiddie C. H., after some skirmishing previously, on March 31st, moved against General Fitz Lee, who had assembled the Confederate cavalry corps in the neighborhood of Five Forks, four miles west of Burgess' Mill. General Pickett, with Corse's, Terry's, and Steuart's brigades of his division, and Ransom's and Wallace's brigades of Johnson's division, had been sent to Five Forks and arrived there at sun-set on the 30th.

On the 31st, General R. E. Lee, in person, was with that part of the army at Burgess' Mill and in the intrenchments on the White Oak Road, and, in order to

give Pickett and Fitz Lee an opportunity to engage Sheridan, when unsupported by any infantry, directed General Anderson to move against Warren's left flank with his available infantry and hold Warren's attention, so as to prevent him from going to Sheridan's assistance. Accordingly, McGowan's, Gracie's and Hunton's brigades, supported by Wise's brigade on their left, charged upon and drove Ayres' division back to Gravelly Run, where Griffin's division was in line, and by their spirited encounters with these two divisions, held the attention of Warren's Corps during that day, so that Pickett and Fitz Lee had a fair opportunity to disable Sheridan's Cavalry, when unsupported by any infantry. These brigades were so successful that, it appears, General Lee was well pleased with their day's work.

Pickett and Fitz Lee drove Sheridan's Cavalry back to Dinwiddie C. H., in great disorder and confronted it there. During the late afternoon and night of that day, Warren extended to his left, so as to be prepared to co-operate with Sheridan the next day (April 1st.) That extension placed his corps on the flank and almost in the rear of Pickett and Fitz Lee when near Dinwiddie C. H.; and they, perceiving the conditions, at light of April 1st., fell back and disposed their commands in line of battle at Five Forks; Pickett's infantry, in line; Munford covering its left flank; W. H. F. Lee, its right, and Rosser in reserve on the north side of Hatcher's Run.

Sheridan, reinforced by Warren's Corps that had been placed under his command, advanced, and by 3 P. M., had uncovered Pickett's and Fitz Lee's line. Hav-

ing ascertained the extent of the line, Warren was directed to move around its left flank between it and Burgess' Mill, and thus to completely sever it from the body of the army, and cut off its retreat or any reinforcements to it, and then he was to press in upon it, whilst the cavalry, dismounted, engaged Pickett's attention in front. In the advance on the flank, Warren encountered only Munford, with his two small brigades of cavalry, that he drove back until he had room to deploy in line upon the flank and rear of Pickett's division. He then quickly moved upon it, doubled it up, and drove it from the field towards the west in the utmost confusion, and captured six guns and many prisoners. Warren then arranged his corps, so as to preclude the possibility of these forces reuniting with the body of the army. It had happened that Fitz Lee, during the day, notified Lieutenant-General, R. H. Anderson, who was at Burgess' Mill with the rest of Johnson's division, and Hunton's and Wise's brigades, that the Fifth Corps was with Sheridan, and that Sheridan, now, with overwhelming force, was pressing upon him. Anderson, in person, with Wise's, Gracie's, and Fulton's brigades moved to his relief, but, as Warren had already crossed the White Oak Road, the direct line of communication between the two places, and Humphreys had sent Miles' division around on that road to confront the forces at Burgess' Mill, Anderson made a wide circuit around Miles and Warren, reached the neighborhood after Fitz Lee and Pickett had been routed, and without affording any assistance whatever, those brigades were added to the routed and disorganized, and left the right wing of Lee's army with almost no infantry and without any cavalry.

After the very successful operation of this day, in which Warren had played so important and conspicuous a part, and his corps had done the work, that evening he received the following order:

“CAVALRY HEADQUARTERS; April 1st, 1865.

Major-General Warren, commanding Fifth Army Corps is relieved from duty, and will report at once for orders to Lieutenant-General Grant, commanding armies of the United States.

By command of Major-General SHERIDAN
JAMES W. FORSYTH, Brev.-Brig. Genl. and Ch. of Staff.

Warren at once reported to Grant, and was assigned to the command of the department of Mississippi, where there was no army, and where fighting had long since ceased. In his report, Sheridan gave as his reason for relieving Warren, his want of promptness in executing his orders, and Warren in his report, claims that as far as they were practicable, he was prompt in executing them.

FIGHTING AROUND PETERSBURG.

After the rout of the right wing of Lee's army, it appeared possible to destroy or capture the whole of the army before it could move from position, and with that in view, Grant ordered that, as early as possible on the morning of the 2nd, assaults should be made along the whole line—by Parke from the Appomattox to the Jerusalem Plank Road, by Wright from the Plank Road, as far as his command extended—by Ord, with the Army of the James, between him and Humphreys, and by Humphreys, upon the intrenchments about Burgess'

Mill; whilst Sheridan, with the cavalry and Fifth Corps was to sweep around and clear out everything to the Appomattox River.

Longstreet, not having discovered that the Army of the James had been withdrawn from his front, though it had been withdrawn on the evening of March 27th, (the 7th day before), remained on the Richmond and Bermuda lines under the impression that he was confronting that army; so that the protection of the whole line from the Appomattox to Burgess' Mill (from 12 to 15 miles in length) when assaulted by the concentrated strength of Grant's army, (the Army of the Potomac, and the Army of the James) devolved upon Gordon's Corps, and Heth's and Wilcox's division of A. P. Hill's Corps, (Mahone's, the other division of A. P. Hill's, at that time was holding the line between the James and Appomattox). The greater part of this long line had, therefore, to be entrusted to the artillery unsupported by any infantry.

Before it was light on the morning of the 2nd, Parke broke through the line near the Appomattox, but was soon driven back there. Later he broke through on the line near the Plank Road, and after a severe engagement lasting throughout the day, in which every available man of Gordon's and A. P. Hill's corps were used to re-establish the line and cover the city of Petersburg, Parke, reinforced by the reserves from City Point, and troops of Wright and Ord, succeeded in holding on to a small part of the works captured in the morning. In this engagement, that brilliant corps commander, General A. P. Hill, was killed, who, during the campaign of '64, commanded the right wing of Lee's

army, and was so successful in defeating all Grant's efforts.

Wright was resisted by but few troops in his assaults upon the rest of the line, and soon swept the line until he connected with Ord, who, likewise meeting with but little resistance, had passed through the lines, faced his army towards Petersburg, and was advancing towards the inner line of redoubts immediately surrounding the city. Humphreys, as soon as he could get his corps together (Miles division having been ordered by Sheridan to him) captured all the works around Burgess' Mill as the few troops holding them were in the act of being withdrawn, and swept around to Sutherland Depot on the South Side Railroad.

Ord, during the evening, succeeded in capturing several redoubts to the north-west of the city, when, at last, Field's division of Longstreet's Corps arrived and held a line protecting the city in that direction until night closed the engagement. Longstreet, in person, had joined Lee early in the morning.

RETREAT.

During the night, General Lee evacuated his lines about the city, crossed over to the north side of the river, and commenced his march to Amelia C. H., where he ordered all the detachments of his army to assemble, and where he had ordered that provisions should be sent by rail from Richmond. In the same night, all the lines around Richmond were evacuated and the troops moved from them, also, to Amelia C. H. All the columns were assembled at that place in due time, but the rations had been carried further on towards Danville, and the army was without any food. That necessitated a day's delay

in order to feed the men, and Grant got ahead on the line of the railroad to Danville, and Lee had to turn off in the direction of Lynchburg, which took him back across the Appomattox at the High Bridge, near Farmville. Just before the column reached the river, it was struck in flank and rear at Sailor's Creek, where the wagon trains were blocked at the ford, and the rear part of the army halted to protect them, and nearly half of the army was broken up, and the greater part of it captured.

On the 8th, General Lee, with the remainder of his army, resumed his march towards Lynchburg, and reached Appomattox C. H.; but, during the afternoon of that day, Sheridan, supported by Ord, cut across his line of march just beyond the Court-house, and, in doing so, cut off from the rest of the army the artillery of A. P. Hill's Corps, under the command of Brigadier-General, R. Lindsay Walker, and the artillery of Anderson's Corps, under the command of Colonel H. P. Jones. Sheridan, evidently did not understand the situation; for this artillery—about one half of the artillery of Lee's army without any infantry or cavalry with it—would have fallen an easy prey to his ambitious cavalry. After spending nearly the whole night of the 8th in marching around Sheridan, in the attempt to reunite with the army, when it was light, finding that was impossible, Jones' artillery moved on to Lynchburg, and reported to General L. L. Lomax in command there, and Walker buried his guns near an old church and disbanded his command.

On the 9th, General Lee ordered Gordon and Fitz Lee to drive Sheridan away, that the army might resume its

march, which they did very promptly; but found that Ord was there also, and further efforts must be vain.

The surrender of the army was then arranged for, and the officers and men paroled.

This ended the career of the Army of Northern Virginia, and the downfall of the Confederate States quickly followed.

There were paroled 28,231 officers and men. But, of this number, only about 11,000 bearing arms, the rest, in the main, belonged to the class of "Impedimenta."

CONCLUSION.

From their organizations, "The Army of the Potomac" and "The Army of Northern Virginia," had confronted each other, had manœvered and fought with skill and valor, if ever but seldom equalled, and had elevated warfare to an ethical plane never contemplated before. How rapidly the names that were conspicuous in history of "The Army of the Potomac," had disappeared from its rolls in succession. In November 1864, Hancock, the hero of its one acknowledged victory, THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG, took his leave, and Warren in the moment of victory, was retired from command. Meade's was almost the only conspicuous name left on the rolls when the crowning victory came. None of those who had been its most conspicuous figures were to be participants of the final triumph. None of them possessed the special qualifications that the Administration required, or else they possessed qualities not conformable to its purposes. Of them, Meade, almost alone, appeared in the closing scene of the drama, and with the disappearance of the distinguished names from its rolls, the dis-

tinguishing characteristics of the army had gone also. It had ceased to be "The Army of the Potomac"; it was a component part of "Grant's Army," and scarcely lived in name.

In "The Army of Northern Virginia," all answered to the last roll-call, that had not already made final answer at the summons of "THE MASTER."

Each of these two great armies had found, in the other, a foeman worthy of his steel, and each, in a manner, lies buried in a common grave—overwhelmed by a tidal-wave.

With the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia ended the life of "The Confederate States," whose birth-throes shook a continent. "The Confederate States" died "a-borning," and upon its *In Memoriam* with spire pointing to Heaven, this inscription:

"No Nation rose so white and fair,
None fell so pure of crime"

will survive the effacement of time, and two figures will always stand out upon it, in bold relief.

JEFFERSON DAVIS and ROBERT E. LEE.

Around them the others will be grouped—Near to them, perhaps, nearest will be

JACKSON and FORREST.



